**Estate Planning Issues With Intra-Family Loans and Notes**

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**Estate Planning Issues With Intra-Family Loans and Notes**

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I. SIGNIFICANCE

A. Examples of Uses of Intra-Family Loans and Notes. Wealthy families often run a “family bank” with advances to various family members as they have liquidity needs. Many of the uses of intra-family loans take advantage of the fact that the applicable federal rate (“AFR”) is generally lower than the prevailing market interest rate in commercial transactions. (The AFR is based “on outstanding marketable obligations of the United States.” The short-term, mid-term, and long-term rates under §1274[[2]](#footnote-2) are determined based on the preceding two months’ average market yield on marketable Treasury bonds with corresponding maturity.[[3]](#footnote-3) ) Examples of possible uses of intra-family loans and notes include:

1. Loans to children with significant net worth;

2. Loans to children without significant net worth;

3. Non-recourse loans to children or to trusts

4. Loans to grantor trusts;

5. Sales to children or grantor trust for a note;

6. Loans between related trusts (e.g., from a bypass trust to a marital trust, from a marital trust to a GST exempt trust, such as transactions to freeze the growth of the marital trust and transfer appreciation to the tax-advantaged trust);

7. Loans to an estate;

8. Loans to trusts involving life insurance (including split dollar and financed premium plans);[[4]](#footnote-4)

9. Home mortgages for family members;

10. Loans for consumption rather than for acquiring investment assets (these may be inefficient from an income tax perspective because the interest payments will be personal interest that does not qualify for an interest deduction);

11. Loans as vehicles for gifts over time by forgiveness of payments in some years, including forgiveness of payments in 2012 as a method of utilizing $5.0 million gift exemption available in 2012;

12. Loan from young family member to client for note at a higher interest rate (to afford higher investment returns to those family members than they might otherwise receive) (In a different context, the Tax Court has acknowledged the reasonableness of paying an interest rate higher than the AFR[[5]](#footnote-5)); and

13. Client borrowing from a trust to which client had made a gift in case the client later needs liquidity (and the resulting interest may be deductible at the client’s death if the note is still outstanding at that time[[6]](#footnote-6)).

B. Inadvertent Loans. Loan situations can arise inadvertently. For example, assume that a client pays a significant “endowment” for the client’s parent to live in a retirement facility. The facility will refund a portion of the endowment when the occupant dies. The maximum refund is 90%. Payment of the “endowment” appears to represent a 10% gift and a 90% percent interest-free loan.

C. Advantages of Loans and Notes.

1. Arbitrage. If the asset that the family member acquires with the loan proceeds has combined income and appreciation above the interest rate that is paid on the note, there will be a wealth transfer without gift tax implications. With the incredibly current low interest rates, there is significant opportunity for wealth transfer.

Example: Assume a very simple example of a client loaning $1 million to a child in December 2012 with a 9-year balloon note bearing interest at 0.95% compounded annually (the AFR for mid-term notes). Assume the child receives a 5% combined growth and income, annually (net of income taxes-- the taxes would be borne by the client if the loan were made to a grantor trust).

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Amount child owns at end of nine years (@5.0%, compounded annually): | $1,551,328 |
| Amount owed child at end of nine years (@0.95%, compounded annually): | 1,088,822 |
| Net transfer to child (with no gift tax) | $ 462,506 |

2. “All in the Family.” Interest payments remain in the family rather than being paid to outside banks.

3. Poor Credit History. Intra-family loans may be the only source of needed liquidity for family member members with poor credit histories.

4. Closing Costs. Borrowing from outside lenders may entail substantial closing costs and other expenses that can be avoided, or at least minimized, with intra-family loans.

D. Advantages of Gifts Over Loans. If a client inquires about making a loan to children, do not just knee-jerk into documenting the loan without considering whether gifts would be more appropriate.[[7]](#footnote-7)

1. Circumstances Indicating a Gift is Preferable to a Loan. Several circumstances suggesting that a gift may be preferable include: (i) the lender does not need the funds to be returned; (ii) the lender does not need cash flow from the interest on the loan; (iii) is not apparent how the law will never be repaid; and/or (iv) the lender does not plan on collecting the loan.

2. Note Receivable in Client’s Estate. The note receivable will be in the client's estate for estate tax purposes. In particular, make use of annual exclusion gifts, which allows asset transfers that are removed from the donor’s estate and that do not use up any gift or estate exemption.

3. Lower Effective Gift Tax Rate If Live Three Years. The gift tax rate is applied to the net amount passing to the donee, whereas the estate tax rate is applied to the entire state, including the amount that will ultimately be paid in estate taxes. If the donor lives for three years, gift taxes paid are removed from the gross estate.

4. Fractionalization Discounts. If the client transfers a fractional interest or a minority interest in an asset owned by the client, the transfer may be valued with a fractionalization discount. On the other hand, if cash is loaned to the child, no fractionalization discounts are appropriate.

5. State Death Tax Avoidance. Gifts remove assets from the donor’s gross estate for state estate tax purposes without payment of any federal or state transfer taxes (assuming the state does not have a state gift tax or “contemplation of death” recapture of gifts back into the state gross estate).

6. Avoiding Interest Income. If the transfer structured as a loan, the parent will recognize interest income (typically ordinary income) at least equal to the AFR, either as actual interest or as imputed interest, thus increasing the parent’s income tax liability. Using loans to fund consumption needs of children is inefficient in that the interest is taxable income to the lender without any offsetting deduction to the borrower, thus generating net taxable income for the family.

7. Avoiding Accounting Burden. Someone must keep track of the interest as it accrues to make sure that it is paid regularly or is reported as income. This can be particularly tedious for a demand loan or variable-rate term loan where the interest rate is changing periodically. There are additional complications for calculating the imputed interest for below-market loans (which means that loans should always bear interest at least equal to the AFR).

8. Avoiding OID Computations If Interest Not Paid Annually. If interest is not paid annually, the original issue discount (OID) rules will probably require that a proportionate amount of the overall interest due on the note will have to be recognized each year by the seller, even if the seller is a cash basis taxpayer. Determining the precise amount of income that must be recognized each year can be complicated, particularly if some but not all interest payments are made. The amount of OID included in income each year is generally determined under a “constant yield method” as described in Regulation §1.1272-1(b)(1).[[8]](#footnote-8) (The OID complications can be avoided if the loan is made to a grantor trust.)

9. Avoiding Non-Performance Complications. If the borrower does not make payments as they are due, additional complications arise.

a. Possible Recharacterization as Gift. The IRS takes the position that if a taxpayer ostensibly makes a loan and, as part of a prearranged plan, intends to forgive or not collect on the note, the note will not be considered valuable consideration and the donor will have made a gift at the time of the loan to the full extent of the loan.[[9]](#footnote-9) While some cases have rejected this approach,[[10]](#footnote-10) and while the lender can attempt to establish that there was no intention from the outset of forgiving the loan, if the lender ends up forgiving some or all of the note payments, questions can arise, possibly giving rise to past due gift tax liability which could include interest and penalties.

b. Imputed Gift and Interest Income. Even if the loan is not treated as a gift from the outset, forgiven interest may be treated the same as forgone interest in a below-market loan, resulting in an imputed gift to the borrower and imputed interest income to the lender. (However, if the forgiveness includes principal “in substantial part” as well as income, it may be possible for the lender to avoid having to recognize accrued interest as taxable income.[[11]](#footnote-11))

c. Modifications Resulting in Additional Loans. If the parties agree to a loan modification, such as adding unpaid interest to the principal of the loan, the modification itself is treated as a new loan, subject to the AFRs in effect when the loan is made, thus further compounding the complexity of record keeping and reporting.

10. Loan to Grantor Trust Can Have Some Advantages of Gift. One of the advantages of making gifts to a grantor trust is that the grantor pays income taxes on the grantor trust income without being treated as making an additional gift. This allows the trust assets to grow faster (without having to pay taxes) and further reduces the grantor’s estate for estate tax purposes. This same advantage is available if the loan is made to a grantor trust. In addition, making the loan to a grantor trust avoids having interest income taxed to the lender-grantor, and avoids having to deal with the complexity of the OID rules.

II. LOAN VS. EQUITY TRANSFER

A. Significance. The IRS may treat the transfer as a gift, despite the fact that a note was given in return for the transfer, if the loan is not bona fide or (at least according to the IRS) if there appears to be an intention that the loan would never be repaid. (If the IRS were to be successful in that argument, the note should not be treated as an asset in the lender’s estate.)

A similar issue arises with sales to grantor trust transactions in return for notes. The IRS has made the argument in some audits that the “economic realities” do not support a part sale and that a gift occurred equal to the full amount transferred unreduced by the promissory note received in return. Another possible argument is that the seller has made a transfer and retained an equity interest in the actual transferred property (thus triggering §2036) rather than just receiving a debt instrument.

B. Gift Presumption. A transfer of property in an intra-family situation will be presumed to be a gift unless the transferor can prove the receipt of “an adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth.”[[12]](#footnote-12)

C. Bona Fide Loan Requirement. In the context of a transfer in return for a promissory note, the gift presumption can be overcome by an affirmative showing of a bona fide loan with a “real expectation of repayment and an intention to enforce the debt.”[[13]](#footnote-13)

The bona fide loan issue has been addressed in various income tax cases, including cases involving bad debt deductions, and whether transfers constituted gross income even though they were made in return for promissory notes.[[14]](#footnote-14) A recent case addresses the bona fide loan factors in the context of whether $400,000 transferred to an employee was taxable income or merely the proceeds of a loan from the employer.[[15]](#footnote-15) The court applied seven factors in determining that there was not a bona fide loan: (1) existence of a note comporting with the substance of the transaction, (2) payment of reasonable interest, (3) fixed schedule of repayment, (4) adequate security, (5) repayment, (6) reasonable expectation of repayment in light of the economic realities, and (7) conduct of the parties indicating a debtor-creditor relationship.

The bona fide loan requirement has also been addressed in various gift tax cases. The issue was explored at length in *Miller v. Commissioner*,[[16]](#footnote-16) a case in which taxpayer made various transfers to her son in return for a non-interest-bearing unsecured demand note. The court stated that “[t]he mere promise to pay a sum of money in the future accompanied by an implied understanding that such promise will not be enforced is not afforded significance for Federal tax purposes, is not deemed to have value, and does not represent adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth.” The court concluded that the transfer was a gift and not a bona fide loan, on the basis of a rather detailed analysis of nine factors:

“The determination of whether a transfer was made with a real expectation of repayment and an intention to enforce the debt depends on all the facts and circumstances, including whether: (1) There was a promissory note or other evidence of indebtedness, (2) interest was charged, (3) there was any security or collateral, (4) there was a fixed maturity date, (5) a demand for repayment was made, (6) any actual repayment was made, (7) the transferee had the ability to repay, (8) any records maintained by the transferor and/or the transferee reflected the transaction as a loan, and (9) the manner in which the transaction was reported for Federal tax purposes is consistent with a loan.”[[17]](#footnote-17)

*Miller* cites a number of cases in which those same factors have been noted to determine the existence of a bona fide loan in various contexts, and those nine factors have been listed in various subsequent cases.[[18]](#footnote-18)

The risks of treating a note in a sale transaction as retained equity rather than debt were highlighted in *Karmazin* *v. Commissioner*,[[19]](#footnote-19) in which the IRS made a number of arguments to avoid respecting a sale of limited partnership units to a grantor trust, including §2701 and 2702. In that case, the taxpayer created an FLP owning marketable securities. Taxpayer made a gift of 10% of the LP interests and sold 90% of the LP interests to two family trusts. The sales agreements contained “defined value clauses.” The sales to each of the trusts were made in exchange for secured promissory notes bearing interest equal to the AFR at the time of the sale, and providing for a balloon payment in 20 years. Jerry Deener (Hackensack, New Jersey) represented the taxpayer and has reported that the IRS “threw the book” at a gift/sale to grantor trust transaction. The IRS sent a 75-page Agent’s Determination Letter in which the entire transaction was disallowed. The partnership was determined to be a sham, with no substantial economic effect, and the note attributable to the sale was reclassified as equity and not debt. The result was a determination that a gift had been made of the entire undiscounted amount of assets subject to the sale. The agent’s argument included: (1) the partnership was a sham; (2) Section 2703 applies to disregard the partnership; (3) the defined value adjustment clause is invalid; (4) the note is treated as equity and not debt because (i) the only assets owned by the trust are the limited partnership interests, (ii) the debt is non-recourse, (iii) commercial lenders would not enter this sale transaction without personal guaranties or a larger down payment, (iv) a nine-to-one debt equity ratio is too high, (v) insufficient partnership income exists to support the debt, and (vi) PLR 9535026 left open the question of whether the note was a valid debt; and (5) because the debt is recharacterized as equity, §2701 applies (the note is treated as a retention of non-periodic payments) and 2702 applies (rights to payments under the note do not constitute a qualified interest). That case was ultimately settled (favorably to the taxpayer), but the wide ranging tax effects of having the note treated as equity rather than debt were highlighted.

In *Dallas v. Commissioner*,[[20]](#footnote-20) the IRS agent made arguments under §§2701 and 2702 in the audit negotiations to disregard a sale to grantor trust transaction by treating the note as retained equity rather than debt, but the IRS dropped that argument before trial and tried the case as a valuation dispute.

D. Estate Tax Context. The bona fide loan issue has also arisen in various estate tax situations.

1. Sale-Leaseback and Whether §2036 Applies. In *Estate of Maxwell v. Commissioner[[21]](#footnote-21)* a sale of property to the decedent’s sons for a note secured by a mortgage, with a retained use of the property under a lease, triggered inclusion under §2036. The court held that the sale-leaseback was not a bona fide sale where the decedent continued to live in the house and the purported annual rent payments were very close to the amount of the annual interest payments the son owed to the decedent on the note. The court observed that the rent payments effectively just cancelled the son’s mortgage payments. The son never occupied the house or tried to sell it during the decedent’s lifetime. The son never made any principal payments on the mortgage (the decedent forgave $20,000 per year, and forgave the remaining indebtedness at her death under her will). The court concluded that the alleged sale was not supported by adequate consideration even though the mortgage note was fully secured; the note was a “façade” and not a “bona fide instrument of indebtedness” because of the implied agreement (which the court characterized as an “understanding”) that the son would not be asked to make payments. The Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s conclusion that

“notwithstanding its form, the substance of the transaction calls for the conclusion that decedent made a transfer to her son and daughter-in-law with the understanding, at least implied, that she would continue to reside in her home until her death, that the transfer was not a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth, and that the lease represented nothing more than an attempt to add color to the characterization of the transaction as a bona fide sale.”

2. Estate Inclusion Under §§ 2033, 2035 and 2038 For Property Transferred Under Note That Is Not Respected. In *Estate of Musgrove v. United States*,[[22]](#footnote-22) the decedent transferred $251,540 to his son less than a month before his death (at a time that he had a serious illness) in exchange for an interest-free, unsecured demand note, which by its terms was canceled upon the decedent's death. The court determined that the property transferred was included in the decedent's estate under any of §§2033, 2035, or 2038. The court reasoned that the promissory note did not constitute fair consideration where there was an implied agreement that the grantor would not make a demand on the obligation and the notes were not intended to be enforced.

3. Advances from FLP Treated as Distributions Supporting Inclusion of FLP Assets Under §2036 Even Though Notes Were Given For the Advances. Assets of an FLP created by the decedent were included in the estate under §2036 in *Rosen v. Commissioner*.[[23]](#footnote-23) Part of the court’s reasoning was that advances to the decedent from the partnership evidenced “retained enjoyment” of the assets transferred to the FLP even though the decedent gave an unsecured demand note for the advances. The purported “loans” to the decedent were instead treated by the court as distributions from the FLP to the decedent. There was an extended discussion of actions required to establish bona fide loans.

Among the factors mentioned by the court are that the decedent never intended to repay the advances and the FLP never intended to enforce the note, the FLP never demanded repayment, there was no fixed maturity date or payment schedule, no interest (or principal) payments were made, the decedent had no ability to honor a demand for payment, repayment of the note depended solely on the FLP’s success, transfers were made to meet the decedent’s daily needs, and there was no collateral. The court also questioned the adequacy of interest on the note.

The specific factors analyzed in detail by the court were summarized as follows:

“The relevant factors used to distinguish debt from equity include: (1) The name given to an instrument underlying the transfer of funds; (2) the presence or absence of a fixed maturity date and a schedule of payments; (3) the presence or absence of a fixed interest rate and actual interest payments; (4) the source of repayment; (5) the adequacy or inadequacy of capitalization; (6) the identity of interest between creditors and equity holders; (7) the security for repayment; (8) the transferee's ability to obtain financing from outside lending institutions; (9) the extent to which repayment was subordinated to the claims of outside creditors; (10) the extent to which transferred funds were used to acquire capital assets; and (11) the presence or absence of a sinking fund to provide repayment.”[[24]](#footnote-24)

4. Valid Debt for § 2053 Deduction. The nine factors listed above from the *Miller* cases were mentioned in *Estate of Holland v. Commissioner*,[[25]](#footnote-25) to support that the decedent’s estate did not owe bona fide indebtedness that could be deducted under §2053[[26]](#footnote-26).Various cases have mentioned one or more of these factors in analyzing the deductibility of a debt as a claim under §2053(a)(3)[[27]](#footnote-27) or of post-death interest paid on a loan as an administrative expense under §2053(a)(2).[[28]](#footnote-28)

One of the requirements for being able to deduct a debt as a claim or interest on a loan as an administrative expense under §2053 is that the debt is bona fide in nature and not essentially donative in character.[[29]](#footnote-29) A variety of factors apply in determine the bona fides of an obligation to certain family members or related entities.[[30]](#footnote-30) Factors that are indicative (but not necessarily determinative) of a bona fide claim or expense include, but are not limited to (1) the transaction occurs in the ordinary course of business, is negotiated at arm’s length, and is free from donative intent; (2) the nature of the debt is not related to an expectation or claim of inheritance; (3) there is an agreement between the parties which is substantiated with contemporaneous evidence; (4) performance is pursuant to an agreement which can be substantiated; and (5) all amounts paid are reported by each party for federal income and employment tax purposes.[[31]](#footnote-31)

E. Upfront Gift If Intent to Forgive Loan?

1. IRS Position*.* Revenue Ruling 77-299 announced the IRS position that if a taxpayer ostensibly makes a loan and, as part of a prearranged plan, intends to forgive or not collect on the note, the note will not be considered valuable consideration and the donor will have made a gift at the time of the loan to the full extent of the loan.[[32]](#footnote-32) However, if there is no prearranged plan and the intent to forgive the debt arises at a later time, the donor will have made a gift only at the time of the forgiveness.[[33]](#footnote-33)

The IRS relied on the reasoning of *Deal v. Commissioner*,[[34]](#footnote-34) for its conclusion in Rev. Rul. 77-299. In *Deal*, an individual transferred a remainder interest in unimproved non-income-producing property to children, and the children gave the individual noninterest-bearing, unsecured demand notes. The Tax Court held that the notes executed by the children were not intended as consideration for the transfer and, rather than a bona fide sale, the taxpayer made a gift of the remainder interest to the children.

The IRS has subsequently reiterated its position.[[35]](#footnote-35)

2. Contrary Cases. The Tax Court reached a contrary result in several cases that were decided before the issuance of Rev. Rul. 77-299 (and the IRS non-acquiesced to those cases in Rev. Rul. 77-299). Those cases reasoned that there would be no gift at the time of the initial loan as long as the notes had substance. The issue is not whether the donor intended to forgive the note, but whether the note was legally enforceable.

In *Haygood v. Commissioner*,[[36]](#footnote-36) a mother deeded to properties to each of her two sons and in return took a vendor’s lien note from the son for the full value of the property, payable $3000 per year. In accordance with her intention when she transferred the properties, the mother canceled the $3,000 annual payments as they became due. The IRS cited the *Deal* case in support of its position that a gift was made at the outset without regard to the value of the notes received. The Tax Court distinguished the *Deal* decision: (1) *Deal* involved the transfer of property to a trust and on the same date the daughters (rather than the trust) gave notes to the transferor; and (2) the daughters gave non-interest-bearing unsecured notes at the time of the transfer to the trust as compared to secured notes that were used in *Haygood*. The court in *Haygood* held that the amount of the gift that occurred at the time of the initial transfer was reduced by the full face amount of the secured notes even though the taxpayer had no intention of enforcing payment of the notes and the taxpayer in fact forgave $3,000 per year on the notes from each of the transferees.

The Tax Court reached the same result 10 years later in *Estate of Kelley v. Commissioner.*[[37]](#footnote-37)  Parents transferred real estate to their three children in return for valid notes, secured by vendor’s liens on the real properties. The parents extinguished the notes without payment as they became due. The IRS argued that the notes “lacked economic substance and were a mere ‘façade for the principal purpose of tax avoidance.’” The court gave two answers to this argument. First, the notes and vendor’s liens, without evidence showing they were a “façade,” are prima facie what they purport to be. The parents reserved all rights given to them under the liens and notes until they actually forgave the notes and nothing in the record suggests that the notes were not collectible. Second, “since the notes and liens were enforceable, petitioners’ gifts in 1954 were limited to the value of the transferred interests in excess of the face amount of the notes.”

The court in *Estate of Maxwell v. Commissioner[[38]](#footnote-38)* distinguished *Haygood* and *Kelley* in a §2036 case involving a transfer of property subject to a mortgage accompanied with a leaseback of the property. The court reasoned that in *Haygood* and *Kelley*, the donor intended to forgive the note payments, but under the facts of *Maxwell*, the court found that, at the time the note was executed, there was “an understanding” between the parties to the transaction that the note would be forgiven. Other cases have criticized the approach taken in *Haygood* and *Kelley* (though in a different context), observing that a mere promise to pay in the future that is accompanied by an implied understanding that the promise will not be enforced should not be given value and is not adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth.[[39]](#footnote-39)

3. Which is the Best Reasoned Approach? One commentator gives various reasons in concluding that taxpayer position is the more reasoned position on this issue.

“The IRS has not done well with this approach, and there are reasons for this. Even if the lender actually intends to gradually forgive the entire loan, (1) he is free to change his mind at any time, (2) his interest in the note can be seized by a creditor or bankruptcy trustee, who will surely enforce it, and (3) if the lender dies, his executor will be under a duty to collect the note. Therefore, if the loan is documented and administered properly, this technique should work, even if there is a periodic forgiveness plan, since the intent to make a gift in the future is not the same as making a gift in the present. However, if the conduct of the parties negates the existence of an actual bona fide debtor-creditor relationship at all, the entire loan may be recharacterized as a gift at the time the loan was made or the property lent may be included in the lender's estate, depending on whether the lender or the borrower is considered to “really” own the property.

…

If the borrower is insolvent (or otherwise clearly will not be able to pay the debt) when the loan is made, the lender may be treated as making a gift at the outset.”[[40]](#footnote-40)

Other commentators agree that the Tax court analysis in *Haygood* and *Kelley* is the preferable approach.[[41]](#footnote-41)

4. Planning Pointers. While the cases go both ways on this issue, taxpayers can clearly expect the IRS to take the position that a loan is not bona fide and will not be recognized as an offset to the amount of the gift at the time of the initial transfer if the lender intends to forgive the note payments as they become due. Where the donor intends to forgive the note payments, it is especially important to structure the loan transaction to satisfy as many of the elements as possible better discussed above in distinguishing debt from equity. In particular, there should be written loan documents, preferably the notes will be secured, and the borrower should have the ability to repay the notes. If palatable, do not forgive all payments, but have the borrowers make some of the annual payments.

III. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF GENERAL TAX TREATMENT OF LOANS UNDER SECTIONS 1274 AND 7872

A. Significance. Intra-family loans can be very useful in many circumstances, including as estate freezing devices in light of the historically extremely low current interest rates. A wide variety of complicating issues arise, however, in structuring intra-family loan transactions. Questions about structuring loan transactions arise repeatedly on the estate planning listservs. The following is an example of a recent ACTEC listserv dialogue. (Howard Zaritsky’s answer—as always, concise and technically correct—is in the accompanying footnote).

QUESTION:

Is this a sham?

 Taxpayer establishes a grantor trust, contributes $10,000 to it and loans it $1,000,000.  The note is a demand note that provides for short term AFR interest.  The trustee invests the funds aggressively.  On December 15th of the same calendar year when the fund is $1,300,000, the grantor forgives the loan.  Is the gift $1,000,000?  If on December 15th of the same year when the trust fund is $700,000 the grantor calls the loan and the trustee pays the grantor $700,000, is there a gift?

 Is the answer different if the initial contribution is $100,000 instead of $10,000? [[42]](#footnote-42)

B. What You Really Need to Know to Avoid Complexities.

1. Structure Loan as Bona Fide Loan. The IRS presumes a transfer of money to a family member is a gift, unless the transferor can prove he received full and adequate consideration*.* Avoid the IRS gift presumption by affirmatively demonstrating that at the time of the transfer a bona fide creditor-debtor relationship existed by facts evidencing that the lender can demonstrate a real expectation of repayment and intention to enforce the debt. Treatment as a bona fide debt or gift depends on the facts and circumstances.

***Summary*:** *Structuring and Administration of Loan to Avoid Gift Presumption.*

* + *Signed promissory note*
  + *Establish a fixed repayment schedule*
  + *Set a rate at or above the AFR in effect when the loan originates*
  + *Secure or collateralize the debt*
  + *Demand repayment*
  + *Maintain records that reflect a true loan transaction*
  + *Repayments are made*
  + *Borrower solvency*
  + *Do not have a prearranged schedule to forgive the loan*

2. Use an Interest Rate At Least Equal to the AFR for Cash Loans. The United States Supreme Court held in *Dickman v. Commissioner*,[[43]](#footnote-43) that interest-free loans between family members are gifts for federal gift tax purposes, even if the loans are payable on demand. *Dickman* did not address how to value the gift. Sections 1274 and 7872 were enacted soon after the *Dickman* case. Those sections deal with valuing gifts from below market loans. The statute seems to contemplate cash loans, and the objective method for valuing the gift element under §7872 appears not to apply to loans of property other than cash.[[44]](#footnote-44) However, the gift element of notes given in exchange for property is also determined under §7872 and as long as the loan bears interest at a rate equal to the AFR for the month in question, there *should* not a deemed gift attributable to the note (although there is no assurance the IRS may not argue in the future that a market rate should be used).[[45]](#footnote-45) Section 7872 is not limited to loans between individuals, and the concepts of §7872 appear to apply to loans to or from trusts, although there is no explicit authority confirming that conclusion.[[46]](#footnote-46)

Section 1274 provides monthly factors for short term (0-3 years), mid-term (over 3 up to 9 years), and long-term (over 9 years) notes. There are factors for annual, semiannual, or monthly compounding. If a loan bears interest at the applicable federal rate (“AFR”) (using the appropriate factor based on the timing of compounding under the note) it will not be a “below market loan” under §7872 and therefore there will be no imputed gift from the lender to the borrower or imputed interest income to the lender.[[47]](#footnote-47) (Technically, a below market loan is a demand loan with an interest rate lower than the AFR,[[48]](#footnote-48) or a term loan for which the amount loaned exceeds the present value of all payments due under the loan.[[49]](#footnote-49)  Because the present value of a term loan is determined using the AFR, a demand or term loan with an interest rate at least equal to the AFR is not a below market loan.)[[50]](#footnote-50) The AFR schedules are published each month on about the 20th day of the month. (One way of locating the AFR for a particular month is to search for “AFR” on the IRS website ([www.IRS.gov](http://www.IRS.gov)).)

***Summary****: Forgone interest is computed by comparing present value of all payments due under the loan (discounted using the appropriate AFR) with the actual loan amount; If the PV is less, there is forgone interest.*

*Forgone interest is deemed to have been transferred from the lender to the borrower as a gift, and then from the borrower to the lender as interest income.*

*Income tax treatment: The forgone interest is imputed as interest income on the last day of each taxable year.*

*Gift tax treatment: For demand loans, the forgone interest each year is deemed to be given on December 31 (or when the loan is repaid). For term loans, 100% of the forgone interest is treated as a gift upfront when the loan is made.*

*Avoid those complexities by using an interest rate at least equal to the AFR for all loans.*

3. Exceptions When AFR Is Not Needed. There are two special rules where interest does not have to be charged on the loan at the AFR to avoid imputed income or gift tax. (Some parents may not want their children to know that.)

a. Exception for $10,000 Loans (Gift and Income Exception). A gift loan is exempt from §7872 if it is made “directly between individuals” and “the aggregate outstanding amount of the loans between such individuals does not exceed $ 10,000.”[[51]](#footnote-51) All loans between the lender and borrower are aggregated regardless of their character (market or below-market), the date made, or the rate of interest (if any).[[52]](#footnote-52) If the amount of loans outstanding between individuals exceeds $10,000 at some point during the year, §7872 will apply to the loan for gift tax purposes regardless of whether the borrower subsequently reduces the loan balance: the amount of deemed gift is fixed at that point.

***Summary****. Under a de minimis exception, the rules that apply to below-market loans and the computation of foregone interest do not apply to loans between individuals if:*

*the aggregate outstanding balance does not exceed $10,000*

*and*

*the loan is not directly attributable to the purchase or carrying of an income-producing asset.*

*No imputed interest computation is required and there are no reportable gifts.*

b. Exception for $100,000 Loans (Income Exception Only). A second exception applies if the aggregate outstanding amount of gift loans between individuals does not exceed $100,000, the imputed interest amount (i.e., the amount treated as retransferred from the borrower to the lender at the end of the year) for income tax purposes is limited to the borrower’s net investment income for the year.[[53]](#footnote-53)

***Summary***: *This special exception limits the amount of imputed interest to be reported from loans between individuals to the borrower’s Net Investment Income “NII” if the following apply:*

*The aggregate outstanding balance does not exceed $100,000 and*

*The borrower notifies the lender in writing of the amount of his/her NII.*

*A de minimis rule allows the lender to report zero interest income if the borrower’s NII does not exceed $1,000.*

*The limitation on the amount of interest applies for income tax purposes only, not gift. The full amount of imputed interest must be included as a gift.*

*The deduction that may be available to the borrower is limited to the amount of imputed income reported by the lender.*

4. Generally Use Term Loans Rather Than Demand Loans. For a demand loan, the stated interest rate is compared to the AFR throughout the loan, and gifts will result for any period during which the stated interest rate is less than the AFR for that period. For term loans, however, the state interest rate is compared to the AFR at the time the loan is originated to determine if the loan results in a gift. In light of this treatment, using term loans has two distinct advantages.

First, there is no complexity of repeatedly determining the appropriate AFR for any particular period. The AFR at the origination of the loan controls throughout the term of the loan for determining the income and gift tax effects of whether the below-market rules of §7872 apply.

Second, during the current incredibly low interest rate environment, there will be no gift tax consequences for the entire term of the note as long as the interest rate of the term note is at least equal to the AFR when the note is originated.

***Summary****: Advantages of term loans over demand loans include:*

* *Easier to administer because interest rate does not have to be redetermined periodically; and.*
* *Takes advantage of current low interest rates for the full life of the term loan.*

5. How to Determine Interest Rate for Demand Loans. For demand loans, the below-market interest amount (that is treated as transferred from lender to borrower for income and gift tax purposes) is determined for each semiannual period based on the short term AFR at the beginning of that semiannual period less the interest that is actually due under the note and paid for that period. In order to avoid having imputed income and gifts with demand loans, the note often provides that the interest rate will be the appropriate short term AFR for each relevant period so that the note is not a below-market loan.

Drafting Interest Rate for Demand Note, Sample Language:  *“…at an initial rate per annum equal to the Federal short-term rate, as published by the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to section 1274(d) of the Internal Revenue Code (hereafter the “Federal short-term rate”), in effect for the month first above written. The interest rate on the unpaid principal amount of this Promissory Note shall be adjusted as of January 1 and July 1 of each year to the Federal short-term rate in effect for such January and July, as the case may be.”*[[54]](#footnote-54)

Drafting Interest Rate for Demand Note, More Aggressive Approach Under Proposed Regulations Example 5:

*“The interest rate … shall be adjusted as of January 1 and July 1 of each year to the Federal short term rate in effect for such January and July, as the case may be. During each semiannual period (Jan. 1 – June 30 and July 1 – Dec. 31; each a Period) the interest rate shall be adjusted to the lowest Federal short-term rate during the applicable Period. (By way of example only, if the lowest Federal short-term rate for January is 4.2%, February is 4.0% and the rest of the Period (March – June) is 4.4%, the rate charged for January shall be 4.2% and for February through June shall be 4.0%.)”*[[55]](#footnote-55)

If the note provides that the interest rate will be the relevant AFR for each particular period, the appropriate AFR will have to be determined over relevant periods (as described below) to calculate the amount of interest due under the note. If the demand note does not call for interest to be paid at the ever-changing relevant short term AFR, such AFR will have to be determined in any event to determine the amount of imputed income and gift from the below-market loan.

For the semiannual period in which the loan is made, the short term AFR in effect on the day the loan is made is used. For each subsequent semiannual period (January-June and July-December), the short term AFR for the first month of that semiannual period (i.e., January or July) is used.[[56]](#footnote-56) (However, “Example 5” in the regulations suggests that the lowest short term rate in the semiannual period [from and after the month in which the loan is made] may be used.)[[57]](#footnote-57) For loans outstanding the entire year, a blended rate is available that effectively applies the January rate for the first half of the year and the July rate for the second half of the year. The blended rate is announced in the July AFR ruling each year (that is published approximately June 20 of each year.) The blended rates for the last three years have been as follows: 2009-0.82%; 2010-0.59%; 2011-0.40%; 2012-0.22%.[[58]](#footnote-58)

Accrued interest (not forgiven) is treated as a new loan and payments are applied to accrued interest first, then principal.

***Example: Below-Market Demand Loan.***

*Your client, Adam, calls you to tell you that on February 1, 2011, he loaned $200,000 to his son, Chris, for the purchase of an investment property. There were no formal loan documents drafted for this loan. Adam tells you that he received full repayment from Chris on June 30, 2012 of $200,000. Adam also gave his son a $13,000 holiday gift on December 15, 2011. The AFRs were as follows: Jan 2011 – 0.43%; Feb 2011 – 0.51%; July 2011 - 0.37%; Jan 2012 – 0.19%; 2011 Blended 0.4%*

*1. What is the imputed interest for 2011? 2012?*

*2. How much does Adam show on his gift tax return as gifts to Chris 2011? 2012?*

*1. What is the imputed interest for 2011 & 2012?*

***Imputed Interest for 2011 = $728***

*Jan 2011 ST AFR = 0.43% and July 2011 ST AFR = 0.37%*

*[$200,000 x (0.43% x 5/12)] + [200,000 x (0.37% x 6/12)] = $728*

***Imputed Interest for 2012 = $190***

*Jan 2012 ST AFR = 0.19%*

*$200,000 x (0.19% x 6/12) = $190*

***Observe: Blended Rate Does Not Apply***

*The loan was not outstanding for all of 2011 or all of 2012. Therefore the blended rate for a calendar year does not apply for either 2011 or 2012.*

*2. How much does Adam show on his gift tax return as gifts to Chris 2011? 2012?*

*Total reportable gift by Adam =*

*2011 = $13,728 ($13,000 Cash gift + $728 Imputed Interest)*

*2012 = $190 (Imputed Interest; assuming no other cash gifts)*

***Summary******of Determining Interest Rate for Demand Loans***

* + *New Loans – the lower of the Short-term AFR in effect the month the loan is made or the 1st month of the semiannual period (January or July)*
  + *Rate is reset every 6 months to the Short-term AFR for January and July*
  + *For loans that remain unchanged during the year, the interest is computed using the annual Blended rate (Published annually in July AFR ruling issued about June 20 – 2012 Blended Rate is 0.22%)*

6. How to Determine Interest Rate for Term Loans. For term loans, determining the appropriate AFR is much easier. Simply use an interest rate that is equal to the AFR with the same compounding period for the month in which the loan is made. For sale transactions, the interest rate on the note can be the lowest AFR for the three-month period ending with the month there was a “binding contract in writing for such sale or exchange.” For sale transactions the appropriate AFR is based not the term of the note, but on its weighted average maturity.[[59]](#footnote-59)

***Example: Below-Market Term Loan.***

*Your client, Adam, calls you again to tell you that on March 1, 2011 he loaned his daughter, Stacey, $200,000 to purchase a new home. The loan has a stated rate of 2% payable annually. It also calls for a balloon repayment of the principal due in 10 Years. Stacey makes annual interest payments of $4,000 each year. The March 2011 AFR rates were as follows: Short-term = 0.54%; Mid-term = 2.44%; Long-term = 4.30%.*

*1.What is the total interest income reportable by Adam for 2011?*

*2.What is the 2011 & 2012 gift reportable by Adam?*

***Step 1: Determine if this loan is a below-market loan (GIFT AMOUNT)***

*Calculate difference between PV of all loan payments and loan amount*

*March 2011 Annual Long-Term Rate = 4.30%*

*Present value of all payment due under the loan:*

*PV of 10 annual $4,000 Interest payments and $200,000 balloon payment in 10 Years discounted using 4.3%*

*PV = $163,241 – Since the loan amount is greater, this is a below-market loan*

*Total Forgone Interest = $200,000 – 163,241 =* ***$36,759***

***Step 2: Calculate the forgone interest for each year (INCOME AMOUNT)***

*March 2011 Annual Long-Term Rate = 4.30%*

*Forgone Interest = Interest using AFR – Interest Payment Made*

*Annual Interest with AFR = ($200,000 x 4.30%) = $8,600*

*Annual Forgone Interest = $8,600 - $4,000 = $4,600*

*2011 Forgone Interest: $4,600 x 10/12 = 3,833*

***Answers:***

*1. What is the total interest income reportable by Adam for 2011?*

*2011 Forgone Interest = $3,833*

*Total interest reported in 2011 for this loan is $7,833*

*(Interest Paid $4,000 + Imputed Interest $3,833)*

*2. What is the 2011 & 2012 gift reportable by Adam?*

*2011 Gift is total forgone interest = $36,759*

*2012 Gift = None, because all forgone interest is reported as a gift in the year the loan is made*

***Summary******of Determining Interest Rate for Term Loans.***

* *The appropriate AFR is the rate in effect for the month the loan is made based on the term of the loan:*

*3 Yrs or less Short-term AFR*

*Over 3 to 9 Yrs Midterm AFR*

*More than 9 Yrs Long-term AFR*

* *The rate continues to apply over the life of the loan despite future rates fluctuation.*
* *For sales transactions, the lowest AFR for the 3 months ending with the sale date can be used.*

7. Lend to Borrowers With the Ability to Repay. One of the factors in determining whether the loan is a bona fide loan rather than an equity transfer[[60]](#footnote-60) is whether the borrower had the ability to repay. In *Miller v. Commissioner*,[[61]](#footnote-61) there was no evidence of the borrower’s ability to repay the loan. The borrower-sons both testified that they had employment income, but introduced no evidence that their income was sufficient to make the payments, after other living expenses. Moreover, while the sons had some assets, primarily their equity in their homes and some liquid investments, there was no indication that Mrs. Miller was prepared to require them to liquidate any of those assets to make payments. The ability to repay was only one of nine factors examined in *Miller*, but there is significant danger that a loan to someone without the ability to repay the loan may not be respected as a loan. Cases involving the application of §2036 to private annuities to trusts and individuals also emphasize the importance of using trusts or individuals who have the ability to repay the debt.[[62]](#footnote-62)

***Summary:*** *The borrower’s ability to repay the loan is a very important factor in establishing that a bona fide debtor creditor relationship exists. This can be very important for income, gift and estate tax purposes. This includes loans to trusts; the trust should be funded with enough assets that it has the ability to repay the loan even if there is some decline in the value of the trust assets.*[[63]](#footnote-63)

8. Accrued Interest Generally Must Be Recognized Each Year Even by Cash Basis Taxpayers. For below-market gift loans, the forgone interest demand loan rules apply. (Although §7872 says that a term loan with a below-market interest rate will be treated as having original issue discount [“OID”] at the time the loan is made, the proposed regulations say that for gift term loans the forgone interest demand loan rules apply.[[64]](#footnote-64)) Each year, a lender must report the interest income imputed to the lender under §7872, with a statement explaining various details.[[65]](#footnote-65)

What if the loan provides adequate interest so that it is not a below-market loan? There is no forgone interest to report under §7872. Nevertheless, if interest accrues but is not actually payable, the original issue discount (OID) rules will apply,[[66]](#footnote-66) and they generally require that a pro rata amount[[67]](#footnote-67) of the overall amount of the OID over the life of the loan must be recognized each year as ordinary income, even for cash basis taxpayers.[[68]](#footnote-68) The amount of OID included in income each year is generally determined under a “constant yield method” as described in the §1272 regulations.[[69]](#footnote-69)

There are a variety of exceptions from the OID rules; for example, the OID rules do not apply to a loan if it is not made in the course of a trade or business and if all outstanding loans between the lender and borrower do not exceed $10,000.[[70]](#footnote-70) For seller financed notes, there are additional exceptions including sales of farms for $1 million or less by individuals or small businesses, sales of principal residences, sales involving total payments of $250,000 or less,[[71]](#footnote-71) and notes given in sales transactions under a certain amount (about $3.8 million in 2012) that the buyer and seller agree to treat as “cash method debt instruments.”[[72]](#footnote-72) However, in most intra-family loan situations, the OID rules will apply.

The key to this analysis is determining the overall amount of OID over the life of the loan. Original issue discount is the excess (if any) of the “stated redemption price at maturity” over the” issue price.”[[73]](#footnote-73)

The “stated redemption price at maturity” is the sum of all payments provided for by the debt instrument except for qualified stated interest payments[[74]](#footnote-74) (but in most intra-family loan situations where there are interest accruals, there will not be any “qualified stated interest”). Therefore, in most common situations, we start with the sum of all payments provided for by the debt instrument.

From that, the “issue price” is subtracted to determine the amount of OID. For cash loans, the “issue price” is the amount loaned.[[75]](#footnote-75) For seller financed transactions, there is a different more involved computation of the “imputed principal amount,” but if the note has stated interest equal to the appropriate AFR,[[76]](#footnote-76) the stated principal amount of the note is the issue price that is subtracted.[[77]](#footnote-77) Therefore the OID would be the total interest payments that would be due under the loan over the life of the loan if the stated interest equals the relevant AFR.

***Summary***: *A pro rata amount of the overall amount of the OID over the life of the loan must be recognized each year as ordinary income, even for cash basis taxpayers. After working through the technical details, the OID is the total interest payments that would be due under the loan over the life of the loan if the stated interest equals the relevant AFR.*

*The OID income is reported ratably over the life of the loan, whether or not the interest is paid, even if the lender is a cash basis taxpayer. The OID complications are avoided if the loan/note transaction is between a grantor and that person’s grantor trust.*

9. Forgiving Debt Should Not Result in Income Recognition to Borrower and May Not Result in the Seller Having to Recognize Accrued But Unpaid Interest as Income. The borrower should not have discharge of indebtedness income if the note is forgiven because §102 excludes gifts from the definition of gross income.[[78]](#footnote-78)The seller may not have to recognize accrued interest as income. By negative implication, the proposed regulations indicate that accrued interest under a note providing stated interest will not be recognized as income if the accrued interest is forgiven as long as the forgiveness “include[s] in substantial part the loan principal.”[[79]](#footnote-79)  The proposed regulations have been outstanding for decades but have never been finalized. However, these regulations appear to provide a reporting position that the waived interest would not have to be recognized as imputed income by the lender.

The following are various limitations and uncertainties regarding the ability to avoid recognizing accrued but unpaid interest by forgiving the interest.[[80]](#footnote-80)

a. Current Year Accrued Interest Only? Only the current year accrued income may avoid recognition under the forgiveness approach if any accrued interest in earlier years had to be recognized in those earlier years.[[81]](#footnote-81)

b. How Much Principal Must be Forgiven? There is inherent ambiguity over how much of the principal must be forgiven when the accrued interest is forgiven. The regulation uses the nebulous phrasing that the forgiveness includes “*in substantial part* the loan principal.” The language of the proposed regulation seems to refer to the principal forgiveness being a substantial part *of the forgiveness* and not a substantial part of the loan principal.

c. Proposed Regulation. This position is based merely on a proposed regulation that has never been finalized. But the fact that the proposed regulation has stood unchanged for decades and that there has been no case law rejecting this analysis over those decades provides comfort. Proposed regulations may be considered to determine if there is substantial authority for purposes of avoiding taxpayer or preparer penalties.

e. Consistently Forgiving Accrued Interest Each Year May Not be Advisable. If the accrued interest must be recognized each year under the OID rules, the only way to avoid the recognition of all interest under the note would be to forgive the accrued interest each year (in connection with a forgiveness in substantial part of the loan principal). However, if the accrued interest is forgiven each year, that is a factor that may be considered in refusing to recognize the loan as a bona fide loan rather than as an equity transfer.

***Summary:***  *Forgiveness or cancellation of an intra-family note does not result in discharge of indebtedness income to the borrower (if the borrower is insolvent or if the forgiveness is in the forgiveness/cancellation is a gift). Proposed regulations provide an argument (by negative inference) that the lender will not have to recognize the unpaid income (that has not previously been recognized under the OID rules) that is forgiven if the forgiveness includes “in substantial part” the loan principal. Do not consistently forgive accrued interest each year; that may be a factor in determining whether there is a bona fide loan.*

10. Discounting Notes in Subsequent Transactions *May* be Possible—But Not for Weak Stomachs. Under gift and estate tax regulations, the value of a note is the unpaid principal plus accrued interest, unless the evidence shows that the note is worth less (e.g., because of the interest rate or date of maturity) or is uncollectible in whole or in part.[[82]](#footnote-82) A wide variety of cases have valued notes at a discount from face based on satisfactory evidence.[[83]](#footnote-83)

Gift Tax Purposes. Under §7872, the gift amount of a below-market loan is the forgone interest, or the amount by which the interest under the note is less than the AFR. Section 7872 does not address other factors that may impact the value of the notes—it just addresses how much gift results as a result of using an interest rate that is lower than the appropriate AFR. The statute does not address the gift tax implications of a note that has an interest rate that is equal to or greater than the AFR. However, the clear implication of §7872 is that a transfer for a note that bears interest that is equal to or greater than the AFR will not be treated as a gift, merely because of the interest rate that is used on the note. Even following the adoption of §7872, the value of notes apparently can be discounted because of factors stated in the general gift tax regulations other than the interest rate used in the notes. There are no proposed regulations issued in conjunction with §7872 that purport to override the general gift tax valuation principles for notes under Reg. § 25.2512-4.

Estate Tax Purposes.

The general estate tax regulation regarding the valuation of notes provides that the estate tax value is the amount of unpaid principal plus interest accrued to the date of death, unless the executor establishes that the value is lower by satisfactory evidence that the note is worth less than the unpaid amount (e.g., because of the interest rate or the date of maturity) or that the note is uncollectible by reason of insolvency of the maker and because property pledged as security is insufficient to satisfy the obligation.[[84]](#footnote-84) Therefore, the note can apparently be discounted based on the note’s interest rate if interest rates generally rise by the time of the holder’s death.

Even if general interest rates do not change between the time the note is given and the date of death, can the note be discounted because the AFR, which is the test rate for gift tax purposes under §7872, is an artificially low rate — the rate at which the United States government can borrow? There are no cases or rulings. A proposed regulation under §7872 suggests that such discounting, merely because the AFR is an artificially low interest rate, would not be allowed.[[85]](#footnote-85) However, that regulation has never been finalized. *Be aware,* h*owever*, the IRS estate tax agent may feel that taking a discount merely for this reason is abusive (because the note was not similarly discounted for gift tax valuation purposes at the time of the sale) and may closely scrutinize every aspect of the loan or sale transaction. Also, beware that the income tax effects of discounting the note may offset or even outweigh discounting the note for estate tax purposes. When the note is paid, the excess payment over the note’s basis is generally treated as ordinary income.[[86]](#footnote-86)

**Summary:** *For gift tax purposes, a loan is not deemed to be worth less than face value because of the interest rate as long as the interest rate is at least equal to the AFR.**However, other factors can be considered (for example, the ability of the borrower to repay) in determining the value of the note, and if the note is worth less than the amount transferred, a gift results.*

*For estate tax purposes, a note can be discounted because of interest rate changes or because of collectability problems (e.g., insolvency of the borrower or insufficiency of collateral). In addition, there MAY be the possibility of discounting a note merely because it uses the AFR interest rate, which is less than a commercially reasonable rate that would apply to such a loan. There is no statute or final regulation requiring that §7872 principles for valuing notes using the AFR also apply for estate tax purposes. However, the IRS fights that argument. Furthermore, when paid the excess payment over the note basis will be treated as ordinary income in most circumstances.*

11. Refinancing Notes To Utilize Lower Interest Rates. There are no cases, regulations or rulings that address the gift tax effects of refinancing notes. Proposed regulations under §7872 include a section entitled “Treatment of Renegotiations,” but merely reserves the subject for later guidance, which has never been issued.[[87]](#footnote-87) One commentator concludes that refinancings at lower AFRs should be possible without gift consequences:

“Although there is no case, ruling, or Code section that explicitly provides that promissory notes may be restated without gift tax effects, economic analysis of the transaction and Regulations strongly support the conclusion that it is possible to do so without a taxable gift being deemed to occur.”[[88]](#footnote-88)

A possible concern is that consistent refinancing of the note may be a factor in determining that the loan transaction does not result in bona fide debt, but should be treated as an equity transfer. In light of the lack of any case law or direct discussion of refinancings at lower AFRs in regulations or in any rulings, most planners suggest caution in this area, and not merely refinancing notes every time the AFR decreases.[[89]](#footnote-89)

Some advisors renegotiating the terms of notes not only adopt the lower more current AFR, but also compensate the lender in some say for accepting the lower rate, “perhaps by paying down the principal amount, shortening the maturity date, or adding more attractive collateral.”[[90]](#footnote-90)

***Summary:*** *Refinancing at lower current interest rates should be permissible, but do not get greedy and do this repeatedly. To be more conservative, make some modification in return for the lender’s agreeing to refinance at the lower interest rate, such as paying down some principal, reducing the term of the loan, or adding collateral.*

C. Best Practices Summary. The following is a brief 10-point checklist of best practices in structuring intra-family loans.

1. Have the borrower sign a promissory note.

2. Establish a fixed repayment schedule.

3. Charge interest at or above the minimum “safe harbor” rate.

4. Request collateral from the borrower.

5. Demand repayment.

6. Have records from both parties reflecting the debt.

7. Show evidence that payments have been made.

8. Make sure that the borrower has the wherewithal to repay the loan.

9. Do not establish any plan to forgive payments as they come due.

10. Refinance with caution.[[91]](#footnote-91)

IV. HISTORY AND CONTEXT OF SECTIONS 7872 AND 1274

A. In the Beginning. Once upon a time, life was good. Gas was 20 cents a gallon, Get Smart reruns ran daily, hard-core speed death-metal music had not been invented, personal interest was deductible, and even the most unsophisticated tax advisors knew enough to use interest-free loans to help clients drive large semi-trailers through gaping holes in the income and gift tax systems.

During this tax utopia, taxpayers used interest-free loans in a variety of ways to exploit the failure of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS” or “Service”) to at first *assert*, then later *convince* the courts, that interest-free loans should be income- and/or gift- taxable transfers. This exploitation included interest-free loans:

 by C corporations (usually closely-held) to shareholders (to avoid double taxation);

 by wealthy persons to family members in lower tax brackets to permit them to invest and receive returns taxed at lower rates;

 by employers to employees as a substitute for taxable compensation (and payroll taxes); and

 by sellers using installment sales to convert interest income to capital gain. This tax Shangri-La lasted, for the most part, from 1913 to 1984.[[92]](#footnote-92)

The IRS was slow to catch on to the potential for tax avoidance, failing to strongly assert that interest-free loans should have tax consequences until 1960, when, in *Dean v. Commissioner*,[[93]](#footnote-93) it made its first coherent argument. In *Dean*, the Commissioner argued that since an interest-free loan did not require an interest payment, the borrower received the free use of the principal as an economic benefit that should be included in gross income. At first the courts were not moved by the IRS’s position.[[94]](#footnote-94) Eventually, however, the United States Court of Claims adopted the theory, although they were reversed.[[95]](#footnote-95) Finally, in 1984, the IRS scored its breakthrough victory in this arena (albeit in the gift tax context), in *Dickman v. Commissioner*,[[96]](#footnote-96) in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the lender’s right to receive interest is a “valuable property right,” and that the transfer of such a right through an interest free loan is a taxable gift.

*Dickman* quickly touched off comprehensive below-market loan reform. Later in 1984, Congress enacted Internal Revenue Code §7872 to govern certain below-market loans. With §7872, Congress created artificial transfers of deemed interest between the borrower and the lender, to ensure that income was recognized by each party.[[97]](#footnote-97) Although *Dickman* concerned only gift tax, §7872 went beyond mere codification of the *Dickman* holding, and beyond the intra-family context, to reach loans to shareholders, employees and a variety of other below-market loans, for *both* income tax and gift tax application. By enacting §7872, Congress indicated that virtually all gifts involving the transfer of money or property would be valued using the currently applicable AFR,[[98]](#footnote-98) thereby replacing the traditional fair-market-value method[[99]](#footnote-99) of valuing below-market loans with a discounting method.

7872 proposed regulations were issued in August 1985,[[100]](#footnote-100) a portion of which were also adopted as temporary regulations.[[101]](#footnote-101) Unfortunately, the statute was amended after the promulgation of the Proposed Regulations, leading to the confusing misalignment of the statute and the Proposed Regulations discussed below.

B. Section 7872, Generally. Section 7872 governs below-market loans in several circumstances, including loans between family members.[[102]](#footnote-102) Section 7872 applies to any transaction that 1) is a bona-fide loan, 2) is below market, 3) falls within one of four categories of below-market loans, and 4) is not within any of several exceptions. The four categories are loans 1) from donor to a donee, 2) from an employer to an employee, 3) from a corporation to a shareholder, and 4) with interest arrangements made for tax avoidance purposes.[[103]](#footnote-103) As we are concerned solely with intra-family transactions, in this article *we shall be concerned only with “gift loans.”*[[104]](#footnote-104)

Generally, §7872 will not impute gift or income tax consequences to a loan providing “sufficient” stated interest, which means interest at a rate no lower than the appropriate AFR, based on the appropriate compounding period.[[105]](#footnote-105)

Any gift loan subject to §7872 which bears interest below the AFR may have adverse tax consequences to the lender.[[106]](#footnote-106) Section 7872 treats a bona fide below-market (i.e., below-AFR) gift loan as economically equivalent to a loan bearing interest at the AFR coupled with a payment by the lender to the borrower of funds to pay the imputed interest to the lender. This “forgone interest” is treated as retransferred by the borrower to the lender as interest. Thus, the forgone interest is treated as a gift by the lender to the borrower and then treated as income to the lender from the borrower. Although income and gift taxes are implicated, the amount of the gift and income do not always align.[[107]](#footnote-107)

Section 7872 is complicated, therefore not well understood, and, in practice, often ignored. The problem is exacerbated in *sales transactions*, which implicate both the income and gift-tax safe harbor of §7872 and the overlapping income tax (and gift tax?) safe harbors of Sections 483 and 1274 governing intra-family sales. *Even if the correct safe harbor is used*, the Code[[108]](#footnote-108) may impute phantom income annually if the loan does not call for “qualified stated interest” (e.g., a loan that does not call for annual payment of interest will be subject to annual imputation of income under the OID rules even if the interest rate satisfies the applicable safe harbor).

V. THE GIFT LOAN: ONE TYPE OF LOAN UNDER SECTION 7872

As a reminder, an important assumption of this article is that, unless indicated otherwise, we are discussing intra-family “gift loans” under §7872(c)(1)(A), as opposed to other loans also covered by §7872, namely compensation related loans,[[109]](#footnote-109) corporation-shareholder loans,[[110]](#footnote-110) or tax-avoidance loans.[[111]](#footnote-111) A below market loan is a “gift loan” if the forgoing of interest “is in the nature of a gift”[[112]](#footnote-112) as defined under the gift tax.[[113]](#footnote-113) The IRS *assumes* that a transfer of money from one family member to another is a gift.[[114]](#footnote-114) A loan can be a gift loan whether the lender is a natural person or an entity and whether, apart from the loan, the parties are related or unrelated,[[115]](#footnote-115) or whether the loan is direct or indirect.[[116]](#footnote-116)

VI. AVOIDING BELOW-MARKET GIFT LOAN STATUS UNDER SECTION 7872

The level of many practitioners’[[117]](#footnote-117) mastery of this area often begins and ends with one concern: keeping a loan from being characterized as below-market under §7872 -- and, therefore, in the context of this article, free from imputed taxable gift and taxable income consequences to the lender. The coping mechanism many have developed to blunt the awful truth about the complexity of §7872 is a cursory knowledge of §1274(d), i.e., that “a 0-3 year note is subject to the short term AFR, an over 3 to 9 year note is subject to the mid-term AFR, and an over 9 year note is subject to the long-term AFR.” This level of mastery is not a springboard to intra-family loan bliss, so we will dig deeper and try to avoid confusion along the way.

As discussed above, a (bona fide) gift loan is “below market” if the lender does not charge at least the rate of interest required under §7872.[[118]](#footnote-118) The rate required under §7872 is tied to the AFR, the lynchpin of the IRS below-market loan scheme.

A. The AFR. The AFR, set forth in §1274(d), is published monthly by the IRS, usually around the 20th day of the preceding month, based on the average yield for treasuries with the applicable remaining maturity periods for the one-month period ending on the 14th of the month.[[119]](#footnote-119) There are three federal rates, a short term rate that is the AFR for obligations maturing three years or less from the issue date, a mid-term rate for the range three to nine years, and a long-term rate for obligations maturing more than nine years from issue.

The AFRs are based on annual, semiannual, quarterly, and monthly compounding of interest. The more often a loan is compounded, the more valuable it is to the lender; therefore, interest rates required by the statutes correspond to the length of the compounding period – the shorter the period, the lower the required rate. For example, nine percent compounded annually is equivalent to 8.62 percent compounded daily.

The appropriate AFR depends on the loan’s terms. The shorter of the compounding period or the payment interval determines the appropriate rate.[[120]](#footnote-120) If interest payments or compoundings are at intervals other than those for which rates are published, the rate for the next longest interval for which rates are published may be used. For example, the monthly rate can be used for a note providing for daily compounding, the quarterly rate can be used for bi-monthly interest payments.[[121]](#footnote-121)

B. Demand Loans. A loan is a demand loan if it is “payable in full at any time on demand of the lender” or “within a reasonable time after the lender’s demand.”[[122]](#footnote-122) As we will see, the rules of §7872 are fairly straightforward in the context of term loans. Demand loans are different story.

1. Seeking a Bright Rule Through Obscurity. Usually, the AFR for a demand loan is the federal short term rate in effect for the period the amount imputed by §7872 (referred to as “forgone interest”) is being determined. This is because, by the nature of an arm’s length demand loan, the lender is effectively protected against rate fluctuations.

Section 7872 provides that interest on the hypothetical arm’s length loan outstanding for any period during the calendar year is deemed paid annually on December 31. Thus, with a loan outstanding from April 4 to November 12, the lender is deemed to require payment of interest on December 31.

Where the principal amount of a demand loan is outstanding for a full calendar year, the Proposed Regulations provide that a “blended rate” shall compute the amount of sufficient interest for the year.[[123]](#footnote-123) The rate is applied to the principal balance outstanding as of January 1, and reflects semiannual compounding of the AFR effective for January, expressed on the basis of semiannual compounding. The blended rate is announced in the latter part of June.[[124]](#footnote-124)

Since the AFR is recomputed monthly, a demand note might technically be below-market for any month during which it bears interest at a rate lower than that month’s AFR. However, *forgone interest* (the *measure* of the gift once the loan fails the below-market *test*) is *computed* under the Proposed Regulations with rates determined once or twice a year.[[125]](#footnote-125) Unfortunately, the Proposed Regulations on the *testing* procedures were issued before the most recent amendment to §7872, which changed the statutory period for AFR adjustment from semi-annually to monthly. Therefore, there is no definite method for *testing* demand loans.

One reputable authority infers the following procedure for testing whether a demand loan is below-market: A demand loan is not below-market for a particular semiannual period (January to June, or July to December) if it bears interest at a rate at least equal to the lesser of 1) a blended rate published annually by the IRS, or 2) the federal short-term rate for the first month of the semiannual period (January or July). For the semiannual period during which the loan is made, the loan is not below market if the rate equals or exceeds the Federal short-term rate for the month in which the loan is made, *even if this rate is lower than both the annual blended rate and the rate for the first month of the semiannual period*.[[126]](#footnote-126)

2. Variable Rate Demand Loans. As outlined above, for a demand loan, no fixed rate can be certain to be sufficient under §7872 for as long as the loan is outstanding; a loan that is above the market rate can quickly become below-market if interest rates rise and the note does not provide for periodic interest-rate adjustments.

This problem may be solved by using a variable rate demand loan that calls for periodic revisions of the interest rate, which might be automatic.[[127]](#footnote-127) Such a note may provide that 1) for each semiannual period (January to June, or July to December), the interest rate is the Federal short-term rate for the first month of the period (January or July), or 2) that the interest rate for a year is the blended rate for the year. Either determination provides, by definition, sufficient stated interest, and therefore will never be below-market.

The Proposed Regulations provide that variable rate demand loans will provide for sufficient interest if the rate fixed by the index used is no lower than the AFR for each semiannual period or the short term AFR in effect at the beginning of the payment period (or, if the agreement so provides, at the end) of the payment or compounding period, whichever is shorter.[[128]](#footnote-128) This rule applies, for example, if interest on a demand loan is compounded monthly, with the rate for each month being the federal short-term rate for the month.

3. The Simplest Safe Harbor Demand Loan. The simplest demand note would be one with a variable rate equal to the AFR in effect on the loan date with interest rate adjustments on the first day of each month. Alternatively, for simplicity, the final regulations could adopt a rule providing that there is sufficient interest when the variable rate changes at least in six-month intervals and, at the beginning of each interval, the rate is at least equal to the AFR in effect on that date. See Section III.B.5 of this outline, *supra*, for an example of such a variable rate demand loan promissory note.

VII. TERM LOANS

A term loan is a loan that is not a demand loan.[[129]](#footnote-129) Under the Proposed Regulations, a term loan is a loan made under an agreement that “specifies an ascertainable period of time for which the loan is to be outstanding.”[[130]](#footnote-130)

A term loan is below-market if “the amount loaned exceeds the present value of all payments due under the loan.” The present value of the payments is determined as of the date of the loan using the AFR as the discount rate. The AFR is the Federal short-term, mid-term, or long-term rate, depending on the term of the loan, in effect on the date the loan is made.[[131]](#footnote-131)

The test is simplified in the Proposed Regulations, which provide that a loan is not below market if it bears “sufficient interest,” which means interest computed “on the outstanding loan balance at a rate no lower than the applicable federal rate based on a compounding period appropriate for that loan.”[[132]](#footnote-132) Interest may be variable, so long as the rate is at or above the AFR at the time the loan is made and is based on an objective index.[[133]](#footnote-133) As opposed to a demand gift loan, which may fall in and out of below-market status (if not properly drafted), a term loan need only qualify (for gift tax purposes) as a market loan at the time the loan is made (or when the $10,000 de minimis ceiling is exceeded).

For sale transactions, the interest rate on the note can be the lowest AFR for the three-month period ending with the month there was a “binding contract in writing for such sale or exchange.” For sale transactions the appropriate AFR is based not on the term of the note, but on its weighted average maturity.[[134]](#footnote-134)

VIII. EXEMPTIONS FROM SECTION 7872

A.$10,000De Minimis Exemption. In the case of gift loans there is an exception for loans where all loans between those same individuals (this exception does not apply to trusts, estates, or corporations) do not exceed $10,000. In that case, there is no deemed transfer for income or gift tax purposes for any day during which the aggregate outstanding amount of loans between those individuals does not exceed $10,000.[[135]](#footnote-135) The $10,000 ceiling amount for this exception includes all loans between the same lender and borrower regardless of the rate of interest.[[136]](#footnote-136) However, this exception will not apply if the loan is directly attributable to purchasing or carrying income-producing assets.[[137]](#footnote-137) (Therefore, this exception applies only where the loan funds are consumed or used for non-income producing property (such as a down payment on a house or for college education).)

This exception applies on a day-to-day basis for gift loans. Even if the aggregate amount of loans between the two individuals exceeds $10,000 for some days, there will be no imputed transfers for income or gift (except as described below for term loans) purposes on any days during which the aggregate standing amount of loans between the individuals does not exceed $10,000. For gift term loans, §7872 continues to apply for gift purposes even after the aggregate loss amount is reduced back to $10,000 or less.[[138]](#footnote-138) (For non-gift loans, if the amount of loans between the individuals ever exceeds $10,000, the exception does not apply to outstanding loans between the individuals after that date even if the outstanding balance of the loans is later reduced below $10,000.)

For purposes of this exception (and all of §7872), husband and wife are treated as one person. [[139]](#footnote-139) Therefore a loan from daughter to father, from father to daughter, from mother to daughter and from daughter to mother will all be counted for purposes of determining if aggregate outstanding loans between daughter and either father or mother exceed $10,000.

This de minimis exemption does not apply to any gift loan “directly attributable to the purchase or carrying of income-producing assets,” which are defined in the Proposed Regulations as 1) an asset of a type that generates ordinary income, or 2) a market discount bond issued prior to June 19, 1984.[[140]](#footnote-140)

B. $100,000 Exemption (Income Exception Only). If the aggregate outstanding amount of gift loans between individuals does not exceed $100,000, the imputed interest amount (i.e., the amount treated as retransferred from the borrower to the lender at the end of the year) for income tax purposes is limited to the borrower’s net investment income for the year.[[141]](#footnote-141) However, there is a de minimis rule: if the borrower has less than $1,000 of net investment income for the year, the net investment income for purposes of this exception is deemed to be zero (so there would be no imputed income from the loan during that year).

This exception can be helpful for below market loans to borrowers who have little net investment income. However, the amount of forgone interest (the amount of interest that is below the interest that would have been incurred if the loan had used the AFR) will be treated as a taxable gift. (If the lender is not making other taxable gifts to the borrower during the year, the amount of the gift from the below-market loan may be covered by the gift tax annual exclusion.)

This exception applies on a day-to-day basis.[[142]](#footnote-142) As with the $10,000 exception, husband and wife are treated as one person. The exception does not apply if a principal purpose of the transaction is to avoid “any Federal tax.”[[143]](#footnote-143)

The limitation applies to both the borrower’s interest deduction and the lender’s interest income, except that it applies to the lender only if “the borrower notifies the lender, in a signed statement, of the amount of the borrower’s net investment income properly allocable to the loan.”[[144]](#footnote-144)

C.Sections 483 and 1274. According to §7872(f)(8), §7872 does not apply to any loan to which Sections 483 or 1274 (pertaining to loans in connection with sales or exchanges) apply. This exception is not nearly as straightforward as the clear language of the statute implies, and there is considerable room for interpretation (and confusion). The interaction of §§483, 1274, and 7872 are discussed in more detail in Section XVIII.A of this outline, *infra*.

IX. INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES OF BELOW-MARKET GIFT LOANS

A. Investment Income Limitation for Gift Loans. If a below-market gift loan is made directly between individuals, and if the outstanding balance of all loans (of any kind) between them is not greater than $100,000, §7872(d)(1) limits the amount of deemed interest paid by the borrower to the lender under §7872 to the borrower’s “net investment income” for the year (as defined under §163(d)(4)).[[145]](#footnote-145) Note that this limitation only applies for *income tax* purposes (thus, the lender is deemed to have made a gift of the full amount of the forgone interest regardless of the borrower’s net investment income). The limitation applies to both the borrower’s interest deduction and the lender’s interest income, except that it applies to the lender only if “the borrower notifies the lender, in a signed statement, of the amount of the borrower’s net investment income properly allocable to the loan.”[[146]](#footnote-146)

B. Demand Loan. With a below-market demand loan, the amount of the “forgone interest” is deemed transferred from the lender to the borrower in the form of a gift, and then retransferred by the borrower to the lender as payment of interest on December 31 (or on the date the loan is repaid). The imputed interest income is in addition to any actual interest income received from the borrower. The amount of forgone interest for any calendar year (i.e., the amount of the additional payment/interest treated as loan paid to lender) is the excess of:

* the amount of interest that would have been payable in that year if interest had accrued at the AFR, over
* any interest actually payable on the loan allocable to that year.[[147]](#footnote-147)

1. Demand Loan Outstanding for an Entire Calendar Year. To calculate the amount of forgone interest for a demand loan with a constant principal amount outstanding for an entire year, the forgone interest is equal to the sum of:

(1) The product of one-half of the January short-term rate based on semi-annual compounding times the principal amount of the loan; and

(2) The product of one-half of the July short-term rate based on the semiannual compounding times the sum of the principal amount of the loan and the amount described in (1).[[148]](#footnote-148)

From this amount, the amount of interest actually paid during the calendar year, if any, is subtracted.

For easier computation, the IRS also publishes a “blended annual rate” that is multiplied by the principal amount of the loan outstanding to arrive at the amount from which the actual interest paid, if any, is to be subtracted.[[149]](#footnote-149) This blended annual rate is published annually in July in the Revenue Procedure that announces the applicable federal rates for that month.[[150]](#footnote-150) The excess amount over the interest actually paid is the forgone interest.

2. Demand Loan Outstanding for Less Than the Entire Year. If a portion of the loan principal is repaid or an additional amount is loaned during the calendar year, the calculation of the forgone interest is complicated. The amount of this interest is calculated by using the “exact method” or the “approximate method.”

a. The “Exact Method”. The exact method is based upon a daily compounding of interest and calculates the interest as “the principal amount multiplied by: (1 + I ÷ k)f -1 where:

I = the Federal short-term rate expressed as a decimal[[151]](#footnote-151)

k = the number of accrual periods in a year; and

f = a fraction consisting of the number of days in the period for which interest is being computed divided by the number of days in a complete accrual period.”[[152]](#footnote-152)

This amount should be computed separately for each month at the short-term rate for that month.[[153]](#footnote-153) The exact method *must* be used in this situation (when the loan balance is not constant throughout the year) if either of the parties is not an individual or the aggregate of loans between them exceeds $250,000.

b. The “Approximate Method.” The approximate method is available to individual lenders and borrowers when the aggregate amount of loans between them is $250,000 or less. Under this method, interest is determined by calculating the interest for a semiannual period and then prorating that amount on a daily basis to determine the amount of interest for the portion of the semiannual period the loan was outstanding.[[154]](#footnote-154) The amount imputed will always be slightly larger under the approximate method.

The Proposed Regulations include examples contrasting the exact method and the approximate method.[[155]](#footnote-155)

3. Demand Loan With Fluctuating Loan Balance. This is a practical issue for most practitioners in administering a note, when the borrower-child pays as the spirit moves her. According to the Proposed Regulations,

[i]f a demand loan does not have a constant outstanding principal amount during a period, the amount of forgone interest shall be computed according to the principles [applying to loans outstanding less than the entire year], with each increase in the outstanding loan balance being treated as a new loan and each decrease being treated as first a repayment of accrued but unpaid interest (if any), and then a repayment of principal.[[156]](#footnote-156)

The Proposed Regulations contain examples calculating the imputed income from a loan with a fluctuating balance.[[157]](#footnote-157)

C. Term Loan. Although §7872(b) provides that a term loan with a below-market interest rate will be treated as having original issue discount (OID) at the time the loan is made,[[158]](#footnote-158) the Proposed Regulations[[159]](#footnote-159) provide that for *gift* term loans the forgone interest demand loan rules apply.[[160]](#footnote-160) The OID rules rest on the premise that the present value of the borrower’s promise to repay is less than the amount loaned; the OID rules are appropriate only if the borrower is assured the use of the lender’s money for a fixed term.

Under the demand loan rules applied to term gift loans, as opposed to the OID scheme, forgone interest accrues on the full amount loaned, and none of the original principal is recharacterized as a non-loan payment. Congress decided that demand loan rules should also determine the income tax consequences of gift term loans “because, in light of the familial or other personal relationship that is likely to exist between the borrower and the lender, the technical provisions of the loan, such as the maturity of the loan, may not be viewed as binding by the parties.” This regime relieves donors and donees of the burden of coping with the OID rules that apply to non-gift term loans.[[161]](#footnote-161)

D. Reporting Requirements. Each year, a lender must report the interest income imputed to him under §7872 on his income tax return, attaching a statement:

◼ Explaining that the interest income relates to an amount includible in his income by reason of §7872;

◼ Providing the name, address and taxpayer identification number of each borrower;

◼ Specifying the amount of imputed interest income attributable to each borrower;

◼ Specifying the mathematical assumptions used (*e.g.*, 360 day calendar year, the exact method or the approximate method for computing interest for a short period) for computing the amounts imputed under §7872; and

◼ Including any other information required by the return or the instructions thereto.[[162]](#footnote-162)

The borrower must attach a similar statement to her income tax return for a taxable year in which the borrower claims a deduction for an amount of interest expense imputed under §7872.

X. GIFT TAX CONSEQUENCES OF BELOW-MARKET GIFT LOAN

A. Demand Gift Loan. For a below-market demand gift loan, the amount of the gift is equal to the “forgone interest” treated as transferred from the lender to the borrower and retransferred from the borrower to the lender as payment of interest, calculated as provided in Section IX.B., *supra* of this outline. The gift is deemed to be made on the last day of the calendar year for each year that the loan is outstanding, or the day the loan is repaid if it is repaid during the year.[[163]](#footnote-163)

B. Term Gift Loan. For income tax purposes, below-market term and demand gift loans are, for the most part, treated the same. For gift tax purposes, however, demand gift loans and term gift loans are treated differently:[[164]](#footnote-164) the amount of a deemed gift is calculated using a different methodology, and the gift is recognized at a different time than the income.[[165]](#footnote-165)

1. Amount. For gift tax purposes, with a term gift loan, the OID rules apply[[166]](#footnote-166) and the lender is treated as making a gift to the borrower in an amount equal to the excess of the principal amount of the loan over the present value of all payments that are required to be made under the terms of the loan. Present value is as determined under §1.7872-14 of the Proposed Regulations. The discount rate for the present value computation is the AFR in effect on the day the loan is made.



The above calculates what present value (PV) would be needed to produce a certain future value (FV) if interest of i% accrues for n periods.

The simplest present value example given in the Proposed Regulations is:[[167]](#footnote-167)

*“Example (1)*

(i) On July 1, 1984, corporation A makes a $200,000 interest-free three-year term loan to shareholder B. The applicable federal rate is 10-percent, compounded semiannually.

(ii) The present value of this payment is $149,243.08, determined as follows: $149,243.08 = $200,000.00 ÷ (1 + (.10/2))6.

(iii) The excess of the amount loaned over the present value of all payments on the loan ($200,000.00 - $149,243.08), or $50,756.92, is treated as a distribution of property (characterized according to §301) paid to B on July 1, 1984.”[[168]](#footnote-168)

2. Timing. The gift is treated as being made on the first day on which §7872 applies to the term loan.[[169]](#footnote-169) Thus, while with a below-market *demand loan* the lender makes a gift *each year* the loan is outstanding, with a below-market *term loan* the lender makes the total gift in the first year of the loan. This can make a significant difference if the lender plans on using her gift tax annual exclusion to shelter the gift to the borrower. While the imputed gift with respect to a demand loan may be less than the annual exclusion amount, the imputed gift with respect to a term loan in the first year of the loan could exceed that amount.

XI. TIMING OF RECOGNITION OF INTEREST INCOME AND INTEREST DEDUCTIONS

A. Below-Market Gift Loans. For below-market gift loans, the §7872 rules apply to determine how much “forgone interest” is treated as transferred to the lender each year, rather than applying the OID rules. The regulations under §1274—which addresses seller financed transactions—say that §1274 does not apply to below-market loans.[[170]](#footnote-170) For below-market loans, the forgone interest demand loan rules apply. (Although §7872 says that a term loan with a below-market interest rate will be treated as having original issue discount [“OID”] at the time the loan is made, the proposed regulations say that for gift term loans the forgone interest demand loan rules apply.[[171]](#footnote-171) ) Each year, a lender must report the interest income imputed to the lender under § 7872, with a statement explaining various details.[[172]](#footnote-172) This regime relieves donors and donees of the burden of coping with the OID rules that apply to non-gift term loans.[[173]](#footnote-173)

B. Loans With Adequate Interest.

1. Overview. What if the loan provides adequate interest so that it is not a below-market loan? There is no forgone interest to report under §7872. Nevertheless, if interest accrues but is not actually payable, the OID rules will generally apply.[[174]](#footnote-174)  The OID rules of §§1271-1275 are extremely complex with many exceptions and technical details. Only a simplified overview of the most relevant provisions is included within the scope of this outline.

An IRS response to a practitioner comment observed that the OID rules will generally apply to loans with accrued interest, even if the loans bear interest at the AFR.

“…the holder of a debt instrument that accrues interest at a fixed rate of interest [at or above the AFR], where such interest is not payable until maturity, must include in income portions of such interest under the OID provisions. See §1.1272-1(f)3)(ii) of the proposed regulations. Therefore, in the above example, the cash basis shareholder must include the deferred interest in income currently. (We recognize that a cash basis taxpayer may be less likely to be scrutinized than an accrual basis taxpayer due to less restrictive accounting requirements. This problem pervades the Code and is not peculiar to§7872).” [[175]](#footnote-175)

That response from an IRS Regional Technical Coordinator interestingly points out that this issue may not receive rigorous scrutiny in audits of cash basis taxpayers. Practitioners may have planned numerous loans or notes in sale transactions in the past without advising that accrued interest must be recognized each year under the OID rules, and the issue may not have been raised in any audits. That does not mean that the OID rules do not apply.

One commentator gives the following example:

“EXAMPLE: Mom lends Junior $1,000. The note provides that interest at the AFR accrues during the term of the loan and a balloon payment of principal plus all accrued interest is due at the end of the term. If this arrangement is bona fide, it should successfully avoid the application of the gift tax. However, for income tax purposes, the interest which is accrued but not paid will constitute OID [citing I.R.C. §1272(a).]. Assuming that no exception to the general rules applies, Mom will have to report interest income during the term of the loan, even though she is not getting paid. Junior will get to deduct the imputed interest paid, even if he is not actually paying it, if the interest is of a character that would otherwise be deductible by him.”[[176]](#footnote-176)

If the loan/seller financed transaction is with a grantor trust, the lender/seller does not have to recognize interest income because he or she is treated as the owner of the trust income and assets for income tax purposes.[[177]](#footnote-177)

2. Exceptions. There are exceptions for various types of financial instruments, including tax-exempt obligations, United States savings bonds, debts of not more than one year, and obligations issued before March 2, 1984.[[178]](#footnote-178) Several additional exceptions include the following.

a. Small Loan Exception. The OID rules do not apply to a loan if all outstanding loans between the lender and borrower do not exceed $10,000, if the loan is between natural persons, if the loan is not made in the course of a trade or business, and if a principal purpose of the loan is not the avoidance of any federal tax.[[179]](#footnote-179)  (For purposes of this exception, a husband and wife living together are treated as one person.[[180]](#footnote-180) )

b. Loan For Acquiring or Carrying Personal Use Property. This exception merely restricts when the OID can be deducted by the obligor, but does not relieve the lender’s recognition of OID income on an annual basis.[[181]](#footnote-181) (For purposes of this exception, personal use property is all property other than trade or business property or property used for the production of income.[[182]](#footnote-182))

c. Loan with “Qualified Stated Interest.” Having “qualified stated interest” is not really an exception to the OID rules, but effectively avoids having OID under the operation of the rules. As a practical matter, interest that is accrued beyond the taxable year is probably not “qualified stated interest” that is subtracted in determining the amount of OID for that year because there must be specified strict penalties for failing to pay the interest during a year (so strict that the interest in all likelihood will be paid each year).[[183]](#footnote-183)

d. De Minimis OID. The OID is treated as zero if the total OID (i.e., the stated redemption price at maturity less the issue price, as discussed below) is less than ¼ of 1% of the stated redemption price at maturity multiplied by the number of complete years to maturity.[[184]](#footnote-184)

e. Seller-Financed Property Exceptions. If a note is given in consideration for the transfer of property (i.e., not a loan for cash), §1274 applies to determine the “issue price,” which is subtracted from the “stated redemption price at maturity” to determine the amount of OID. There are a variety of exceptions under §1274(c)(3), in which event there generally would be no OID.[[185]](#footnote-185) These exceptions include sales of farms for $1 million or less by individuals or small businesses, sales of principal residences, and sales involving total payments of $250,000 or less.[[186]](#footnote-186) See Section XI.B.4.d of this outline *infra*.

Cash Method Debt Instruments. For certain seller-financed debt instruments that do not exceed $2 million, indexed from 1989,[[187]](#footnote-187) a cash-method seller who is not a dealer can agree with the buyer to treat the note as a “cash method debt instrument.” In that event, the interest is taken into account by both buyer and seller under the cash receipts and disbursements method (i.e., as actually paid).[[188]](#footnote-188)

f. Transactions to Which §483 Applies. Another exception applies in connection with §483. In the limited situations in which §483 applies, there is imputed interest under §483 rather than OID under §1274, and the taxpayer’s accounting method (i.e., cash or accrual) controls the timing for reporting unstated interest; interest is not included or deducted until a payment is made or due.

3. OID Must Be Reported Ratably Over Life of Loan. The aggregate OID over the life of the loan is reported under a daily proration approach.[[189]](#footnote-189) The OID is included in income each year under the OID rules even for cash basis taxpayers. However, any “qualified stated interest” is included based on the taxpayer’s normal method of accounting.[[190]](#footnote-190)

The amount of OID included in income each year is generally determined under the “constant yield method” as described in Regulation §1.1272-1(b)(1).[[191]](#footnote-191)

4. Determination of OID Amount. Original issue discount is the excess (if any) of the “stated redemption price at maturity” over the” issue price.”[[192]](#footnote-192) Each of these terms has very specific technical definitions.

a. Stated Redemption Price at Maturity. The stated redemption price at maturity is the sum of all payments provided for by the debt instrument except for qualified stated interest payments.[[193]](#footnote-193) (Qualified stated interest is excluded from the OID calculation because it is reported separately based on the taxpayers’ accounting methods.) To the extent that stated interest exceeds qualified stated interest (discussed immediately below), the excess is included in the stated redemption price at maturity.[[194]](#footnote-194)

b. Qualified Stated Interest. Qualified stated interest is interest stated in the debt instrument that meets various significant restrictions, including that the note calls for interest at a fixed rate payable unconditionally at fixed periodic intervals of 1 year or less during the entire term of the instrument.[[195]](#footnote-195)

Regulations clarify that the “unconditionally” requirement means that there must be reasonable legal remedies to compel timely payment of the interest or conditions are imposed that make the likelihood of late payment (other than a late payment within a reasonable grace period) of nonpayment a remote contingency.[[196]](#footnote-196) Remedies or other terms and conditions are not taken into account if the lending transaction doesn't reflect arm's length dealing and the holder does not intend to enforce the remedies or other terms and conditions. According to a Senate Finance Committee Report, interest will be considered payable unconditionally only if the failure to pay the interest will result in consequences to the borrower that are typical in normal commercial lending transactions. Thus, in general, interest will be considered payable unconditionally only if the failure to timely pay interest results in acceleration of all amounts under the debt obligation or similar consequences.[[197]](#footnote-197) Rev. Rul. 95-70, 1995-2 C.B. 124 states that if the debt instrument’s terms do not provide the holder with the right to compel payment, they must provide for a penalty that is large enough to ensure that, at the time the debt instrument is issued, it is reasonably certain that the issuer will make interest payments when due.

*Example: Parent loans $100,000 cash to child for a 4-year note that pays stated interest of 1% for the first two years and 6% for the last two years. Assuming there are sufficient restrictions to assure that the interest will be paid currently, the “qualified stated interest” is the 1% amount that is paid throughout the life of the loan. The stated redemption price at maturity includes the full amount of interest payments over the four years less the 1% payments that constitute qualified stated interest. As a result, the stated redemption price at maturity exceeds the issue price (which equals the amount of the cash loan, as discussed below), and the excess amount is OID. A note that has stated interest that does not constitute qualified stated interest will generally have the effect of creating or increasing OID.*

c. Issue Price for Cash Loans. Section 1273 describes the definition of “issue price” for various types of debt instruments, including notes received for cash loans. (There are separate special rules under §1274 that apply to seller-financed transactions, as discussed in Section XI.B.4.d of this outline *infra*.) For cash loans, the “issue price” is the amount loaned.[[198]](#footnote-198)

*Example: Parent loans $1,000,000 cash to Child in return for a 4-year note with stated interest equal to the mid-term AFR on the date of the cash loan. However, the interest is not paid annually (or if the note does call for annual interest payments, there are not sufficient penalties and restrictions on non-payment of interest for the interest to constitute qualified stated interest). Because the interest is not qualified payment interest, the full amount of interest payments under the note will constitute OID, calculated as follows:*

*Stated redemption price at maturity=$1,000,000 + all interest payments required*

*Less Issue price = $1,000,000*

*OID is the amount of aggregate interest payments required under the note.*

d. Issue Price for Seller Financed Transactions. Section 1274 generally applies to debt instruments given in a sale or exchange for property that is not regularly traded on an established market (other than for cash, services, or the right to use property). It applies special rules for determining the issue price. The general concept of §1274 is that all payments due on seller financed sales or exchanges of property are discounted at a minimum interest rate (the relevant AFR) to compute an imputed principal amount. The issue price is the lesser of the stated principal amount or this imputed principal amount. (If the note has stated interest equal to the AFR, the imputed principal amount will generally be the same as the stated principal amount.[[199]](#footnote-199)) The difference between the total payments due under the note (excluding qualified stated interest) and this issue price is the OID that is taxable as ordinary income to the holder of the debt instrument over his holding period.

Seller-Financed Property Exceptions. There are several exceptions involving debt instruments given for sales or exchanges of property where §1274 does not apply. (In those situations, there will be no OID—the issue price is of the debt instrument is its stated redemption price at maturity.[[200]](#footnote-200) )

These exceptions include sales of farms by individuals or small businesses for $1 million or less, sales of principal residences, and sales involving total payments of $250,000 or less.[[201]](#footnote-201)

Debt Instrument With Adequate Stated Interest. If the debt instrument has adequate stated interest, the issue price is the stated principal amount under the note (including all payments due under the note other than stated interest). There will be adequate stated interest if the debt instrument has a single stated interest rate, paid or compounded at least annually, that is equal to or greater than the test rate under §1274(d).[[202]](#footnote-202) The test rate is generally the lowest of the AFRs for the 3-month period ending with the month in which there is a binding contract of sale.[[203]](#footnote-203)

However, there are several exceptions in which the test rate is different than the AFR. For sale-leaseback transactions, the test rate is 110% of the AFR.[[204]](#footnote-204) For “qualified debt instruments” under §1274A(b) (notes under $2.8 million, indexed since 1989--$5,339,300 in 2012, for the sale or exchange of property other than new §38 property), the test rate is no greater than 9%, compounded semiannually.

*Example: Parent sells property worth $1.0 million to Child in February 2012 in return for a 4-year note. The note bears interest at 1.12% (the mid-term AFR for February 2012), with all interest and principal being due at the end of 4 years (i.e., $1,045,558). The note has adequate interest. The issue price is the stated principal amount of the note, or $1,000,000. The OID calculation is as follows:*

*Stated redemption price at maturity $1,045,558*

*Less issue price (stated principal amount) 1,000,000*

*OID 45,558*

Debt Instrument That Does Not Have Adequate Stated Interest. If the debt instrument does not have adequate stated interest, its issue price is the sum of the present values of all payments, including interest, due under the instrument, using a discount rate equal to the relevant test rate under §1274(d) (as described immediately above).[[205]](#footnote-205) The sum of such present values is the imputed principal amount of the note.[[206]](#footnote-206)

5. Loan Transaction With Grantor Trust Not Subject to OID Complexities. If the loan/seller financed transaction is with a grantor trust, the lender/seller does not have to recognize interest income because he or she is treated as the owner of the trust income and assets for income tax purposes.[[207]](#footnote-207)

XII. DEDUCTION OF INTEREST PAID UNDER LOANS

A. Overview. Under both §7872 and the OID rules of §1274, the interest element that is recognized as interest or OID taxable income in a particular year by the lender may be deducted in that same year by the borrower if the interest is of a type that is deductible under the Code.[[208]](#footnote-208)

The general requirements for deducting interest are briefly summarized below.

B. Personal Interest. Interest that is not explicitly deductible under specified provisions in §163 (including, among other things, investment interest an, qualified residence interest) is treated as personal interest that is not deductible.[[209]](#footnote-209)

C. Investment Interest. A noncorporate taxpayer may deduct “investment interest” to the extent of “net investment income” for the taxable year.[[210]](#footnote-210) An unlimited carryforward is allowed for investment interest so that it can be deducted in a succeeding taxable year to the extent the taxpayer has investment income in that succeeding year.[[211]](#footnote-211) (If the taxpayer never has such an excess, the carryover dies with the taxpayer.)

Both “investment interest” and “net investment income” relate to interest expense or income related to “property held for investment,” which is generally property that “produces income” in the form of interest, dividends, annuities, or royalties or is “of a type” that produces such income.[[212]](#footnote-212) For example, stock is held for investment even if dividends are not received in a year because stock is a type of property that produces dividend income.[[213]](#footnote-213) In addition, “property held for investment” includes an interest in a trade or business if the business is not a passive activity for purposes of §469 (such as working interests in oil and gas properties) and if the taxpayer does not materially participate in the business.[[214]](#footnote-214)

“Investment interest” is interest expense that generally is deductible (*e.g.,* an expense that is not required to be capitalized) that is “properly allocable to property held for investment” other than qualified residence interest or interest expense included in computing income or loss from a passive activity subject to §469.[[215]](#footnote-215) “In general, interest expense on a debt is allocated in the same manner as the debt to which such interest expense relates is allocated. Debt is allocated by tracing disbursements of the debt proceeds to specific expenditures.”[[216]](#footnote-216) Specific rules for tracing debt proceeds to specific expenditures are described in that temporary regulation.[[217]](#footnote-217)

“Net investment income” is the excess of investment income over investment expense.[[218]](#footnote-218) Investment income generally is gross income from property held for investment and generally includes net gain on dispositions of such property.[[219]](#footnote-219) Investment expenses that must be deducted in determining net investment income includes all deductions “(other than for interest) which are directly connected with the production of investment income”.[[220]](#footnote-220) Gross income or expenses of a passive activity are not included in the calculation of net investment income. Net capital gain and qualified dividend income are included in investment income only to the extent the taxpayer so elects.[[221]](#footnote-221) (Making this election causes such net capital gain or qualified dividend income to be treat as ordinary income,[[222]](#footnote-222) but making the election is often advantageous because the effect is that the net capital gain or qualified dividend ordinary income can be offset by the investment interest deduction. A taxpayer may choose not to make the election if the taxpayer anticipates having ordinary investment income in excess of investment expense in an upcoming year, so that the investment interest expense offsets what would otherwise by recognized as ordinary income in the near future.)

D. Original Issue Discount. Section 163(e) provides that the issuer of a debt instrument (i.e., the borrower who gives a note) may deduct the daily portions of OID during the taxable year as determined under §1272(a) to the extent the deduction is not disallowed by some other Code provision (for example, if the proceeds of the debt instrument were used to acquire personal use property.) As with all of the OID rules, the provisions of §163(e) are quire complex.

E. Qualified Residence Interest. Interest on loans to acquire a personal residence or home equity loans secured by a personal residence can be deducted, subject to various limitations on loans amounts can be deducted if various requirements under §163(h)(3)-(4) are satisfied. One of the important requirements is that the loan must be secured by the residence. See Section XIII.B of this outline *infra,* for a summary of the requirements to be able to deduct personal residence interest.

XIII. HOME MORTGAGE NOTES

A. Significance. Parents are increasingly making loans to children to finance their acquisition of personal residences, or even second homes. In December 2012, the AFR for mid-term loans (3-9 years) is 0.95% and the AFR for long-term loans (over 9 years) is 2.40%. These incredibly low rates are significant lower than rates that the children can get from commercial lenders for home mortgage loans. More significantly, as lenders have adopted much stricter down payment and qualification standards for home mortgage loans, loans from parents may be the only alternative for the child to be able to acquire a residence desired by the child (and that the child’s parents wants the child to be able to purchase).

B. Qualified Residence Interest. Interest on loans secured by personal residences (or second homes) may be deducted only if the loan meets various requirements so that the interest is “qualified personal interest.”[[223]](#footnote-223) The main requirement is that the loan must be secured by the personal residence. Even though the parent may be willing to make an unsecured loan, the loan should be documented with a legally binding mortgage in order for the child to be able to deduct the interest on the loan as qualified residence interest.

The major requirements for the loan to qualify so that interest on the loan is qualified interest are summarized.

1. Legally Liable; Debtor Relationship. The borrower is legally liable for the loan. There is a true debtor-creditor relationship.

2. Secured by Residence. The mortgage is secured by the borrower’s principal residence (as described in §121) or a second home in which the borrower has an ownership interest.[[224]](#footnote-224)

Debt is secured by a qualified residence only if (1) the residence is specific security for the loan, (2) the residence can be foreclosed on in the event of default, and (3) the security interest is recorded or otherwise perfected under state law, whether or not the deed is recorded.[[225]](#footnote-225)

While the residence must be secured by the residence, the loan can still qualify even if the security interest is ineffective or the enforceability of the security interest is restricted under any applicable state or local homestead or other debtor protection law.[[226]](#footnote-226) The debt can be secured by other assets in addition to the residence without violating the security requirement.[[227]](#footnote-227)

Observe that a non-tax advantage of having the loan secured by the residence is that if the residence is awarded to the borrower’s spouse in a divorce action, the residence continues to serve as collateral for the outstanding loan.

3. Qualified Residence. A qualified residence includes a house, condominium, mobile home, boat, house trailer, or other property that under all the facts and circumstances can be considered a residence.[[228]](#footnote-228)

A residence currently under construction can be treated as a qualified residence for a period of up to 24 months if it becomes a qualified residence when it is ready for occupancy.[[229]](#footnote-229)

If the residence is rented during the year, it is treated as a qualified residence only if the taxpayer uses it for personal purposes for a number of days that exceeds the greater of (i) 14 days, or (2) 10% of the number of days the unit was rented at a fair rental rate.[[230]](#footnote-230) If a second residence is not rented or held out for rent during the year, it qualifies as a qualified residence even if the taxpayer does not use the residence personally during the year. I.R.C. §163(h)(4)(A)(iii).

4. Types of Qualifying Loans and Limitations on Amounts of Loans. The loan is acquisition indebtedness (i.e., debt incurred in acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving the residence,[[231]](#footnote-231) or a refinancing of acquisition indebtedness, or home equity indebtedness.[[232]](#footnote-232)

For acquisition indebtedness, the aggregate amount treated as acquisition indebtedness does not exceed $1.0 million ($500,000 for a married individual filing a separate return).[[233]](#footnote-233) (The $1 million acquisition indebtedness limit is a “per residence” limitation, not a “per taxpayer” limitation where the residence is owned jointly by two individuals.[[234]](#footnote-234))

For home equity indebtedness, the aggregate amount treated as home equity indebtedness does not exceed the fair market value of the residence reduced by acquisition indebtedness, and does not exceed $100,000 ($50,000 for a married individual filing a separate return).[[235]](#footnote-235)

The combined acquisition indebtedness and home equity indebtedness that can qualify is up to $1,100,000, or $550,000 for married individuals filing separate returns. A taxpayer who borrows more than $1 million to purchase a principal residence may deduct the interest on up to $1.1 million of the loan: $1 million as acquisition indebtedness and $100,000 as home equity indebtedness.[[236]](#footnote-236)

If the debt secured by the residence exceeds the $1.1 million amount, there must be an allocation of interest that is attributable to the amount of debt that qualifies. Various allocation methods are provided in temporary regulations (that were issued before the $1.1 million limit was imposed under OBRA in 1987), and in an IRS Notice and Publication.[[237]](#footnote-237) the IRS has confirmed that, based on the legislative history of § 163(h), until further it regulations are issued, taxpayers may use any reasonable method in allocating debt in excess of the acquisition and home equity debt limitation, including the exact and simplified methods in the temporary regulations, the method in Publication 936, or a reasonable approximation of these methods.[[238]](#footnote-238)

5. Estate or Trust. For a residence held by an estate or trust, the interest can be qualified interest if the residence is a qualified residence of a beneficiary who has a present interest in such estate or trust or an interest in the residuary of such estate or trust.[[239]](#footnote-239)

6. Reporting Requirements. If qualified residential interest is paid to an individual (such as a parent), the name, address, and TIN of the person to whom the interest is paid must be disclosed on Form 1040, Schedule A, and a $50 penalty can be assed for the failure to do so.

XIV. REFINANCING NOTES AT LOWER CURRENT AFR

A. Overview. There are no cases, regulations or rulings that address the gift tax effects of refinancing notes. Proposed regulations under §7872 include a section entitled “Treatment of Renegotiations,” but merely reserves the subject for later guidance, which has never been issued.[[240]](#footnote-240) One commentator concludes that refinancings at lower AFRS should be possible without gift consequences:

“Although there is no case, ruling, or Code section that explicitly provides that promissory notes may be restated without gift tax effects, economic analysis of the transaction and Regulations strongly support the conclusion that it is possible to do so without a taxable gift being deemed to occur.”[[241]](#footnote-241)

Other commentators have agreed, for example, concluding that “there is no gift consequence when such a loan is refinanced at a lower AFR.”[[242]](#footnote-242)

B. Economic Analysis If Notes Can Be Prepaid by Borrower. If the borrower can prepay the note with a penalty at any time, and if prevailing interest rates decline, the borrower would likely pay off the original note and borrow the amount on a new note at current rates. That happens daily with thousands of homeowners refinancing their mortgages as interest rates have declined. The borrower could either (i) pay off the original loan (with the higher interest rate) and borrow again at the lower rate, or (ii) give a new note (at the current AFR) in substitution for the original note (with the higher interest rate).

This phenomenon is supported by the prices at which marketable callable notes are traded. For callable bonds, the bond prices do not increase proportionally as interest rate decrease (because investors know that the issuer may likely call (i.e., prepay) the bonds that bear higher than current market rates.[[243]](#footnote-243)

While it is possible that the IRS might argue that a gift results by re-characterizing the transaction as merely having the lender accept a lower AFR note in placed of a higher AFR note, there is no case law or rulings addressing the issue. One commentator reasons that logically there should be no gift tax consequences:

“Many of the promissory notes used in the intrafamilial context are term (rather than demand) notes that provide that the borrower may, at the borrower’s option, prepay all or any portion of the principal of the promissory note at any time with premium or penalty of any kind. Whether or not this right to prepay is restricted, if the borrower has the funds available, it seems that the borrower, without negative gift or income tax consequences, may repay the lender in advance of the maturity date, thereby decreasing the amount of total interest that would accrue on the borrower’s debt (and, as a result, the total payment the lender expected to receive under the note in *the* absence of repayment).”[[244]](#footnote-244)

C. Regulations (Including Proposed Regulations) Suggest That Refinancing to a Lower AFR Is Not A Gift. Commentators have provided cogent analysis of regulations suggesting that there should be no gift tax consequences to substituting a lower AFR note for a high rate note. The Blattmachr, Madden, Crawford article reasons as follows:[[245]](#footnote-245)

(1) Proposed regulation §25.7872-1 provides a rule for valuing a term loan note, and it seems to contemplate addressing the value of the note *just at the time the loan is made.[[246]](#footnote-246)* According to its heading, that proposed regulation applies only to “Certain Below-Market Loans,” which would not include loans having stated interest equal to the AFR (or higher). In any event, there is no proposed regulation addressing the valuation of notes for gift tax purposes after they have been issued.

(2) Section 7872(h) (now §7872(i)) may authorize gift tax regulations regarding the valuation of intra-family notes that bear interest at the AFR in light of §7872, but none have been promulgated.

(3) The gift tax regulation that generally applies for valuing notes says that the value is” the amount of unpaid principal, plus accrued interest to the date of the gift, unless the donor establishes a lower value.” A *lower* value may be established by satisfactory evidence “that the note is worth less than the unpaid amount (because of the interest rate, or date or maturity, or other cause), or that the note is uncollectible … and that the property, if any, pledged or mortgaged as security is insufficient to satisfy it.”[[247]](#footnote-247)

(4) Proposed regulations under §7872 regarding the *estate tax* value of notes says that the value is the lesser of “a) the unpaid stated principal, plus accrued interest, or b) the sum of the present value of all payment due under the note (including accrual interest), using the applicable Federal rate for loans of a term equal to the remaining term of the loan in effect at the date of death.”[[248]](#footnote-248)

(5) Thus, the only applicable gift tax regulation, and the proposed estate tax regulation, both indicate that the value of a note as of the relevant date will not be greater than the amount of unpaid principal plus accrued interest.

(6) As a result, “a family note issued at the AFR which is higher than the current AFR has an FMV for gift tax purposes *not greater* than its face amount.”[[249]](#footnote-249)

(7) Therefore, there should be no gift if a lower AFR note is substituted for a pre-existing note with a higher interest rate. The “old” note has a value presumed to equal its face amount and the new note has a gift tax value under §7872 equal to its face amount (as long as the interest rate is at least equal to the AFR). Therefore, the exchanged notes have equal values for gift tax purposes, and no gift results from the exchange.

D. Does Refinancing Suggest Transaction Is Not a Loan? A possible concern is that consistent refinancing of the note may be a factor in determining that the loan transaction does not result in bona fide debt, but should be treated as an equity transfer.[[250]](#footnote-250)

E. Practical Planning Pointers. In light of the lack of any case law or direct discussion of refinancings at lower AFRs in regulations or in any rulings, most planners suggest caution in this area, and not merely refinancing notes every time the AFR decreases.[[251]](#footnote-251) If the planner is concerned about the treatment of a refinancing (perhaps because there have been refinancing in the past), consider having the borrower borrow money from a bank to repay the loan and several months later approaching the original lender about the possibility of borrowing money under a new note (at the lower AFR) to be able to pay off the bank. Repeated refinancings every time the AFR goes down would seem to fall clearly under the “Pigs get fat and hogs get slaughtered” proverb. Lenders in arm’s length transactions are not willing to simply reduce interest rates on existing debt, at least not without getting something in return.

Some planners advise renegotiating the terms of notes not only to adopt the lower more current AFR, but also to compensate the lender in some say for accepting the lower rate, “perhaps by paying down the principal amount, shortening the maturity date, or adding more attractive collateral.”[[252]](#footnote-252)

Another possibility is to change the interest rate to a rate that is higher than the minimum required rate, but lower than the interest rate stated in the original loan. The rationale for this suggestion is that borrowers in the commercial context will not continue paying higher interest rates if they can refinance a debt at a significantly lower interest rate without a prepayment penalty. Refinancing, however, may incur some closing costs, but those costs maybe minimal compared to the interest savings over the remaining term of the note. If the borrower refinances the note, the original lender will then lend the funds to some other borrower, but at the current lower interest rate. A refinancing at a lower, but not quite down to market rates, may result in a win/win for both the borrower and lender.[[253]](#footnote-253)

XV. DISCOUNTING OF NOTES FOR GIFT AND ESTATE TAX PURPOSES

A. Various Factors Recognized by Cases and IRS in Discounting Notes.

1. Discounting Generally Permitted Upon Showing of “Satisfactory Evidence.” The gift and estate tax regulations for valuing notes generally (discussed below) provide that notes can be valued at less than face value plus accrued interest if the donor or estate demonstrates by “satisfactory evidence” that the value is lower. The IRS has conceded in Technical Advice Memoranda that notes need not necessarily be valued at their face amounts.

Technical Advice Memorandum 8229001 identified eight specific considerations for valuing mortgages and promissory notes.[[254]](#footnote-254)

* Presence or lack of protective covenants (the more onerous the restrictions on the borrower, the lower the risk for the lender and the lower the required discount);
* Nature of the default provisions and the default risk (the default risk is lower [and the discount is lower] if the borrower has better coverage for making payments, evidenced by factors such as interest coverage ratios, fixed-charge coverage ratios, and debt-equity ratios; the more stringent the default provisions under the note, the lower the risk to the lender [and the discount is lower]);
* Financial strength of the issuer (the key financial ratios mentioned above and current economic conditions, including financial strength of any parties giving guarantees are important, strong financials indicate lower risk and lower discounts);
* Value of the security (the higher the value of the security, the lower the risk for the lender and the lower the discount);
* Interest rate and term of the note (the analysis goes beyond just determining in the interest rate on the note equals the current market rate, an increase in market interest rates during the term of the note will decrease the value of the note, the longer the term of the note, the more exposed the holder is to interest rate increases and the greater the discount on the note [or the higher the required interest rate to offset this risk]);
* Comparable market yields (the yields from various types of financial instruments may be considered, the most comparable debt instrument is used and adjustments are made for specific risk differences from the comparable instrument, there may be few comparables for private transaction notes);
* Payment history (if payments are current and are made timely, especially if there is a lengthy history of timely payments, the risk for the lender is lower [and the discount is lower]); and
* Size of the note (there are conflicting impacts, on one hand the borrower may have more ability to repay smaller notes, on the other hand small notes are note as likely to be from larger companies with excellent financials and the universe of potential buyers of small notes is very limited; smaller notes may call for higher discounts).

Technical Advice Memorandum 9240003 valued a note for estate tax purposes. The note from the decedent’s nephew had a face amount of $215,000 and was cancelled in the decedent’s will. The TAM concluded that the note was worth significantly less than face value because of its uncollectability (and also determined that the cancellation did not result in taxable income to the nephew because the cancellation was in the nature of a gift).

Upon a showing of appropriate circumstances, it is clear that notes can be discounted for gift and estate tax purposes.[[255]](#footnote-255)

2. Cases. Cases in various contexts have addressed factors that should be considered in valuing notes. Courts have applied substantial discounts to notes in a variety of estate tax cases.[[256]](#footnote-256)

For gift tax purposes, if gifts are made of notes themselves, the IRS has an incentive to reduce the amount of discount-to-face of the gift tax value of the notes. On the other hand, if assets are transferred in return for notes, the IRS has an incentive to increase the discount-to-face of the notes and to treat the excess value transferred over the value of the notes as gifts. Discounts have been allowed in gift tax cases.[[257]](#footnote-257) Note valuations can arise in a wide variety of contexts for income tax purposes, and various income tax cases have allowed substantial discounts.[[258]](#footnote-258)

3. Interrelationship of Estate and Gift Tax Values of Notes. A recurring situation is of a taxpayer who makes a transfer in return for a note, claiming that the note equals the value of the asset transferred so that there is no gift. At the taxpayer’s death, the estate takes the position that a discount-to-face should be applied in valuing the note for estate tax purposes. There can certainly be situations where interest rate changes or changes in the borrower’s ability to repay may justify valuation differences, but the estate should expect the IRS agent to be wary that the IRS is being whipsawed in such situations. Indeed, the IRS Estate Tax Examiner’s Handbook advises agents that reporting a note from a related party at less than its face amount raises strong evidence that a gift was made at the date of the issuance of the note.[[259]](#footnote-259)

B. Gift Tax Regulations and §7872. The general regulation for valuing notes for gift tax purposes states that the value is the unpaid principal plus accrued interest, unless the evidence shows that the note is worth less (e.g., because of the interest rate or date or maturity) or is uncollectible in whole or in part. The regulation provides:

“The fair market value of notes, secured or unsecured, is presumed to be the amount of unpaid principal, plus accrued interest to the date of the gift, unless the donor establishes a lower value. Unless returned at face value, plus accrued interest, it must be shown by satisfactory evidence that the note is worth less than the unpaid amount (because of the interest rate, or date of maturity, or other cause), or that the note is uncollectible in part (by reason of the insolvency of the party or parties liable, or for other cause), and that the property, if any, pledged or mortgaged as security is insufficient to satisfy it.”[[260]](#footnote-260)

Section 7872 provides rules for determining the amount of gifts incurred by making below-market loans. The gift amount is the amount of the forgone interest.[[261]](#footnote-261) The statute does not address other factors that may impact the value of the notes—it just addresses how much gift results as a result of using an interest rate that is lower than the appropriate AFR. The statute does not address the gift tax implications of a note that has an interest rate that is equal to or greater than the AFR. However, the clear implication of §7872 is that a note that bears interest that is equal to or greater than the AFR will not be treated as a gift, merely because of the interest rate that is used on the note. Indeed, the IRS took that position in *Frazee v. Commissioner[[262]](#footnote-262)* and has consistently applied that same position in subsequent private letter rulings.[[263]](#footnote-263)

Even following the adoption of §7872, the value of notes apparently can be discounted because of factors stated in the general estate tax regulations other than the interest rate used in the notes. There are no proposed regulations issued in conjunction with §7872 that purport to override the general gift tax valuation principles for notes under Reg. § 25.2512-4. Prop. Reg. §25.7872-1, which addresses the gift tax implications of below market loans under §7872, makes no reference to discounting the value of loans for reasons other than comparison of the interest rate on the note to the AFR. Proposed regulations under § 2512, issued in conjunction with proposed regulations issued under §7872, simply make reference to §7872: “See §25.7872-1 for special rules in the case of gift loans (within the meaning of §1.7872-4(b)) made after June 6, 1984.”[[264]](#footnote-264)

The preamble to those proposed gift tax regulations simply states that “Proposed §25.7872-1 implements section 7872(a) by providing that the amount transferred by the lender to the borrower and characterized as a gift is subject to the gift tax provisions.”

Keep in mind that a “gift loan” is a below-market loan where the forgone interest is in the nature of a gift.[[265]](#footnote-265) Therefore, a loan that bears adequate interest and that is therefore not a below-market loan, by definition is not a “gift loan.” Therefore, even the brief reference in gift tax proposed regulations issued in conjunction with the proposed regulations under §7872 would not apply to loans that bear interest at a rate equal to the applicable AFR or greater.

C. Estate Tax Regulations and §7872. The general estate tax regulation regarding the valuation of notes is very similar to the gift tax regulation quoted above, and provides that the estate tax value is the amount of unpaid principal plus interest accrued to the date of death, unless the executor establishes that the value if lower by satisfactory evidence that the note is worth less than the unpaid amount (e.g., because of the interest rate or the date of maturity) or that the note is uncollectible by reason of insolvency of the maker and because property pledged as security is insufficient to satisfy the obligation.[[266]](#footnote-266)

If economic conditions change from the time the note was given and interest rates generally rise by the time of the holder’s death, the value of the note may be discounted—based on the changed conditions—as provided in the estate tax regulations. A particularly interesting issue is whether a note providing for interest at the AFR can be discounted for estate tax purposes merely because interest at the AFR is below what the market would charge for a similar note, even if interest rates have not generally increased from the time the note was given to the date of the holder’s death. We know that §7872 provides an artificially low interest rate — the rate at which the United States government can borrow. Stated differently, if the estate were to try to sell the note, with an interest rate at AFR, a hypothetical willing buyer would not pay full face value because the AFR is based on the safest of debt instruments—one from the U.S. government. Can the estate tax valuation reflect that reality?[[267]](#footnote-267) The Tax Court in *Estate of Duncan v. Commissioner[[268]](#footnote-268)* observed that under fiduciary principles, an irrevocable trust would be questioned for loaning money to another trust (even having the same trustee and beneficiaries) if the interest rate was not greater than the AFR, because the AFR is based on the yield on U.S. government obligations.[[269]](#footnote-269)

While §7872 addresses gift issues, and subsequent authority recognizes that notes with interest at the AFR will not be discounted merely for gift tax purposes because of the interest rate, there is no such similar certainty for estate tax purposes. As discussed below, however, a proposed regulation under §7872 suggests that such discounting, merely because the AFR is an artificially low interest rate, would not be allowed.[[270]](#footnote-270) However, that regulation has never been finalized.

Does that mean that the note can be discounted for estate tax purposes because there are no regulations on point for estate tax purposes? Because there is no coordinating regulation some attorneys take the position that general valuation principles should be applicable, and it may be possible to discount the note for estate tax purposes if the note uses the AFR as the interest rate. *Be aware, however*, the IRS estate tax agent may feel that taking a discount for this reason alone is abusive (because the note was not similarly discounted for gift tax valuation purposes at the time of the sale) and may closely scrutinize every aspect of the sale or loan transaction. Lance S. Hall, with FMV Opinions, Inc. reports one example of having appraised a note for estate tax purposes at about half the outstanding balance of the note—and having the value accepted in the estate tax audit. Hall, The FMV Solution (September 15, 2009). (In the situation described, FMV Opinions, Inc. applied a discount rate based upon required rates of return for highly rated publicly traded debt issued by REITs, adjusted for the substantial differences between the note and the public debt. Specifically, while the trust was well capitalized as of the date of death, the note was unsecured and lacked protective covenants. Additionally, both the note and the underlying assets of the trust were not readily marketable.)

Section 7872 specifically authorizes the issuance of regulations addressing the valuation of notes in light of §7872. Section 7872(i)(2) states that “[u]nder regulations prescribed by the Secretary, any loan which is made with donative intent and which is a term loan shall be taken into account for purposes of chapter 11 [the estate tax chapter] in a manner consistent with the provisions of subsection (b) [providing for the income and gift tax treatment of below-market loans.]” Commentators observe that regardless what Congress meant, it merely authorized regulations (final regulations have never been issued) “and did not write a self-executing rule.” [[271]](#footnote-271)

The IRS has issued a proposed regulation for estate tax purposes that directly addresses the estate tax value of a “gift term loan” following the issuance of §7872 and that may even address the value of notes having adequate interest. The proposed regulation conceivably purports to say that the value of the note could not be discounted for estate tax purposes except to make adjustments where the stated interest rate under the note is lower than the AFR in effect at the date of death or where the facts impacting the collectability of the note have changed “significantly since the time the loan was made.” In this regard, the proposed regulation may impose a stricter standard for discounting notes for estate tax purposes because of uncollectability issues than the standards described in the general estate tax regulation for valuing notes, which do not impose the requirement of a “significant” change. Prop. Reg. §20.7872-1 provides:

“For purposes of chapter 11 of the Internal Revenue Code, relating to estate tax, a gift term loan (within the meaning of §1.7872-4(b)) that is made after June 6, 1984, shall be valued at the lesser of:

(a) The unpaid stated principal, plus accrued interest; or

(b) The sum of the present value of all payments due under the note (including accrual interest), using the applicable Federal rate for loans of a term equal to the remaining term of the loan in effect at the date of death.

No discount is allowed based on evidence that the loan is uncollectible unless the facts concerning collectability of the loan have changed significantly since the time the loan was made. This section applies with respect to any term loan made with donative intent after June 6, 1984, regardless of the interest rate under the loan agreement, and *regardless of whether that interest rate exceeds the applicable Federal rate in effect on the day on which the loan was made*.”[[272]](#footnote-272)

The proposed regulation says that it applies to valuing a “gift term loan,” which would be a below market loan (with interest less than the relevant AFR). However, the last sentence says that it applies to any term loan made with donative intent *even* *if the interest rate exceeds the AFR* on the day the loan was made. Query, does the “with donative intent” phrase simply mean that the loan was not a compensation related loan or corporation-shareholder loan as referenced in §7872(c)(1) (B-C), or does it refer to a loan that was intended as a gift even though it had an interest rate higher than the relevant AFR? Arguably, the note given in a sale transaction does not reflect a loan “with donative intent.” In any event, this regulation has never been finalized.

What is the effect of proposed regulations? The IRS may support a position by reference to proposed regulations but insists that they cannot be relied on to support a position that contradicts a position being taken by the IRS.[[273]](#footnote-273) Courts view proposed regulations as merely a source of “informed judgment” and accord them “no more weight than a litigant’s position.”[[274]](#footnote-274) However, courts may follow proposed regulations if neither the taxpayer nor the IRS challenges their validity.[[275]](#footnote-275)

D. Valuation of Notes in Entity. If the note is in an entity that is valued on an asset-value basis, the note may be discounted, and the decedent’s interest in the entity may subsequently be discounted as well for lack of control or lack of marketability. However, the IRS may raise objections if a note is contributed to an LLC or partnership for the sole purpose of achieving an additional “wrapper” discount. For example, if an asset is sold to a grantor trust in return for an installment note, and the if the note is contributed to an LLC and the LLC interest is given to another grantor trust with the same beneficiaries, the IRS may raise objections if a substantial valuation discount is claimed on the value of the LLC interest that contains the note as its sole asset.

E. Income Tax Impact of Discounting Note Values. In deciding whether to take the position that a note is discounted for income tax purposes, the planner must realize that while the discount may result in estate tax savings, there may be adverse income tax implications attributable to that discount as payments are later received on the note.

If an individual inherits a note (other than an installment sale note) that is valued below face, and if the individual receive payments on the note exceeding the discounted value of the note, the excess is treated as ordinary income.[[276]](#footnote-276) For example, sections 1271-1275 deal with OID by requiring the debt holder to take any discount into income as ordinary income, not as capital gain.[[277]](#footnote-277) In addition, the debt holder may be required to accrue the discount over his holding period without regard to his usual method of accounting. If there is no sale or exchange of the note, there would be no capital gain element of the income recognition. An example in a respected treatise illustrates this phenomenon:

*“EXAMPLE: Mom lends Son $1,000,000 at the then AFR of 7 percent. When she dies, the value of the note is $750,000, for whatever reason, even though $1,000,000 is still outstanding. If the note’s value for estate tax purposes is $750,000, then when the $1,000,000 is paid, the recipient will have ordinary income of $250,000. If the note is distributed to Son, he will have cancellation of indebtedness income of $250,000 on the distribution.*[[278]](#footnote-278)

The result should be different if an individual receives the note by gift. Under the dual basis rules of §1015, the donee’s basis in the note would be the donor’s basis for purposes of determining the amount of any gain. Therefore, the reduction in value of the note up to the time of the gift would not result in a decreased basis for purposes of determining later gain on the note.

If the note is an installment sales note, special rules apply if the note is satisfied at less than face value, if there is a disposition or cancellation of the note, or if related parties dispose of property purchased with the installment note within two years of the sale.[[279]](#footnote-279)

XVI. EFFECT OF WAIVER, CANCELLATION OR FORGIVENESS OF NOTE LIABILITY

A. No Discharge of Indebtedness Income for Promissory Notes. If the forgiveness or cancellation of the loan (other than an installment sale note) is in the nature of a gift, there is no discharge of indebtedness income, because §102 excludes from the definition of gross income any amount received as a gift or bequest, and this overrides § 61(a).[[280]](#footnote-280) The forgiveness of a family loan is typically intended as a gift. Section 108 contains special rules regarding discharge of indebtedness income. The Senate Finance Report accompanying the passage of §108 specifically states that “debt discharge that is only a medium for some other payment, such as gift or salary, is treated as that form of payment rather than under the debt discharge rules.”[[281]](#footnote-281)

If the borrower is insolvent when the loan is forgiven with no further prospect of being able to repay the loan, the forgiveness may not be a gift but just a reflection of economic reality. There should be no discharge of indebtedness income if the forgiveness occurs in a bankruptcy case or when the obligor is insolvent.[[282]](#footnote-282) In that circumstance, the lender may be able to take a bad debt deduction for the year in which the loan becomes worthless.[[283]](#footnote-283) If the loan was made in the ordinary course of the lender’s trade or business, it may result in a business bad debt deduction, which results in ordinary losses.[[284]](#footnote-284) Much more common, in the intra-family loan context, is that the loan is a nonbusiness debt, which results in short term capital loss.[[285]](#footnote-285) However, special scrutiny applies to intra-family loans, and unless the lender can overcome the presumption that the loan was a gift when made,[[286]](#footnote-286) no bad debt deduction is allowed.

Another exception is that discharge of indebtedness income up to $2 million of mortgage debt on the taxpayer’s principal residence before 2014 is excluded from gross income. This applies to the restructuring of debt, foreclosure of a principal residence, or short sale of a principal residence in which the sales proceeds are insufficient to pay off the mortgage and the lender cancels the balance.[[287]](#footnote-287)

If a parent loaned cash to a non-grantor trust for the parent’s children and the trust becomes insolvent, the parent should be able to cancel the note and avoid discharge of indebtedness income by the trust under §108(a)(1)(B) even without taking the position that the cancellation is a gift. Indeed, arguably the cancellation is not a gift because the note is worthless in any event. (However, if the note arose as a result of an installment sale, there are special rules that apply when installment sale notes are cancelled,[[288]](#footnote-288) as discussed in Section XVIII.C.2 of this outline *infra*.)

Through 2012, a homeowner may exclude from income up to $2 million ($1 million if married filing separately) of debt incurred to buy, build or substantially improve his or her principal residence, which debt is reduced by mortgage restructuring or by forgiveness in connection with a foreclosure.[[289]](#footnote-289) However, if the home mortgage arose by a loan from a family member, it is likely that the forgiveness results from a gift, in which event the full amount of debt forgiveness (even exceeding $2 million) would be excluded from income. However, a family member may in the appropriate situation take the position that the restructuring is not a gift but is in light of economic realities, and that even though the borrower may not qualify for the insolvency exception, the debt relief does not result in taxable income to the borrower.

For a grantor trust, a note from the grantor trust to the grantor (in return for a cash loan of a sale of assets) can be forgiven by the grantor without causing discharge of income taxable income because the debt is treated as owned by the grantor for income tax purposes (i.e., a loan from the grantor to the grantor).[[290]](#footnote-290) That is most helpful because the exception for insolvent taxpayers under §108(a)(1)(B) would not apply even if the grantor trust was also insolvent unless the grantor were also insolvent under proposed regulations. Proposed regulations provide that grantor trusts and disregarded entities will not be considered the “taxpayer” under §108, but the grantor trust or entity owner is treated as the taxpayer.[[291]](#footnote-291) Therefore, the §108 exceptions are available for grantor trusts and disregarded entities only to the extent that the owner is insolvent or undergoing bankruptcy.

B. Special Rules for Cancellation of Installment Note. There are special rules governing the cancellation or forgiveness of an installment sales note, designed to prevent a seller from being able to avoid income recognition from the initial sale.[[292]](#footnote-292)

C. Possibility of Avoiding Having to Recognize Unpaid Interest Income Upon Loan Forgiveness. Even though there is not discharge of indebtedness income on the forgiveness of a loan, that does not necessarily address whether the lender must recognize accrued but unpaid interest as taxable income. Section 7872 addresses the income and gift tax implications of below-market loans, but §7872(i)(1)(A) specifically authorizes the issuance of regulations to provide that adjustments will be made to the extent necessary to carry out the purposes of §7872 if there are waivers of interest.

The proposed regulations to §7872 discuss the effect of forgiving interest payments.[[293]](#footnote-293) While §7872 generally applies to below-market loans, the proposed regulation appears to apply to loans with adequate interest and that are not below-market loans. (The regulation states that it applies to loans with stated interest that initially would have been subject to §7872 had they been made without interest.)

The somewhat strangely worded regulation operates by negative implication. It says that a waiver of interest payments will be treated as if interest had been paid to the lender (requiring the lender to realize interest income) and then retransferred by the lender to the borrower (as a gift where the forgiveness is in the nature of a gift) *but only if* three conditions are satisfied:

“(1) the loan initially would have been subject to section7872 had if been made without interest;

(2) the waiver, cancellation or forgiveness does not include in substantial part the loan principal; and

(3) a principal purpose of the waiver, cancellation, or forgiveness is to confer a benefit on the borrower, such as to pay compensation or make a gift, a capital contribution, a distribution of money under section 301, or a similar payment to the borrower.”[[294]](#footnote-294)

If a family loan is forgiven as a gift, the first and third requirements are satisfied. Therefore all three requirements will be satisfied (and the waived interest will have to be recognized as income by the lender) *only if* “the waiver, cancellation or forgiveness does not include in substantial part the loan principal.” Stated a different way, this proposed regulation indicates that the lender will not be treated as having received interest that is forgiven if the forgiveness includes not only interest on the loan but also “in substantial part the loan principal.”

One respected commentator reasons that forgiveness of principal and accrued interest will be treated the same as if the principal had been forgiven before the interest accrued, so that no interest income will be recognized by the lender:

“Forgiveness of all principal and accrued interest has an economic consequence similar to an outright payment or forgiveness made before the interest accrued, and the authors of the proposed regulations apparently decided that taxpayers should neither be penalized nor given the opportunity to increase interest deductions when they execute a forgiveness later rather than sooner.”[[295]](#footnote-295)

There are various limitations and uncertainties regarding the ability to avoid having to recognize accrued but unpaid interest by forgiving the interest:

1. Current Year Accrued Interest Only? Because stated interest that is not paid in a year generally must be recognized each year under the OID rules,[[296]](#footnote-296) it may be only the current year accrued interest that can avoid recognition under this forgiveness approach, because accrued interest from prior years may have already been recognized as taxable income.

2. How Much Principal Must be Forgiven? There is inherent ambiguity over how much of the principal must be forgiven when the accrued interest is forgiven. The regulation uses the nebulous phrasing that the forgiveness includes “*in substantial part* the loan principal.” For example, if the accrued interest for the year is $30,000 on a $1 million outstanding loan, can the forgiveness be for $60,000, forgiving $30,000 of principal and the $30,000 of accrued interest? Does “substantial part” mean that the forgiveness of principal is only about 25% or more of the total forgiveness? Many would say that 25% of something is a “substantial part” of that thing. Or is 50% of more required for this purpose? Or does the forgiveness have to include a substantial part of the outstanding principal on the loan (such as 25% of the full $1 million loan amount?) The language of the proposed regulation seems to refer to the principal forgiveness being a substantial part *of the forgiveness* and not a substantial part of the loan principal.

3. Proposed Regulation, But Provides Substantial Authority For Avoiding Penalties. This position is based merely on a proposed regulation that has never been finalized. But the fact that the proposed regulation has stood unchanged for decades and that there has been no case law rejecting this analysis over those decades appears to provide comfort in taking the position that the forgiveness of accrued interest in that manner can avoid ever having to recognize that accrued interest as income.

Proposed regulations are considered in determining whether there is “substantial authority” for purposes of avoiding taxpayer or preparer penalties.[[297]](#footnote-297)

4. Consistently Forgiving Accrued Interest Each Year May Not be Advisable. If the accrued interest must be recognized each year under the OID rules, the only way to avoid the recognition of all interest under the note would be to forgive the accrued interest each year (in connection with a forgiveness in substantial part of the loan principal). However, if the accrued interest is forgiven each year, that is a factor that may be considered in refusing to recognize the loan as a bona fide loan rather than as an equity transfer. The factors listed in *Miller v. Commissioner[[298]](#footnote-298)* include (1) whether interest was charged, (2) whether a demand for repayment was made, and (3) whether any actual repayment was made. Consistently forgiving all interest payment would seem inconsistent with those factors.

Furthermore, an IRS response to a letter from a practitioner suggests that having a plan to forgive the interest in each year may result in recasting the transaction as an interest-free loan under the §7872 rules, which would seem to mean that the imputed forgone interest would be recognized each year):

“The legislative history of section 7872 reveals that the conferees recognized that a term loan with deferred interest at a rate equal to or greater than the AFR, and a related gift to defray all or part of the interest payable on the loan, may be the economic equivalent of an interest-free loan with a principal amount equal to the sum of the actual stated amount of the loan and the amount of the gift. The conferees anticipated that under regulations, such a transaction would be treated in accordance with its economic substance. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1021 (1984) 1984-3 (Vol. 2) C.B. 275.”[[299]](#footnote-299)

XVII. LOANS TO GRANTOR TRUSTS AND COROLLARY ISSUES REGARDING LOANS TO INDIVIDUALS

A. Overview. Loans may be made to individuals; alternatively loans may be made to grantor trusts. Many of the advantages of sale transactions to grantor trusts could also be achieved with loans to grantor trusts. (The grantor would pay income tax on the trust income, GST exemption can be allocated to the trust, etc.) Special considerations where loans are made to grantor trusts are addressed.

B. Does Demand Loan to Trust Cause Grantor Trust Treatment? Several cases have upheld arguments by the IRS that the grantor’s ability to demand repayment at any time of a demand note from the trust causes the trust to be treated as a grantor trust under §674(a), at least where the loan constituted the entire trust corpus. The cases arose before the Supreme Court’s decision in *Dickman,*[[300]](#footnote-300) and before the passage of §7872, when interest-free loans were often used as an income shifting and wealth transfer strategy. As a separate taxpayer, the trust may have owed a very low income tax rate (the facts arose before the compressed income tax rates were applied to trusts).

Section 674(a) provides the general rule that the grantor is “treated as the owner of any portion of a trust in respect of which the beneficial enjoyment of the corpus or the income therefrom is subject to a power of disposition, exercisable by the grantor or a nonadverse party, or both, without the approval or consent of any adverse party.”

The cases conclude that the grantor’s power to demand repayment of the trust assets to repay the demand loan constitutes “an independent power of disposition over the beneficial enjoyment of the corpus or income.”

In *Kushner v. Commissioner*,[[301]](#footnote-301) the grantor initially gave $100 to a trust for his children and a month later loaned $100,000 to the trust in return for a demand note. The loan was repaid a year later, and a new $150,000 loan was extended on a demand note. The trust earned interest income over $16,000 in each of 1982 and 1983. The IRS argued that the grantor should have reported the interest income under the grantor trust rules. The Tax Court concluded:

“…petitioner’s ability to demand payment of the loans enabled him to maintain direct dominion and control over the beneficial enjoyment of the trust’s corpus. Thus, petition is to be treated as owner of the trust to the extent of the amounts which he loaned to the trust.”[[302]](#footnote-302)

There are no reported cases in which the IRS has made this argument following the adoption of §7872, which removed the income tax advantages of interest-free demand loans.

C. Necessity of “Seeding” Necessary for Loans to Trusts. For sales to grantor trusts, the common “folklore” is that the trust should end up with equity value of about 10% after the sale (meaning that the note value would not exceed 9 times the equity value of the trust). There is no statue, regulations, or case law imposing that requirement, but the general theory is that the trust must have some net equity value to support that the note is worth its face amount. (Otherwise, any decline at all in the trust assets would leave the trust in a position that it could not pay the note in full.)

The same rationale would seem to apply to loans to trusts. If a parent loans $1 million cash to a trust that has an equity value of $10, the IRS might be expected to take the position that the note is not worth $1 million, and that the transaction results in a gift (and opens the possibility of an argument that §2036 applies to cause inclusion of the trust assets in the parent’s estate at his or her death). A possible counterargument is that there is no necessity of having a minimum trust amount in several situations sanctioned by regulations where the trust will owe annuity payments to the grantor, such as a grantor retained annuity trust or charitable lead annuity trust.[[303]](#footnote-303)

Cases addressing whether assets transferred to a trust in return for a private annuity are included in the transferor’s estate under §2036 as a transfer with a retained interest have pointed to various factors, including: (i) annuity payments were limited to or substantially equal to the income generated by the assets; (ii) the obligor’s personal liability for the annuity payments is in some manner limited to the income generated by the assets; (iii) the obligor lacks the economic means from which to make annuity payments other than the income generated by the assets; and (iv) the annuitant maintains managerial control over the assets.[[304]](#footnote-304) Items (i)-(iii) of that list all relate to whether there are assets in the trust other than just the assets transferred in return for the private annuity.[[305]](#footnote-305)

Conservative planners structure transactions for parents to make gifts to trusts and build equity value in trusts in other ways to support the value of notes that the trusts gives for subsequent cash loans or sales to the trust.[[306]](#footnote-306)

D. Necessity that Individual Borrowers Have Financial Ability to Repay. A corollary question to a requirement that a trust has “seeding” to support a loan is whether the same approach should apply to cash loans to individuals? Should the individuals have sufficient net worth to have the ability to repay the loans? The ability to repay loans is not a factor under §7872 in determining the amount of gift that occurs by reason of making a below-market loan, and the proposed regulation under §7872 addressing the gift tax implications of below-market loans makes no reference to any factors other than comparison to the interest rate on the note to the AFR.[[307]](#footnote-307) The ability to repay loans is a factor that is considered in whether the transaction is respected as resulting in debt rather an equity transfer.[[308]](#footnote-308) In addition, there have been cases that determined that gifts occurred when sales were made to individuals for notes where, among other factors, the individuals did not have the ability to repay the notes.[[309]](#footnote-309)

Some of the cases involving transfers to individuals in return for private annuities have also applied §2036 where the individual had no ability to make the annuity payments other than with the transferred assets. Interestingly, the private annuity cases involving transfers to *individuals* in return for private annuities have not focused so closely on the net value of the individuals as compared to private annuity transactions involving trusts. However, there have been some cases that have not respected transfers for private annuities promised by individuals where the individuals did not have the financial wherewithal to pay the annuity.[[310]](#footnote-310) For example, in *Hurford v. Commissioner*,[[311]](#footnote-311) a mother transferred all of the limited partnership interests of a partnership to two of her children in return for private annuities from the two children. The court held that §2036(a)(1) applied for various reasons, including that the children had no ability to make the annuity payments other than from the assets in the partnership.[[312]](#footnote-312)

E. Treatment of Non-Recourse Loans to Individuals. A further corollary issue is whether non-recourse loans can be made to individuals, secured only by what the individuals buy with the loan proceeds. Economically, this is no different than a recourse loan to a trust whose only assets are assets that the trust acquires with the loan proceeds. If the general thinking is that trusts should have adequate “coverage” (the rule of thumb is 10% coverage) for sales or loans, does that mean that nonrecourse loans to individuals would not be respected as having full value? Interestingly, §1274 addresses the effects of nonrecourse loans.[[313]](#footnote-313) (Various tax shelter arrangements previously involved “flipping” properties acquired with nonrecourse indebtedness in excess of the fair market value of the property. Section 1274(b)(3) provides that where nonrecourse debt is used, the “issue price” for purposes of determining the amount of OID cannot exceed the value of the property transferred in return for the nonrecourse note.) However, §7872 does not address nonrecourse loans. Furthermore the cases addressing whether loan transactions are recognized as debt or equity transactions, do not specifically address nonrecourse loans as a factor in that analysis, but they do include the borrower’s ability to repay the loan as a factor, which would seem to suggest that having a nonrecourse loan would be a negative factor in the debt-equity analysis.[[314]](#footnote-314)

Some cases have discounted the value of notes, in part because of the nonrecourse nature of the notes.[[315]](#footnote-315)

F. Guaranties. A variety of commentators have addressed the impact of guaranties of note in sale to grantor trust situations. See Section XIX.A.2 of this outline for a detailed discussion of the effect of guaranties in sale to grantor trust transactions. Arguments can be made that the a guaranty by a trust beneficiary of the trust’s note should not be a gift, but merely represents the beneficiary’s effort to protect his or her interest in the trust.[[316]](#footnote-316) However, there is uncertainty as to whether a beneficiary’s guaranty of the trust’s note in a sale context constitutes some kind of gratuitous transfer to the trust by the guarantor, and many planners structure sale to grantor trust transactions so that the trust pays market value for any guaranties of the trust’s obligations.

There does not seem to be any difference in the analysis for loan transactions with trusts as opposed to sale transactions with trusts. Indeed, the Letter Ruling 9113009, the IRS letter ruling that initially raised concerns about the gift tax effects of loan guaranties, addressed the guaranty of *loans* (as opposed to sale notes) made by the guarantor’s children. While Letter Ruling 9113009 was withdrawn by Letter Ruling 9409018, which addressed only other issues requested in the original ruling request without mention of gift tax issues, the earlier ruling nevertheless provides the IRS’s analysis of why gift guaranties may include gift elements. The IRS reasoned generally that the guaranty confers an economic benefit from date they are given and the promisor of a legally enforceable promise for less than adequate and full consideration makes a completed gift on the date the promise is binding and determinable in value rather than when the promised payment is actually made.[[317]](#footnote-317)

Cautious planners will treat the use of guaranties as a way of providing “coverage” for loans transactions the same as in sale transactions. For a discussion of further issues involving the use of guaranties, such as whether a fee must be paid for the guaranty and how to determine an appropriate amount to pay for the guaranty,[[318]](#footnote-318) see Section XIX.A.2 of this outline *infra*.

XVIII. INTRA-FAMILY INSTALLMENT SALES (OTHER THAN SALES TO GRANTOR TRUSTS)

Planners have long used intra-family sales to freeze the estate tax value of the assets sold, and to provide liquidity by replacing an illiquid asset with cash.[[319]](#footnote-319)

These advantages are balanced against the disadvantages of a sale, among them the recognition of gain, loss of control over the asset, and loss of income from the asset. To avoid the immediate recognition of gain, sales to family members are often structured as installment sales. The installment method permits a sale of property without the seller being required to report the gain until the actual receipt of the payments (subject to the exceptions noted).

Although the installment sale method will generally be available under §453(a),[[320]](#footnote-320) there are significant exceptions. In particular, the installment sale method is not available for a sale of marketable securities and other property regularly traded on an established market.[[321]](#footnote-321) It is also not available to the extent that the gain in question is depreciation recapture and may not be available at all if the sale consists of depreciable property and is to a controlled entity.[[322]](#footnote-322) Finally, sales of inventory or dealer property will not generally qualify for installment treatment.[[323]](#footnote-323)

Even if the installment method is available, there may be limits on its use. First, interest may be charged on the deferred tax liability if the aggregate face amount of all of the seller’s installment obligations from sales during the year exceeds $5,000,000.[[324]](#footnote-324) Also, a pledge of the installment note will trigger gain recognition.[[325]](#footnote-325) Lastly, a gift or other disposition of the installment note, or the sale of the purchased property by a related purchaser within two years of the installment sale, may cause the balance of the deferred gain to be recognized.[[326]](#footnote-326)

A. Which Interest Rate Applies to Installment Sales?

There has been an interesting history of litigation over whether, for gift tax purposes, the appropriate interest rates for installment sales are to be determined under §§483, 1274, or 7872 and whether the six-percent safe harbor rate for land sales between relatives under §483(e) can apply for gift tax purposes if the AFR is over six percent.

Prior to the enactment of §7872, Congress first entered the realm of interest rate safe harbors in the context of installment sales. Congress enacted or amended income tax statutes Sections 483 (1964, amended in 1984) and 1274 (1984) to address a problem not involving the gift tax. Under these statutes, certain debt instruments issued in connection with installment sales must bear interest at the AFR to ensure that it provides “adequate stated interest.” The statutes were aimed at installment sales transactions where the parties opted to inflate the sales price and impose reduced or no interest payments. This allowed the seller to convert ordinary income to capital gain and allowed the buyer to treat all payments as basis. Thus, although they employ the same methodologies for imputing interest as §7872, these sections ostensibly address not valuation issues, but rather *characterization of income*.

*Section 1274*. As a brief overview, §1274 provides the general rule for income tax treatment of installment sales; it applies to a note issued in a sale or exchange unless the note is excepted from its application. Section 1274(d)(2) provides that in a sale or exchange, the appropriate AFR is the lowest such rate for the three-month period ending with the month there was a “binding contract in writing for such sale or exchange.” For installment sales the appropriate AFR is based not on the term of the note, but on its weighted average maturity.[[327]](#footnote-327) The *weighted average maturity* of an obligation equals the sum of the amounts obtained by multiplying the number of complete years from the issue date until the payment is made by a fraction. The numerator of the fraction is the amount of each payment under the instrument (other than qualified stated interest), and the denominator is the stated redemption price at maturity.[[328]](#footnote-328) Once an instrument’s term is calculated, the discount rate used is the lowest AFR in effect during the three-month period ending with the first month a binding written contract for the transaction exists.

*Section 7872*. Section 7872(f)(8) explicitly states that §7872 does ***not*** apply to a loan given in consideration for the *sale or exchange of property*; this area is, at first glance, covered by Code Sections 483 and 1274. This is so even if Sections 483 and 1274 do not apply by reason of exceptions or safe harbor provisions.[[329]](#footnote-329) This straightforward statement is modified somewhat by the regulations and proposed regulations, and transmogrified by case law (see below).

In *Frazee v. Commissioner*, the court reasoned that §7872 applies in seller financing situations,[[330]](#footnote-330) and acknowledged the IRS concession that §7872 applied for gift tax purposes rather than valuing the note under a market rate approach: “We find it anomalous that respondent urges as her primary position the application of Section 7872, which is more favorable to the taxpayer than the traditional fair market value approach, but we heartily welcome the concept.”[[331]](#footnote-331) Similarly, in *True v. Commissioner*,[[332]](#footnote-332) the court held that §7872 applies to a purchase transaction under a buy-sell agreement for a deferred payment.

Private Letter Rulings 9535026 and 9408018 confirm the IRS position that §7872 will apply to the gift tax valuation of notes issued in intra-family sales transactions, regardless of the application of Sections 1274 or 483 to the transaction for income tax purposes.

The bottom line is that this issue will remain submerged so long as the AFR remains around six percent, unless Congress intervenes.[[333]](#footnote-333) When the AFR climbs above six percent, in intra-family land sales transactions, careful planners will apply the AFR unless gift taxes are not an issue. Circuit level cases have split as to whether the 6 percent safe harbor applies for gift tax purposes.[[334]](#footnote-334) Aggressive planners outside of the 8th and 10th circuits may always choose to use the 6 percent safe harbor, relying on the favorable case*,* common sense and fairness.

With intra-family sales transactions involving sales of personal use property (i.e., not land held for investment), at least under the §7872 proposed regulations, §483 is not applicable and §7872 should be used. The penalty for using the 7872 safe harbor in that case, however, is not burdensome, as the §1274 or 483 AFR (permitting the lowest of the prior three months’ AFRs) is usually not substantially better than the §7872 AFR.

B. Consequences of Using Inadequate Stated Interest: Imputed Interest or OID. If either of Sections 483 or 1274 apply, and the applicable safe harbor interest rate is not utilized (the note does not call for qualified stated interest), interest will be imputed under §483 as “imputed interest” or under §1274 as “OID” (Original Interest Discount). Both are calculated in the same manner. However, they differ as to the timing of recognition of unstated interest.

1. Timing. When §1274 applies, OID is determined on a daily basis and is income to the seller and deductible by the buyer (unless the buyer is an individual and the interest is personal interest) without regard to the taxpayer’s use of the accrual or cash method. The practical effect when OID is imputed is that OID will be allocated daily, thus thwarting the tax deferral effects of the delayed interest payments. By contrast, in the limited situations in which §483 still applies, the taxpayer’s accounting method (i.e., cash or accrual) controls the timing for reporting unstated interest; interest is not included or deducted until a payment is made or due.

2. Amount: Computing OID. The computation of OID is discussed in Section XI.B.4 of this outline *supra*.

C. Income Tax Implications for Seller. The following summaries assume a qualifying rate has been utilized in the installment sale.

1. Recognition of Gain or Loss. An installment sale is a disposition of property in which one or more payments are to be received after the year of the disposition.[[335]](#footnote-335) Under §453(a), “income from an installment sale” is usually reported by “the installment method.” With installment method, gross profit is determined by subtracting the seller’s adjusted basis from the selling price. The gross profit is then divided by the selling price (less any “qualifying indebtedness” assumed or taken subject to by the buyer) to arrive at the “gross profit ratio.”[[336]](#footnote-336) Each payment of principal received by the seller is then multiplied by the gross profit ratio to determine the amount of each payment allocable to the gain and to nontaxable return of basis. [[337]](#footnote-337)

*Example: If property with an adjusted basis of $30 is sold for $50, payable $10 at the closing and $10 annually for four years thereafter, with interest at an adequate rate on the deferred payments, the gross profit is $20 (contract price of $50 less adjusted basis of $30), resulting in a gross profit ratio of 40 percent ($20/$50). Thus, the seller has gain for the year of sale of $4 (40 percent of $10), and 40 percent of each later installment will be similarly includable in income when the installment is collected.[[338]](#footnote-338) If the selling price is less than the seller’s basis, a loss would be realized, but would most likely be disallowed under §267(a) because the purchaser would likely be a member of the seller’s family to whom §267(b)(1) would apply, or a trust created by the grantor to which §267(b)(4) would apply.*

If the selling price is less than the seller’s basis, a loss would be realized, but would most likely be disallowed under §267(a) because the purchaser would likely be a member of the seller’s family to whom §267(b)(1) would apply, or a trust created by the grantor to which §267(b)(4) would apply.

2. Disposition of Installment Note.

a. By Seller. A potential tax issue of which practitioners should be aware is caused when the selling family member disposes of an installment obligation. In that case the seller will be required to recognize all or part of the deferred gain if the installment obligation “is satisfied at other than its face value or distributed, sold, or otherwise disposed of” before the buyer completes the payments.[[339]](#footnote-339)

(1) Gift. Giving an installment note back to the obligor is also a disposition, and giving an installment obligation to a related party recognizes the entire unpaid principal balance on the note at the time of the gift.[[340]](#footnote-340)

(2) Partial Forgiveness. Often a related party seller will forgive installment payments as they come due. In such case the donor/seller will be taxed on both the interest and gain portions of the forgiven installment, even though no cash is received. The forgiven gains are a taxed as a partial disposition of the obligation under §453B(f), and the donor will recognize the previously untaxed gain portion of the forgiven installment.

**EXAMPLE**:[[341]](#footnote-341) Parent sells an asset to Child for $100,000. Parent's adjusted basis at the time of the sale is $20,000. Child gives Parent an installment note amortized by seven $20,000 annual payments and an eighth payment of $5,640, each payment including interest at the then-appropriate rate of 10 percent. Parent forgives the first installment and Parent consents to gift split. They intend to forgive each subsequent installment in the same manner. The IRS does not successfully challenge the transaction. Child's payments amortize the installment debt as follows:

Year Payment Principal Interest

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1 $20,000 $10,000 $10,000

2 20,000 11,000 9,000

3 20,000 12,100 7,900

4 20,000 13,310 6,690

5 20,000 14,640 5,360

6 20,000 16,106 3,894

7 20,000 17,716 2,284

8 5,640 5,128 512

When Parent forgives the first $20,000 installment, Parent still must report $10,000 of interest income and $8,000 of long-term capital gain (the capital gain on the sale was $80,000 of the total $100,000 sales price, so 80 percent of each principal payment is a capital gain). Assuming that Parent is in the 35 percent marginal income tax bracket, Parent must pay $4,700 of income tax in the first year, even though Parent receives no cash (35 percent × $10,000 interest) + (15 percent × $8,000 capital gain).

(3) Death. A bequest of an installment obligation that arose during the seller’s lifetime to someone other than the obligor on the note does *not* trigger gain,[[342]](#footnote-342) but the income is IRD -- the recipient of the obligation recognizes gain on the future payments to the extent the seller would have recognized it.[[343]](#footnote-343) A bequest of an installment note to the obligor cancels the note (because a merger of interest has occurred) and accelerates the incidence of taxable IRD,[[344]](#footnote-344) causing the decedent’s estate to recognize the difference between the face amount and the decedent’s basis in the obligation.[[345]](#footnote-345) Such a bequest to an unrelated party, however, will cause the estate only to recognize the difference between the note’s *fair market value* and the decedent’s basis immediately before death, without regard to the actual outstanding balance.

In addition, any cancellation of such a note is treated as a transfer that triggers immediate gain on the note. If the decedent’s will specifically bequeaths the note to someone other than the obligor of the note, the gain should not be triggered to the estate. If the estate elects to make a non-pro rata distribution of the assets pursuant to authority in the will or state law, and if the executor elects to distribute an installment note to someone other than the obligor, it is not clear whether recognition of the gain to the estate will be avoided. The IRS might conceivably take the position that there has been an indirect distribution of the note to the obligor.[[346]](#footnote-346)

A cancellation of a note at death, or a bequest of an installment note to the obligor will trigger recognition of inherent gain on the note to the estate. However, the triggering transfer and the related reporting of gain does not occur until the earliest of (1) the executor’s assent to the distribution of the note under state law, (2) the actual cancellation of the note by the executor, (3) upon the note becoming unenforceable due to the applicable statute of limitations or other state law, or (4) upon termination of the estate.[[347]](#footnote-347) For example, if an installment note passes by the residuary clause to the decedent's child, the accelerated gain is reported by the estate in the year in which the note is actually distributed to the child.[[348]](#footnote-348)

If the estate made the sale after the decedent’s death, a transfer of an installment obligation would generally cause the transferor immediately to recognize any remaining gain which has been deferred by the installment reporting method.[[349]](#footnote-349)  Of course, in many situations in which the estate sells an asset for an installment note, there should be little gain to recognize upon a disposition of the installment obligation due to the step-up in basis of the asset at death. If an estate asset is to be sold that has substantial appreciation above its stepped-up basis, consider distributing the asset to a beneficiary and allowing the beneficiary to make the installment sale.

b. Sale by Buyer.Under §453(e), the related buyer’s sale of the purchased asset within two years of the date of the purchase is treated as a disposition by the original seller of the obligation.[[350]](#footnote-350) Thus, an intra-family installment sale imposes a risk on the seller that the buyer will take some action that causes the seller’s tax on the deferred gain to be accelerated.

**EXAMPLE**:[[351]](#footnote-351) Parent sells a building to Child for $100,000. Parent's adjusted basis at the time of the sale is $20,000. Child gives Parent an installment note amortized by seven $20,000 annual payments and an eighth payment of $5,640, each payment including interest at the then-appropriate rate of 10 percent. One year (and one payment) after buying the building, Child resells it for $125,000. Parent is deemed to have received a complete payment of Child's installment note and must recognize the previously unrecognized $70,000 gain on the sale ($80,000 total gain on the sale less $10,000 gain recognized on the first installment payment). Assuming that Parent is in the 15 percent capital gains tax bracket, this produces a $10,500 capital gains tax (15% × $70,000 = $10,500).

* NOTE: A related buyer need not *resell* the purchased assets to create a problem for the seller. If the buyer’s “disposition” is something other than a sale or exchange, the amount the seller is deemed to have received is the fair market value of the asset at the time of the second disposition.[[352]](#footnote-352) Certain transactions, including the transmission of the asset at death, are not acceleration events under this rule, but gifts, notably, are dispositions.[[353]](#footnote-353)

XIX. INSTALLMENT SALE TO GRANTOR TRUST

A. Description. A very effective method of freezing an individual’s estate for federal estate tax purposes is to convert the appreciating assets into a fixed-yield, non-appreciating asset through an installment sale to a family member.[[354]](#footnote-354) The traditional disadvantage of an installment sale is that the donor has to recognize a substantial income tax gain as the installment payments are made. The gains would typically be taxed at 15% (without considering state income taxes), and the interest would be taxed at ordinary income tax rates. If the sale is made to a trust that is treated as a grantor trust for income tax purposes, but which will not be included in the settlor’s estate for federal estate tax purposes, the estate freezing advantage can be achieved without the income tax costs usually associated with a sale. In addition, care must be taken to select a “defect” that would cause the grantor to be treated as the “owner” of trust income as to both ordinary income and capital gains.

There is a trade-off in the fact that the assets transferred in the sale will have carryover basis; however, if the low basis assets are purchased by the grantor prior to death, this loss of basis step-up would be avoided.

Briefly, the steps of planning an installment sale to a grantor trust are as follows.

1. Step 1. Create and “Seed” Grantor Trust. The individual should create a trust that is treated as a grantor trust for federal income tax purposes (meaning that the grantor is the owner of the trust for income tax purposes). The trust will be structured as a grantor trust for income tax purposes, but will be structured so that the grantor is not deemed to own the trust for estate tax purposes.[[355]](#footnote-355) This type of trust (which is treated as owned by the grantor for income but not estate tax purposes) is sometimes called a “defective trust”.

The grantor trust should be funded ( “seeded”) with meaningful assets prior to a sale.[[356]](#footnote-356) There is lore that the value of equity inside the grantor trust must be 10% of the total value in order for the sale to be respected. In Letter Ruling 9535026, the IRS required the applicants to contribute trust equity of at least 10 percent of the installment purchase price in order to avoid association status for income tax purposes and to have the trust be treated as a trust.)

Various planners have suggested that is not required absolutely, and some respected national speakers said that the equity amount could be as low as 1%--depending on the situation. One planner (who considers himself a conservative planner) has used less than 10% sometimes, and on occasions he is concerned whether 10% is enough. The legal issue is whether there is debt or equity. (For example, if it is debt, it is permissible to use the AFR as the interest rate.) The issue is whether there is comfort that the “debt” will be repaid.

*McDermott v. Commissioner*,[[357]](#footnote-357) involved a 19.6 to 1 debt equity ratio (which translates to a 5.6% equity amount). The IRS acquiesced in *McDermott*. One attorney uses that as a base point – he never uses less than 5.6% seeding. On the other hand, there is a published ruling involving a 20% contribution, and the IRS ruled it was debt. (That was not a sale to grantor trust situation.)

In *Petter v. Commissioner*,[[358]](#footnote-358) footnote 8 notes that the estate tax attorney involved in structuring the transaction “said he believed there was a rule of thumb that a trust capitalized with a gift of at least 10 percent of its assets would be viewed by the IRS as a legitimate, arm’s length purchaser in the later sale.” At least this is a reference to the 10% rule of thumb in a reported case.

Under the 10% rule of thumb, the trust should hold approximately 10% in value of the eventual trust assets after a purchase occurs in step 2. As an example, if a $900,000 asset will be sold to the trust, the settlor might make a gift of $100,000 to the trust. After the trust purchases the asset, it would own assets of $1,000,000, and it would have a net worth of $100,000, or 10% of the total trust assets. (This is analogous to the 10% cushion requirement in §2701(a)(4).) Stated differently, if the 10% seeding is based on analogy to the initial seeding gift should be 11.1% of the amount of the later sale to the trust (if values remain constant.) If the grantor transfers $11.10 to the trust, and later sells an asset for a $100.00 note, the “$11.10 “seeding” would be 10% of the total $111.10 assets in the trust following the sale. That means there would be a 9:1 debt equity ratio.

In determining whether the note represents debt or equity, one must consider a variety of factors, including the nature (and volatility) of assets in the trust, and the risk profile of the clients. If there is experience of assets actually increasing in value after sales to the trust and payments actually being made, when the next grantor trust sale is considered, the grantor would seem to have good reason to be more comfortable using a lower equity cushion.

Some commentators have suggested that initial seeding should not be required as long as the taxpayer can demonstrate that the purchaser will have access to the necessary funds to meet its obligations as they become due.[[359]](#footnote-359) Even those authors, however, observe that the §2036 issue is an intensely factual one, and that “only those who are willing to take substantial risks should use a trust with no other significant assets.”[[360]](#footnote-360)

The seed money can be accomplished either through gifts to the trust, or through transfers to the trust from other vehicles, such as a GRAT.

Spouses as Joint Grantors. Most planners do not use joint trusts with both spouses as grantors. There is the theoretical concern of whether one spouse might be treated as selling of the assets, which are eventually sold to the trust, to the portion of the trust treated as a grantor trust as to the spouse. If so, there would be no gain recognition on the sale (under §1041), but interest on the note would be taxable.[[361]](#footnote-361) Furthermore, there is significant uncertainty regarding the effect of a subsequent divorce or death of a spouse.

2. Step 1: Can “Seeding” Be Provided by Guarantees? A guarantee by a beneficiary or a third party may possibly provide the appropriate seeding, sufficient to give the note economic viability. Beware that if the trust does not pay a fair price for the guarantee, the person giving the guaranty may be treated as making an indirect contribution to the trust, which might possibly result in the trust not being treated as owned wholly by the original grantor.[[362]](#footnote-362)

Of particular concern is Letter Ruling 9113009. This letter ruling, initially raised concerns about the gift tax effects of loan guaranties made by the guarantor’s children. While Letter Ruling 9113009 was withdrawn by Letter Ruling 9409018, which addressed only other issues requested in the original ruling request without mention of gift tax issues, the earlier ruling nevertheless provides the IRS’s analysis of why gift guaranties may include gift elements. The IRS reasoned generally that the guaranty confers an economic benefit from date they are given and the promisor of a legally enforceable promise for less than adequate and full consideration makes a completed gift on the date the promise is binding and determinable in value rather than when the promised payment is actually made. The IRS’s full analysis of this issue in Letter Ruling 9113009 is quoted in Section XVII.F of this outline *supra*.

Some commentators argue, however, that a beneficiary who guarantees an indebtedness of the trust is not making a gift until such time, if at all, that the guarantor must “make good” on the guarantee. (Otherwise, the beneficiary would be treated as making a gift to him or herself.)[[363]](#footnote-363)

If the beneficiary has a real interest in the trust, and the beneficiary gives a guarantee to protect his or her own investment, the guarantee arguably is not a gift to the trust. The leading case is *Bradford v. Commissioner*,[[364]](#footnote-364) in which the IRS acquiesced. (If the beneficiary is making a gift to the trust, the beneficiary is a grantor to that extent, and the trust is no longer a wholly grantor trust as to the original grantor, so there could be bad income tax consequences to the grantor of the trust as well as gift tax consequences to the person giving the guaranty.) The best analogy supporting that the beneficiary does not make a gift is in the life insurance area. There are various cases and acquiescences that if a beneficiary pays premiums to maintain the policy that is owned by a trust, that is not a gift to the trust. Indeed, that is an actual transfer, not just a guarantee.

The timing and amount of the gift from a beneficiary-guarantee, if any, is unclear.

“Probably the closest commercial analogy is a bank’s charge for a letter of credit. Generally, the bank makes an annual or more frequent charge for such a letter. By analogy, there will be an annual gift, probably in the range of one to two percent of the amount guaranteed, so long as the guarantee is outstanding. However, it may also be argued that a much larger, one-time taxable gift will occur at the inception of the guarantee, especially if the loan precludes prepayment. [Citing Rev. Rul. 94-25, 1994-1 C.B. 191.] The final possibility is that no gift will occur until a beneficiary actually has to make a payment under the guarantee. In this event, the measure of the gift will presumably be the amount of the payment under the guarantee. [Citing Bradford v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 1059 (1960).]

It is by no means a given that a guarantee by a beneficiary is a gift. Instead, the clear weight of authority seems to support the absence of any gift by the beneficiaries to the trust, at least where the guarantee is a bona fide obligation of the beneficiary making the guarantee, and where the beneficiary has sufficient net worth to make good on the guarantee in the event of a default by the trust.”[[365]](#footnote-365)

If the planner is squeamish about guarantees by beneficiaries, the trustee could pay an annual fee to the beneficiary in return for the guarantee.[[366]](#footnote-366) Some planners report using a fee between 1-2%. Other planners suggest that the fee would typically be higher (about 3%). The 1-2% (or lower) fee for a typical bank letter of credit is based on having a pre-existing relationship with a person who has substantial assets. The difficulty with paying a guaranty fee is determining what the correct amount of the fee. There may be a gift if no fee or if an insufficient fee is paid for the guarantee. (Some planners have reported using Empire Financial to value these guaranties.) One planning alternative is to file a non-transfer gift tax return reporting the guarantee transaction.

Thus, in summary, the safest course is to pay for the guarantee and the safer alternative if that is not done is to have the guarantee be made by a beneficiary rather than a third party.

3. Step 2. Sale for Installment Note; Appropriate Interest Rate. The individual will sell property to the grantor trust in return for an installment note for the full value of the property (taking into account appropriate valuation discounts). The note is typically secured by the sold asset, but it is a full recourse note. The note is often structured to provide interest only annual payments with a balloon payment at the end of the note term. The interest is typically structured to be equal to the §7872 rate. Often a longer term note is used to take advantage of the current extremely low AFRs for a number of years.. For December 2012 (when the §7520 rate for valuing GRAT annuity payments is 1.2%), the annual short-term (0-3 years) rate is 0.24%, the annual mid-term (over 3, up to 9 years) rate is 0.95%, and the long-term (over 9 years) rate is 2.40%. Typically, the note would permit prepayment of the note at any time without penalty. The note should be shorter than the seller’s life expectancy in order to minimize risks that the IRS would attempt to apply §2036 to the assets transferred in return for the note payments.

Many planners are using long term notes (over 9 years) in light of the extremely low long term rate because the interest rate is still relatively low; but use a note term shorter than the seller’s life expectancy. (The buyer could prepay the note if desired, but there would be the flexibility to use the low long term rate over the longer period.)

Some planners structure the transaction to leave time between the time of the “seed” gift and the subsequent sale, by analogy to the “real economic risk of a change in value” analysis in *Holman v. Commissioner.*[[367]](#footnote-367) *Pierre v. Commissioner[[368]](#footnote-368)* applied a step transaction analysis to aggregate the gift and sale portions of LLC interests that were transferred within 12 days of each other for valuation purposes. A possible concern (though the IRS has not made this argument in any reported case) is that the gift and sale may be aggregated and treated as a single transaction for purposes of applying §2036, which would mean that the sale portion does not qualify for the bona fide sale for full consideration exception in §2036.[[369]](#footnote-369)

Some planners have suggested taking the position that the lowest AFR in the month of a sale or the prior two months can be used in a sale to defective trust situation, relying on §1274(d). Section 1274(d) says that for any sale or exchange, the lowest AFR for the month of the sale or the prior two months can be used.  However, relying on §1274(d) is problematic for a sale to a defective trust--because such a transaction, which is a "non-event" for income tax purposes, may not constitute a "sale or exchange" for purposes of §1274(d). The apparently unqualified incorporation of §1274(d) in §7872(f)(2) arguably gives some credibility to this technique. However, relying on a feature that depends on the existence of a "sale" as that word is used in §1274(d)(2) [in the income tax subtitle] in the context of a transaction that is intended not to be a "sale" for income tax purposes seems unwise.

Most planners use the applicable federal rate, under the auspices of §7872, as the interest rate on notes for intrafamily installment sales. Section 7872 addresses the gift tax effects of “below-market” loans, and §7872(f)(1) defines “present value” with reference to the “applicable Federal rate.” Using §7872 rates is supported by the position of the IRS in Tax Court cases and in several private rulings,[[370]](#footnote-370) as discussed in Section XVIII.A. of this outline *supra*. However, the IRS could conceivably at some point take the position that a market interest rate should be used for sales.

4. Step 3. Operation During Term of Note. Hopefully the trust will have sufficient cash to make the interest payments on the note. If not, the trust could distribute in-kind assets of the trust in satisfaction of the interest payments. Payment of the interest, whether in cash or with appreciated property, should not generate any gain to the trust or to the grantor, because the grantor is deemed to be the owner of the trust for income tax purposes in any event.

Because the trust is a grantor trust, the grantor will owe income taxes with respect to income earned by the trust. Payment of those income taxes by the grantor is not an additional gift to the trust.[[371]](#footnote-371) To the extent that the entity owned by the trust is making distributions to assist the owners in making income tax payments, the cash distributions to the trust could be used by the trust to make note payments to the grantor/seller, so that the grantor/seller will have sufficient cash to make the income tax payments.

Consider having the seller elect out of installment reporting. The theory is that the gain would then be recognized, if at all, in the first year, but there should be no income recognition in that year.[[372]](#footnote-372) Death during a subsequent year of the note arguably would be a non-event for tax purposes. Some (probably most) commentators believe that installment reporting is not even available for sales to a grantor trust, because the transaction is a non-event for income tax purposes.

5. Step 4. Pay Note During Seller’s Lifetime. Plan to repay the note entirely during the seller’s lifetime. Income tax effects may result if the note has not been paid fully by the time of the seller’s death. Income tax issues with having unpaid note payments due at the grantor’s death and planning alternatives to avoid those issues are discussed in Section XIX.D.5 of this outline *infra*.

The installment note could be structured as a self-canceling installment note (“SCIN”) that is payable until the expiration of the stated term of the note or until the maker’s death, whichever first occurs. SCIN transfers are discussed further in Section XX of this outline.[[373]](#footnote-373)

6. Best Practices For Sales to Grantor Trusts, Particularly of Closely Held Business Interests.

* A starting point is to create voting and non-voting units. One planner typically creates 999 non-voting shares for every 1 voting share. Non-voting shares can be transferred without fear of the client losing control of the business.
* Gift of 10% and sale of 90%, leaving 1/9 ratio of equity to debt.
* The installment sale allows tremendous leverage. For example, the client could make a gift of $5 million and then sell $45 million worth of closely held business interests.
* Cash from investment assets or other assets could be used to make the gift to fund the initial equity of the trust. If possible, the gift should be cash rather than an interest in the entity that will be sold to the trust.
* Make the gift to the trust a significant time before the sale (i.e., 30, 60 or 90 days, or even the prior taxable year).[[374]](#footnote-374) John Porter suggests transferring an initial gift of cash to the trust—something other than the illiquid asset that will be sold to the trust—so that the cash is available to help fund note payments.
* The key of using the installment sale is to get an asset into the trust that has cash flow. For example, if the business does not have cash flow, real estate that is used by the business but that is leased by the business from the business owner could be transferred to the trust because it does have cash flow.
* Cash flow from the business may be sufficient to assist making payments on the promissory note.
* Model anticipated cash flow from the business in structuring the note.
* For pass-through entities, cash distributed from the entity to owners so they can pay income taxes on the pass-through income will be distributed partly to the grantor trust as the owner of its interest in the entity; that cash can be used by the trust to make note payments; the grantor could use that cash to pay the income tax. This “tax distribution cash flow” may be enough to fund a substantial part of the note payments.
* The goal is to be able to pay off the note during the seller’s lifetime.
* Lack of control and lack of marketability discounts would apply, based on the asset that is sold.
* Best practices for avoiding §2036, 2038 argument: Do not make entity distributions based on the timing and amount of note payments (make distributions at different times than when note payments are due and in different amounts than the note payments)(John Porter suggestion).
* Use a defined value clause to protect against gift consequences of the gift and sale of hard-to-value assets to the trust. (If a charitable entity is used for the “excess value” typically a donor advised fund from a Communities Foundation is used. It should act independently in evaluating the values. It should hire an appraiser to review the appraisal secured by the family. The donor advised fund will want to know an exit strategy for being able to sell any business interest that it acquires. An advantage of using a donor advised fund as compared to a private foundation is that it is not subject to the self-dealing prohibition, so the family is able to repurchase the business interest.)
* The interest rate is very low. For example, in February 2013 a nine-year note would have an annual interest rate of 1.01%. If there is a 30% discount, effectively the interest rate as compared to the underlying asset value is about 0.7%, so if the business has earnings/growth above that, there is a wealth shift each year.
* This approach takes advantage of opportunities that could be eliminated in the future – discounts, current large gift and GST exemption, and extremely low interest rates.

B. Basic Estate Tax Effects.

1. Note Includible In Estate. The installment note (including any accumulated interest) will be included in the grantor/seller’s estate. There may be the possibility of discounting the note if the interest rate and other factors surrounding the note cause it to be worth less than face value. See Section XV of this outline *supra* regarding the possibility of discounting notes for estate tax valuation purposes.
2. Assets Sold to Trust Excluded from Estate. The asset that was sold to the trust will not be includible in the grantor’s estate, regardless how long the grantor/seller survives. (There is some risk of estate inclusion if the note is not recognized as equity and if the grantor is deemed to have retained an interest in the underlying assets. The risk is exacerbated if a thinly capitalized trust is used – less than 10 percent equity.[[375]](#footnote-375))
3. Grantor’s Payment of Income Taxes. The grantor’s payment of income taxes on income of the grantor trust further decreases the grantor’s estate that remains at the grantor’s death for estate tax purposes.

4. Question 12(e) on Form 706. A new question was added to Form 706 in October 2006 in Part 4, Question 12e.

Question 12a asks "Were there in existence at the time of the decedent's death any trusts created by the decedent during his or her lifetime?"

Question 12b asks: "Were there in existence at the time of the decedent's death any trusts not created by the decedent under which the decedent possessed any power, beneficial interest or trusteeship?"

Question 12e asks: "Did decedent at any time during his or her lifetime transfer or sell an interest in a partnership, limited liability company, or closely held corporation to a trust described in question 12a or 12b?"[[376]](#footnote-376)

This question underscores the advantage of reporting sales of discounted interests in closely-held entities on a gift tax return. Eventually the IRS will learn about this transaction. This Form 706 question applies retroactively to all transfers made by decedents filing the Form 706. Even so, some planners prefer not to report sales on a gift tax return. The taxpayer can obtain quality current appraisals. If the IRS contests the sales valuation when the seller dies years later, the IRS’s appraisal prepared at that time (many years after the date of the sale) may have less credibility. In light of this proof issue, the likelihood of the IRS contesting the valuation years later may be significantly less than the likelihood of the IRS contesting the valuation currently if the sale is reported on a current gift tax return.

Recognize that the Form 706 question only applies to transfers to trusts and not to transfers to individuals.

C. Basic Gift Tax Effects.

1. Initial Seed Gift. The grantor should “seed” the trust with approximately 10% of the overall value to be transferred to the trust by a combination of gift and sale. This could be accomplished with an outright gift when the grantor trust is created. Alternatively, the grantor trust could receive the remaining amount in a GRAT at the termination of the GRAT to provide seeding for a further installment sale.

2. No Gift From Sale. The sale to the trust will not be treated as a gift (assuming the values are correct, and assuming that there is sufficient equity in the trust to support valuing the note at its full face value.) There is no clear authority for using a valuation adjustment clause as exists under the regulations for GRATs.[[377]](#footnote-377)

D. Basic Income Tax Effects.

1. Initial Sale. The initial sale to the trust does not cause immediate gain recognition, because the grantor is treated as the owner of the trust for income tax purposes.[[378]](#footnote-378)

2. Interest Payments Do Not Create Taxable Income. Because the grantor is treated as the owner of the trust, interest payments from the trust to the grantor should also be a non-event for income tax purposes. (On the other hand, if there are sales between spouses, while there is no gain recognition on the sale under §1041, interest payments would constitute taxable income.[[379]](#footnote-379))

3. IRS Has Reconfirmed Informal Rulings That Using Crummey Trust Does Not Invalidate “Wholly Owned” Status of Grantor. In order to avoid gain recognition on a sale to a grantor trust, the grantor must be treated as wholly owning the assets of the trust. Theoretically, this may be endangered if the trust contains a Crummey withdrawal clause. However, recent private letter rulings reconfirm the IRS’s position that using a Crummey clause does not endanger the grantor trust status as to the original grantor.[[380]](#footnote-380)

4. Grantor’s Liability for Ongoing Income Taxes of Trust. The grantor will be liable for ongoing income taxes for the trust income. This can further reduce the grantor‘s estate for estate tax purposes and allow the trust to grow faster. However, the grantor must be willing to accept this liability. Giving someone the discretion to reimburse the grantor for paying income taxes of the trust may be an alternative.[[381]](#footnote-381) (An additional possible alternative for the sale to grantor trust strategy is that if the grantor’s spouse is a discretionary beneficiary of the trust, the trust could make a distribution to the spouse that would be sufficient to pay the income taxes that would be payable on the joint return of the grantor and the grantor’s spouse.)

5. Seller Dies Before Note Paid in Full. If the seller dies before the note is paid off, the IRS may argue that gain recognition is triggered at the client’s death. The better view would seem to be that gain recognition is deferred under §453 until the obligation is satisfied after the seller’s death. The recipient of installment payments would treat the payments as income in respect of decedent. Presumably, the trustee would increase the trust’s basis in a portion of the business interest to reflect any gain actually recognized.

The income tax effect on the trust if the grantor dies before the note is paid in full has been hotly debated among commentators.[[382]](#footnote-382) A concern regarding the possibility of immediate recognition of income at death is that if grantor trust statute is terminated during the grantor’s life while any part of the note is unpaid, the capital gain is accelerated and taxed immediately.[[383]](#footnote-383) However, the result may be different following the death of the grantor. One of the articles addressing this issue provide the following arguments in its detailed analysis of why income should not be realized as payments are made on the note after the grantor’s death.[[384]](#footnote-384)

• No transfer to the trust occurs for income tax purposes until the grantor’s death (because transactions between the grantor and the trust are ignored for income tax purposes.)

• There is no rule that treats a transfer at death as a realization event for income tax purposes, even if the transferred property is subject to an encumbrance such as an unpaid installment note.[[385]](#footnote-385) However, the property does not receive a step up in basis because the property itself is not included in the decedent’s estate.

• The note itself is included in the decedent’s estate, and the authors argue that the note should be entitled to a step up the basis. A step up in basis is precluded only if the note constitutes income in respect to the decedent (“IRD”) under §691. They argue that the note should not be treated as IRD because the existence, amount and character of IRD are determined as if “the decedent had lived and received such amount.”[[386]](#footnote-386) The decedent would not have recognized income if the note were paid during life,[[387]](#footnote-387) so the note should not be IRD.

• This position is supported by the provisions of §§691(a)(4) & (5), which provide rules for obligations “reportable by the decedent on the installment method under section 453.” The installment sale to the grantor trust was a nonevent for income tax purposes, and therefore there was nothing to report under §453.

• This position does not contradict the policy behind §691, because the income tax result is exactly the same as if the note had been paid before the grantor’s death – no realization in either event.

• If the unpaid portion of the note were subject to income tax following the grantor’s death, double taxation would result. The sold property, which is excluded from the grantor’s estate, does not receive a stepped-up basis—so ultimately there will be an income tax payable when that property is sold.

One possible planning approach if the grantor does not expect to survive the note term is for the grantor to make a loan to the trust and use the loan proceeds to pay the installment note before the grantor’s death. (A step transaction argument presumably could be avoided by having the trust borrow funds from someone other than the grantor to be able to pay off the note.)

Some authors have suggested a strategy they identify as "basis boosting."[[388]](#footnote-388) If an individual sells assets to a grantor trust and the individual dies, most planners think gain should not be realized at death. But the answer is unclear. The authors suggest contributing other property to the grantor trust with basis sufficient to eliminate gains. Example: An individual sells an asset with a basis of 10 for note for 50. The asset appreciates to 100 before the grantor dies. The potential gain would be 50 minus 10 or 40 when the trust is no longer a grantor trust. If the grantor contributes additional assets to the grantor trust with a basis of 40, that basis could be applied and offset the gain. However, it is not yet clear that this will work. The amount realized from the relief of liability (50 in the example) might have to be allocated between the two assets. If one must allocate the amount deemed realized between the two assets, the gain would not be totally eliminated.

The result might be better if the two assets are contributed to a partnership or LLC, which would require having another partner or member to avoid being treated as a disregarded entity. There would seem to be a stronger argument that there would be no apportionment of the amount realized between the two classes of assets in that situation.

Chief Counsel Advice 200923024 concluded that a conversion from nongrantor to grantor trust status is not a taxable event (addressing what seems to be an abusive transaction). An interesting statement in the CCA is relevant to the commonly asked question of whether there is gain recognition on remaining note payments at the death of the grantor if the grantor has sold assets to a grantor trust for a note. In addressing the relevance of the authorities suggesting that a taxable event occurs if the trust loses its grantor trust status during the grantor’s lifetime, the CCA observed:

“We would also note that the rule set forth in these authorities is narrow, insofar as it only affects inter vivos lapses of grantor trust status, not that caused by the death of the owner ***which is generally not treated as an income tax event.*”[[389]](#footnote-389)**

6. Basis; Limitation of Basis for Loss Purposes. The basis of a gifted asset under Section 1015 is the donor’s basis, except that for loss purposes, the basis is limited to the asset’s fair market value at the time of the gift. There is no clear answer as to the basis of assets given to a grantor trust is limited to the asset’s fair market value for loss purposes (if the donor’s basis exceeds the fair market value). One commentator takes the position that the loss limitation does not apply to gifts to a grantor trust.[[390]](#footnote-390)

7. Gift Tax Basis Adjustment. If a donor makes a gift to the grantor trust in order to “seed” an installment sale, and if the donor has to pay gift tax with respect to the initial gift, can the trust claim a basis adjustment under §1015(d) for the gift tax paid? There is no definitive authority as to whether the basis adjustment is authorized, but there would seem to be a good-faith argument that the gift-tax paid basis adjustment should be permitted even though the gift was to a grantor trust.

E. Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Effects. Once the trust has been seeded, and GST exemption has been allocated to cover that gift, no further GST exemption need be allocated to the trust with respect to the sale (assuming that it is for full value). A potential risk, in extreme situations, is that if the sold asset is included in the transferor’s estate under §2036, no GST exemption could be allocated during the ETIP.

F. Advantages of Sale to Grantor Trust Technique.

1. No Survival Requirement; Lock in Discount. The estate freeze is completed without the requirement for survival for a designated period.

A corollary of this advantage is that the discount when selling a partial interest is locked in as a result of the sale. For example, if a client owns 100% of an entity and sells one-third of the entity to each of three trusts, with the one-third interests being valued as minority interests,[[391]](#footnote-391) the discount amount is removed from the client’s estate regardless when the person dies. If the sale had not occurred and the client owned the 100% interest at his or her death, no minority discount would be available.

2. Low Interest Rate. The interest rate on the note can be based on the §7872 rate (which is based on the relatively low interest rates on U.S. government obligations). However, the IRS could conceivably at some point take the position that a market interest rate should be used for sales.

3. GST Exempt. The sale can be made to a GST exempt trust, or a trust for grandchildren, so that all future appreciation following the sale will be in an exempt trust with no need for further GST exemption allocation.

4. Interest-Only Balloon Note. The installment note conceivably can be structured as an interest only-balloon note. (With a GRAT, the annuity payments cannot increase more than 120% in any year, requiring that substantial annuity payments be paid in each year.) However, the planner must judge, in the particular situation, if using an interest-only balloon note might raise the risk of a §2036 challenge by the IRS. It would seem that a §2036 challenge is much less likely if the transaction looks like a traditional commercial transaction. (Another aspect of avoiding §2036 is that the trust should not as a practical matter simply use all of its income each year to make note payments back to the seller.) While there is no requirement that even the interest be paid currently, it “may be most commercially reasonable to require the payment of interest at least annually … even if all principal balloons at the end.”[[392]](#footnote-392)

5. Income Tax Advantages. The estate freeze is completed without having to recognize any income tax on the sale of the assets as long as the note is repaid during the seller’s lifetime. In addition, the interest payments will not have to be reported by the seller as income.

G. Risks.

1. Treatment of Note as Retained Equity Interest, Thus Causing Estate Inclusion of Transferred Asset. Under extreme circumstances, it is possible that the IRS may take the position that the note is treated as a retained equity interest in the trust rather than as a mere note from the trust. If so, this would raise potential questions of whether some of the trust assets should be included in the grantor’s estate under §2036 and §2702. It would seem that §2036 (which generally causes estate inclusion where the grantor has made a gift of an asset and retained the right to the income from that asset) should not apply to the extent that the grantor has sold (rather than gifted) the asset for full market value.[[393]](#footnote-393)

If the note that is received from the trust is treated as debt rather than equity, the trust assets should not be included in the grantor/seller’s gross estate under §2036. This means that the analysis of whether the note is treated as debt or as a retained equity interest is vitally important. This issue is addressed in detail in Section II of this outline *supra*. A number of cases have highlighted a variety of factors that are considered.[[394]](#footnote-394)

One Technical Advice Memorandum concluded that §2036 did apply to property sold to a grantor trust in return for a note, based on the facts in that situation.[[395]](#footnote-395)

Analogy to private annuity cases would suggest that §2036 should not typically apply to sale transactions. For example, the Supreme Court refused to apply the predecessor of §2036 to the assignment of life insurance policies coupled with the retention of annuity contracts, because the annuity payments were not dependent on income from the transferred policies and the obligation was not specifically charged to those policies.[[396]](#footnote-396) Various cases have followed that approach (in both income and estate tax cases).[[397]](#footnote-397)

One commentator has suggested that there is a significant risk of §2036(a)(1) being argued by the IRS if “the annual trust income does not exceed the accrued annual interest on the note.”[[398]](#footnote-398) Much of the risk of estate inclusion seems tied to the failure to have sufficient “seeding” of equity in the trust prior to the sale.

John Porter reports that he has several cases in which the IRS is taking the position that notes given by grantor trusts in exchange for partnership interests should be ignored, based on the assertion that the “economic realities of the arrangement … do not support a part sale,” and that the full value of the partnership interest was a gift not reduced by any portion of the notes. (This position conflicts with Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-a, which provides that transfers are treated as gifts “to the extent that the value of the property transferred by the donor exceeds the value in money or money’s worth of the consideration given therefore.”)[[399]](#footnote-399)

If the note term is longer than the seller’s life expectancy, the IRS would have a stronger argument that §2036 applies.

The IRS has questioned the validity of a sale of limited partnership interests to a grantor trust in the *Karmazin* case,[[400]](#footnote-400) (discussed below) which was settled in a manner that recognized the sale. The IRS argued, among other things, that commercial lenders would not make similar loans because the nine-to-one debt/equity ratio was too high, there was insufficient security (no guarantees were used in that transaction), and there was insufficient income to support the debt.

Practical Planning Pointers: Ron Aucutt summarizes planning structures to minimize the estate tax risk.

“The reasoning in *Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust* suggests that the estate tax case is strongest when the following features are carefully observed:

a. The note should be payable from the entire corpus of the trust, not just the sold property, and the entire trust corpus should be at risk.

b. The note yield and payments should not be tied to the performance of the sold asset.

c. The grantor should retain no control over the trust.

d. The grantor should enforce all available rights as a creditor.”[[401]](#footnote-401)

2. Risks of Thin Capitalization. The same commentator summarizes the possible risks of thin capitalization as follows:

“a. includibility of the gross estate under section 2036,

b. a gift upon the cessation of section 2036 exposure,

c. applicability of section 2702 to such a gift,

d. the creation of a second class of equity in the underlying property with possible consequences under section 2701,

e. possible loss of eligibility of the trust to be an S Corporation,

f. treatment of the trust as an association taxable as a corporation,

g. continued estate tax exposure for three years after cessation of section 2036 exposure under section 2035, and

h. inability to allocate GST exemption during the ensuing ETIP.

The section 2036 problem may go away as the principal on the note is paid down, or as the value of the purchased property (the equity) appreciates, but the ETIP problem would remain.”[[402]](#footnote-402)

The risks of thin capitalization were highlighted in *Karmazin* *v. Commissioner*,[[403]](#footnote-403) in which the IRS made a number of arguments to avoid respecting a sale of limited partnership units to a grantor trust, including §2701 and 2702. The IRS argued that the note in the sale transaction involved in that case should be treated as debt rather than equity for various reasons, including that (i) the only assets owned by the trust are the limited partnership interests, (ii) the debt is non-recourse, (iii) commercial lenders would not enter this sale transaction without personal guaranties or a larger down payment, (iv) a nine-to-one debt equity ratio is too high, (v) insufficient partnership income exists to support the debt.

Another potential risk of thin capitalization that is rarely mentioned is the risk of having the trust treated as an association, taxable as a corporation. The planners involved in securing Letter Ruling 9535026 indicate that the IRS required having a 10% equity interest to avoid association status in that situation.

3. Potential Gain Recognition if Seller Dies Before Note Paid. There is potential gain recognition if the seller dies before all of the note payments are made. The IRS may argue that the gain is accelerated to the moment of death. It would seem more likely that the gain should not be recognized until payments are actually made on the note. Credible arguments can be made for no income realization either during or after the grantor’s death, as discussed in Section XIX.D.5 of this outline *supra*.

4. Valuation Risk. If the IRS determines that the transferred assets exceed the note amount, the difference is a gift. There is no regulatory safe harbor of a “savings clause” as there is with a GRAT. One way that might reduce the gift tax exposure risk is to describe the amount transferred in the sale transaction using a “defined value” formula approach,[[404]](#footnote-404) as discussed in Section XIX.I of this outline, *infra.*

5. Volatility Risk. If the asset that is sold to the trust declines in value, the trust still owes the full amount of the note to the grantor. Thus, any equity that had been gifted to the trust prior to the sale could be returned to the donor or included in the donor’s estate. Furthermore, if beneficiaries or others give guaranties to provide the 10% “seeding,” the guarantors will have to pay the guaranteed amount to the trust if the trust is otherwise unable to pay the note.

Realize that equity contributed to a grantor trust is really at risk. Also, appreciation in the grantor trust is at risk if there is a subsequent reversal before the note is repaid. If the trust is used for new purchases, that can have great benefit – but it also has risks.

H. Summary of Note Structure Issues.

1. Term of Note. The term of the note usually does not exceed 15-20 years, to ensure treatment of the note as debt rather than a retained equity interest. The term of the note should be less than the grantor’s life expectancy (whether or not a SCIN is used).

2. Interest Rate. The §7872 rate is typically used. However, the IRS could conceivably at some point take the position that a market interest rate should be used for sales.

3. Timing of Payments. The note typically calls for at least having the interest paid currently (annually or semi-annually). While there is no absolute requirement to have interest paid currently, doing so makes the note appear to have more “commercial-like” terms than if interest merely accrues over a long term.

4. Security. Using a secured note is permissible. In fact, having security for the note helps ensure that the value of the note equals the value of the transferred property.

5. Timing of Sale Transaction. If the gift to the trust and the subsequent sale occur close to each other, the IRS might conceivably attempt to collapse the two steps and treat the transaction as a part-sale and part-gift. However, that would not seem to change the overall result. Some planners structure the transaction to leave time between the time of the seed gift and the subsequent sale, by analogy to the “real economic risk of a change in value” analysis in *Holman v. Commissioner*.[[405]](#footnote-405) (Conceivably, the IRS might argue that the combined transaction is a transfer with retained interest that is not covered by the bona fide sale for full consideration exception in §2036 because of the gift element of the combined transaction. However, there are no reported cases where the IRS has taken that position based on gifts and sales within a short period of time of each other.)

6. Defined Value Transfer. The amount transferred might be described by a defined value. See Section XIX.I. of this outline, *infra.*

7. Crummey Clause. To be totally conservative and assure that the trust is treated as a grantor trust as to the original grantor, consider not using a Crummey clause. However, the IRS has ruled numerous times that using a Crummey clause does not convert the trust to being partially a grantor trust as to the beneficiary rather than as to the owner.[[406]](#footnote-406)

8. Entire Corpus Liable for Note. The entire corpus of the trust should be liable for the note, not just the property sold in return for the note.

9. Payments Not Based on Performance of Sold Asset. The amount and timing of payments should in no way be tied to the performance of the sold asset—or else the note has the appearance of being a retained equity interest in the property itself.

10. No Retained Control Over Sold Asset. The grantor should retain no control over the sold asset. The risk of inclusion under §2036, in a situation where the grantor is retaining payments from the transferred property, is exacerbated if the grantor also has any control over the transferred property.

11. Payments Less Than Income From Sold Asset. Preferably, the required ongoing note payments would be less than the income produced by the sold assets. Furthermore, the trust should not routinely make prepayments to distribute all trust income to the grantor as note payments.

12. Ability to Make Payments. The trust should have sufficient assets to make principal and interest payments as they become due.

13. Reporting. The existence of the notes should be reflected on financial statements and interest income and expenses must be property reported.

14. Whether to Report Sale Transactions on Gift Tax Returns. Various planners typically have not reported sales on gift tax returns. However, they must rethink that position in light of the Question 12(e) on Form 706 about whether the decedent ever sold an interest in an entity to certain types of trusts. Some planners trend toward reporting sale transactions in most circumstances, but not all.[[407]](#footnote-407) If the planner decides to report the transaction, how much should be disclosed? Many planners attach copies of all of the sale documents, including any sales agreement, transfer documents, notes, security agreements, deeds of trust, UCC filings, etc. Disclosing all of that information illustrates that the transaction was treated and documented as an arms’ length commercial transaction. Some attorneys also report adding to the disclosure a statement that the return and all attachments, taken together, are intended to satisfy the requirements of the adequate disclosure regulations. The intent is to communicate that the planner is ready in case the case is selected for audit.

15. Downpayment. Some attorneys prefer giving cash to comprise the “10% gift element” in order to stay under the IRS’s radar screen. If a partnership interest is given to the trust, the box on Schedule A must be checked on the gift tax return (Form 709) reflecting that the asset was valued with a discount. (That may have been what triggered the audit that resulted in the *Karmazin* lawsuit, discussed in Sections II.C and XIX.G.2 of this outline *supra*.)

16. Underwater Sales. If at some point after the transaction, the value of the trust assets is less than the amount of the debt, the transaction may need to be revisited. Alternative approaches include:

(a) renegotiating the interest rate if the AFR has become lower;

(b) renegotiating the principal amount of the note (but why would the grantor renegotiate for a lower principal payment?; there seems to be no advantage to the grantor unlike the typical bank renegotiation in which the bank may renegotiate in order to receive some upfront payment or more favored position; the trust has nothing “extra” to grant to the grantor in a renegotiation; this approach seems risky);

(c) have the grantor sell the note from the original grantor trust that purchased the asset to a new grantor trust (the note would presumably have a lower value than its face value; any appreciation above that value would inure to the benefit of Trust 2 even though Trust 1 ends up having to pay all of its assets on the note payments; a big disadvantage is that the new trust would have to be “seeded” and the value of the underlying asset could decrease even further so that the seeding to Trust 2 would be lost as well); or

(d) the grantor could contribute the note from the grantor trust to a new GRAT (future appreciation would inure to the benefit of the GRAT remaindermen but there would be no new “seeding” requirement which could be lost as well if there were more deprecation in the value of the underlying assets).[[408]](#footnote-408)

17. One Planner’s Suggested Approach.

* Cash gift of 10%
* Sale of assets, so that the sale portion and gift portion are in a 90/10 ratio.
* Do not report the sale on an income tax return.[[409]](#footnote-409)
* Generally do not get a separate tax ID number for the grantor trust, but follow the procedures of Regulation §1.671-4(b).
* If the plan is to keep the trust in existence until the grantor’s death (for example if it is a GST exempt trust), consider reporting the sale on a gift tax return. There may be lower odds of a gift tax audit than of an estate tax audit—although that may be changing in light of the increased estate tax exemption.[[410]](#footnote-410)
* The general preference is to use sale to grantor trusts rather than GRATs for business interests, because a longer term is needed to make the payments out of the business’s cash flow. (That planner tends to use 2-year GRATs for publicly traded securities.)

I. Defined Value Structures. As discussed above, a valuation risk is that a gift may result if the IRS determines that the value of the transferred asset exceeds the consideration given in the sale transaction. One way that might reduce the gift tax exposure risk is to use a defined value clause—defining the amount transferred by way of a fractional allocation between an (1) irrevocable trust and (2) a charity (or the transferor’s spouse, a QTIP Trust or a GRAT—some person or entity to which the transfer would not generate gift taxes). The IRS does not recognize defined value clauses, on public policy grounds but several cases have now rejected that argument where the “excess amount” passes to charity.[[411]](#footnote-411) Some of the cases have directly involved sales to grantor trusts.

*Petter v. Commissioner[[412]](#footnote-412)* involved classic inter vivos gifts and sales to grantor trusts using defined value clauses that had the effect of limiting gift tax exposure. The gift document assigned a block of units in an LLC and allocated them first to the grantor trusts up to the maximum amount that could pass free of gift tax, with the balance being allocated to charities. The sale document assigned a much larger block of units, allocating the first $4,085,190 of value to each of the grantor trusts (for which each trust gave a 20-year secured note in that same face amount) and allocating the balance to charities. The units were initially allocated based on values of the units as provided in an appraisal by a reputable independent appraiser. The IRS maintained that a lower discount should be applied, and that the initial allocation was based on inappropriate low values. The IRS and the taxpayer eventually agreed on applying a 35% discount, and the primary issue was whether the IRS was correct in refusing on public policy grounds to respect formula allocation provisions for gift tax purposes. The court held that the formula allocation provision did not violate public policy and allowed a gift tax charitable deduction in the year of the original transfer for the full value that ultimately passed to charity based on values as finally determined for gift tax purposes.

Similarly, *Hendrix v. Commissioner*[[413]](#footnote-413)involved combined gifts and sales using defined value formula clauses. Parents transferred stock in a closely-held S corporation to trusts for their daughters and descendants and a charitable donor advised fund, to be allocated between them under a formula. The formula provided that shares equal to a specified dollar value were allocated to the trust and the balance of the shares passed to the charitable fund. The trust agreed to give a note for a lower specified dollar value and agreed to pay any gift tax attributable to the transfer. Under the formula, the values were determined under a hypothetical willing buyer/willing seller test. The transfer agreement provided that the transferees were to determine the allocation under the formula, not the parents.[[414]](#footnote-414) The court recognized the effectiveness of the transfers of defined values under the formulas.[[415]](#footnote-415)

One case has approved a straightforward defined value gift assignment of a dollar amount of LLC units that did not involve a charitable transfer.[[416]](#footnote-416) A similar structure conceivably could be structured in a sale transaction, by providing that only a defined value of assets are sold in the sale transaction in return for the note given as consideration, if the rationale of that case is accepted by other courts.

Another possible “defined value” approach to avoid (or minimize) the gift risk is to provide in the trust agreement that any gift before Date 1 passes to a gift trust. The initial “seed gift” to the trust would be made before that date. The trust would say that any gift after that date goes 10% to a completed gift trust and 90% to incomplete gift trust. If a court ultimately determines that the note does not equal the full value of the asset that is sold to the trust, 90% of the gift element would pass to an incomplete gift trust, and there would be no immediate gift taxation on that portion.

Another possibility is to use a disclaimer even for a sale to grantor trust. The trust would specifically permit a trust beneficiary to disclaim any gift to the trust and the trust would provide that the disclaimed asset passes to a charity or back to the donor or to some other transferee that does not have gift tax consequences. After a sale to the trust, the beneficiary would disclaim by a formula: “To the extent any gift made by father to me, I disclaim 99% of the gift.”

If the sale is made to a grantor trust for the client that is created by the client’s spouse, an advantage is that the client could be given a power of appointment. If the sale results in a gift element, it would be an incomplete gift. That portion of the trust would continue to be included in the grantor ‘s estate, but the client would have achieved the goal of transferring as much as possible as the lowest possible price without current gift tax exposure. Gain would not be recognized on the sale, but a downside to this approach is that the selling spouse would recognize interest income when the spouse’s grantor trust makes interest payments.[[417]](#footnote-417)

XX. SCINs

A. Overview. A potential disadvantage of a basic intra-family installment sale or sale to a grantor trust is the potential inclusion, in the seller’s estate, of the unpaid obligation at its fair market value on the date of the seller’s death. One way to avoid this problem is to use a self-canceling installment note (SCIN), a debt obligation containing a provision canceling the liability upon the death of the holder.[[418]](#footnote-418)

If the holder dies prior to the expiration of the term of the SCIN, the automatic cancellation feature may operate to remove a significant amount of assets from what would otherwise be includible in the estate of the holder. This feature can also be useful if the seller does not want to burden the purchaser with the continued obligation to make payments after the seller’s death.

Planning with SCINs followed the seminal case of *Estate of Moss v. Commissioner.[[419]](#footnote-419)* The Tax Court held that the remaining payments that would have been due following the maker’s death under a SCIN was not includable in the decedent’s gross estate under § 2033 because “[t]he cancellation provision was part of the bargained for consideration provided by decedent for the purchase of the stock” and as such “it was an integral provision of the note.”[[420]](#footnote-420)

The potential advantages of using SCINs for estate tax savings may be further enhanced by “backloading” the payments. That may result in a significantly smaller amount being paid to the seller during life and with a greater amount being cancelled, thus resulting in exclusion of more value from the seller’s gross estate.[[421]](#footnote-421) A potential disadvantage of the SCIN transaction is that if the seller outlives his or her life expectancy, the premium that is paid for the cancellation feature may result in more value being included in the seller’s estate than if the cancellation provision had not been used.

As discussed below, the SCIN transaction works best when the seller/client dies prior to, and “preferably” materially prior to, his or her actuarial life expectancy. The ideal candidate is someone in poor health, but whose death is not imminent, or someone with a very poor family health history. As with all sophisticated tax planning strategies, the SCIN is not for all clients or all situations, especially since clients’ actual life expectancies are never truly known in advance.

There are also numerous issues concerning the technique which have not yet been fully resolved. In addition to the obvious mortality issue, there are questions as to what base rates should be used (the Section 7520 rate or the AFR?), what life expectancies should be used (the tables used under Section 7520, the tables used under Section 72, or the seller’s actual life expectancy?), how the payments should be allocated for income tax purposes (what amounts are return of basis, interest, and gain?) and the effect of the cancellation of the note upon the seller’s death for income tax purposes (is the cancellation a taxable event for the debtor?).

In any event, the use of SCINs adds a whole new dimension of tax uncertainties and complexities.[[422]](#footnote-422)

B. Note Terms.

1. Interest Rate. Although it is tempting to apply the below-market safe harbor of §7872 (and, arguably, §1274 (d)), there is an additional element at work with the SCIN that makes it advisable to structure the SCIN so that the value of the SCIN is at least equal to the value of the property sold.

For the value of the SCIN to equal the value of the property sold, the seller of the property must be compensated for the risk that the seller may die during the term of the note, and thus not receive the full purchase price. Since such a feature must be bargained for at arm’s length to be respected, the seller must be compensated for the risk associated with the potential cancellation either by an increase in the purchase price or by a higher interest rate.[[423]](#footnote-423) To calculate the premium, an advisor must determine what stream of payments are required, taking into consideration the possible death of the seller, to have the same present value as the principal amount of the promissory note.[[424]](#footnote-424) There is not universal agreement on how payments under a SCIN are properly valued, for there is no clear answer concerning which mortality tables should be used and which discount rate should be applied to value the payments. Some commentators use the life expectancies in Table 90CM for May 1999-April 2009 and Table 2000CM from May 2009 forward[[425]](#footnote-425) and a rate equal to the greater of 120% of the mid-term AFR, assuming annual payments, as prescribed by §7520, or the AFR for the actual term of the note, as prescribed by Section 7872.[[426]](#footnote-426) Others use the annuity tables under §72[[427]](#footnote-427) and the AFR as prescribed by §7872.[[428]](#footnote-428) Additionally, some commentators have recommended that the actual life expectancy be used.[[429]](#footnote-429)

While an advisor could determine these payment streams and resulting rates manually, or by use of a computer program, some commentators recommend that an actuary be employed.[[430]](#footnote-430)

Although the matter is by no means free from doubt, some commentators are persuaded by the well-reasoned approach of *Hesch and Manning*. The §7872 AFRs are, more likely than not, appropriate, and the examples used in regard to SCINs will generally use AFRs, not §7520 rates. Nonetheless, AFRs should not be used by the faint of heart. A conservative planner probably should use the higher of the §7520 rate or the AFR for the actual term of the note, as recommended by *Covey*. Clearly, many, if not most, practitioners are using the higher of the §7520 rate or the AFR for the actual term of the note; the estate tax risk of using a rate that is too low is simply too great.

2. Term. The term of the SCIN should not equal or exceed the individual’s life expectancy, or the SCIN might be recharacterized as a private annuity.[[431]](#footnote-431) Even this conclusion is not universally accepted.[[432]](#footnote-432) As noted above, however, there is a difference of opinion as to how life expectancy is to be determined. Are the 90CM estate tax tables (for May 1999-April 2009) and Table 2000CM (from May 2009 forward),[[433]](#footnote-433) the Table V income tax annuity tables,[[434]](#footnote-434) or the Seller’s actual life expectancy to be used? While a conservative approach would be to structure the SCIN to have a term which is shorter than the shortest of all of these possible life expectancies, such a structure would materially detract from the primary advantage of the SCIN -- the likelihood that a would-be seller with health problems or a poor family health history will die before he or she is “supposed to.” If the seller has a “terminal illness,” however, the actuarial tables should not be used.[[435]](#footnote-435) If §7520 applies for these purposes, “terminal illness” means that the individual has an “incurable illness or other deteriorating physical condition” which results in at least a 50% probability that he or she will die within one year.[[436]](#footnote-436) If the person lives for 18 months or longer after the relevant valuation date, he will be presumed not to have been terminally ill at the time of the transaction, unless the existence of a terminal illness can be established by clear and convincing evidence.[[437]](#footnote-437) Whether or not SCINs are technically subject to this regulation, it is probably wise not to use standard actuarial tables when a person is gravely ill.[[438]](#footnote-438)

Also, as discussed above in the context of an installment sale to a grantor trust, a SCIN term which is too long may raise debt/equity concerns, especially when the sale is to a trust with comparatively few other assets.

The mortality component of the SCIN increases as the term of the SCIN increases, for a greater risk premium must be added to the SCIN to compensate the seller for the higher probability that the seller will die prior to the expiration of the longer term.

3. Premium on Principal. If the risk premium is not reflected in a higher interest rate, then it must be added to the sales price and reflected in a higher face amount of the SCIN. As discussed below, a principal risk premium should be treated as a capital gain to the seller and increase the basis of the property in the hands of the purchaser.

4. Comparison of Interest and Principal Premiums. If a self-amortizing note with equal principal and interest payments is used, there should be no difference for estate tax purposes between choosing an interest risk premium and a principal risk premium, as the annual payments under either structure would be the same. If, however, an interest-only SCIN or a level principal payment SCIN is used, then for estate tax purposes, the relative merits of choosing the principal premium or interest rate premium to compensate the seller for the risk of death occurring during the term of the SCIN should be analyzed, as the benefits depend upon the type of note used.

For income tax purposes, choosing to increase the principal balance of the purchase price will generally result in higher capital gains taxes and lower interest income being reported by the seller, with the buyer receiving a higher basis in the purchased asset and a lower current deduction, if any, for the payment of interest. If the asset being sold has a high basis, the seller may prefer the principal adjustment approach, because there may be minimal capital taxes payable in any event. Conversely, if the purchase price remains equal to the fair market value of the property sold and the interest rate is instead increased, then the seller will report more interest and less capital gains income. In turn, purchaser will take a lower cost basis in the acquired property, but may have a higher current deduction for the increased interest payments.[[439]](#footnote-439)

C. Income Tax Consequences to Seller for Sale to Family Member or Non-Grantor Trust.

1. Availability of Installment Method. A sale of property to a family member or a non-grantor trust in exchange for a properly structured SCIN is a taxable event and, unless the seller elects otherwise, should generally result in installment sale treatment for the seller.[[440]](#footnote-440) Under the installment method, it is assumed that the seller will outlive the term of the SCIN, and the maximum principal amount to be received by the seller in the SCIN transaction, including any principal premium, is the “selling price.”[[441]](#footnote-441) The seller’s adjusted basis is then subtracted from this selling price to determine the gross profit, if the selling price exceeds the basis.[[442]](#footnote-442)

A portion of each payment will also consist of interest, which may be calculated under one of two methods, depending upon whether the SCIN is treated as a maximum selling price installment sale, or as a contingent payment installment sale.[[443]](#footnote-443) By treating the payment stream as a maximum selling price installment sale, the interest paid will be front-loaded. In contrast, if the payment stream is treated as a contingent payment installment sale, the interest paid will be back-loaded.

2. Death of Seller During the Term of the SCIN. If the SCIN is cancelled by reason of the death of the seller during the note term, any deferred gain will be recognized as income. The primary question is whether the deferred gain is properly includible (a) on the deceased seller’s final return, in which event the resulting income tax liability should be deductible as a §2053 claim against the estate for estate tax purposes, or (b) in the initial return of the deceased seller’s estate as an item of income in respect of a decedent (“IRD”) under §691.[[444]](#footnote-444)

When the issue arose in *Estate of Frane*, the Tax Court agreed that gain should be recognized upon the death of the seller prior to the expiration of the term of the SCIN, but held that the gain was properly reportable by the seller on the seller’s final return, not by the seller’s estate.[[445]](#footnote-445) The Tax Court held that the income tax consequences of the cancellation were governed by §453B(f), which had been enacted, in part, to overrule the outcome of *Miller v. Usury*,[[446]](#footnote-446), so that the cancellation of a SCIN would be treated as a disposition.[[447]](#footnote-447) Because the cancellation was in favor of a related party, the fair market value of the obligation would be no less than the face amount of the obligation.[[448]](#footnote-448) Since the Tax Court held that the gain was properly reportable on the seller’s final income tax return, it also held that the Seller’s estate was not taxable under the IRD rules of §691(a).

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the Tax Court in favor of the Service’s alternate position that the decedent’s estate recognizes the deferred gain on its initial income tax return as an item of IRD.[[449]](#footnote-449) In *Estate of Frane*, the Eighth Circuit held that the cancellation of a SCIN is not a “disposition” which is taxed to the seller under §453B pursuant to §453B(f), but is rather a “transmission” which is taxable as IRD to the estate under §691 pursuant to §453B(c). The Eighth Circuit based this decision on the language in §691(a)(5)(iii) that “cancellation occurring at the death of obligee shall be treated as a transfer by the estate, taxable under §691(a)(2).”[[450]](#footnote-450) This holding is in accord with IRS’s published position.[[451]](#footnote-451) The Eighth Circuit decision in *Frane* may not be the final word on the issue of whether the deferred gain is includible in income by the deceased seller on his final return or by the estate of the deceased seller on its initial return. The Eighth Circuit’s position has not been adopted by any other Circuits. An argument can be made that the gain should be recognized by the seller on his or her final income tax return in accordance with the Tax Court decision and §453B(f).[[452]](#footnote-452) Furthermore, some commentators argue that the cancellation should not result in any income recognition.[[453]](#footnote-453)

If the seller dies before all note payments have been paid, the net effect is that the amount of the unpaid payments is excluded from the gross estate for estate tax purposes, but is treated as income for income tax purposes. As the estate and income tax rates become closer in amounts, does using SCINs make sense? There is a net advantage, even if the estate and income tax rates are the same, because, the estate tax savings is based on the entire amount of the remaining payments whereas the income tax cost is based on just the amount of taxable income, which is the amount of the remaining payments less basis attributable to those payments. For example, if a high basis asset is sold, the income tax cost may be relatively small.

D. Income Tax Consequences to Seller for Sale to Grantor Trust. As in the case of a typical installment sale to a grantor trust, the trust’s purchase of the seller’s property in exchange for a SCIN should not be a taxable event, at least as long as the trust remains a grantor trust.

1. Cessation of Grantor Trust Status During Grantor’s Lifetime. If the grantor trust ceases to be a grantor trust during the grantor’s lifetime, and if the SCIN is still outstanding at the time of such cessation, a taxable event is likely to be deemed to have occurred at the time the trust ceases to be a grantor trust.[[454]](#footnote-454) Presumably, any gain will be based on the excess of the amount then due under the SCIN over the adjusted basis of the grantor trust’s assets.

2. Grantor’s Death During Installment Note Term. The grantor’s death before the end of the term of the SCIN results in the cancellation of the remaining payments otherwise due under the SCIN. Because of the cancellation feature, and because the sale never took place for income tax purposes during the life of the seller, the deferred gain that would normally be recognized upon the death of the seller under *Frane* arguably should not be recognized by the seller or the seller’s estate, although the matter is not free from doubt.[[455]](#footnote-455)

E. Income Tax Consequences to Purchaser for Sale to Family Member or Non-Grantor Trust.

1. Basis. If the sale is to a family member or a non-grantor trust, the first income tax consideration for the buyer-debtor is the calculation of the basis in the property received. Unfortunately, the manner in which basis is determined is not completely settled. G.C.M. 39503 concludes that the buyer-debtor acquires a basis equal to the maximum purchase price of the property. This result would be symmetrical to the treatment of cancellation at death in favor of a related party as a disposition under §453B(f) and is arguably supported by what might be dicta in the Eighth Circuit’s decision in *Frane*.[[456]](#footnote-456) G.C.M. 39503, and the *Frane* appellate decision in, however, both predate the final versions of Treas. Reg. sections 1.483-4 and 1.1275-4(c)(5), which provide that a purchaser only receives basis when payments are made on a contingent payment instrument, not when the contingent payment obligation is issued. Although it is not clear that a SCIN is a contingent payment instrument subject to these regulations, a conservative purchaser may choose to increase basis only to the extent that payments are made, especially because of the potential penalties under §§6662(e)(1)(A) and (h)(2) if the adjusted basis claimed exceeds 200% of the amount determined to be correct.[[457]](#footnote-457)

2. Interest Deduction. The second income tax consideration for the purchaser is the amount and deductibility of interest. The amount of the interest component of each payment should be computed under one of the two methods discussed above in regard to the seller. As for the buyer’s ability to deduct the interest, while G.C.M. 39503 states that “[in] the installment sale situation, …interest is fully deductible by the buyer”, the purchaser will be subject to the typical limitations placed on the deductibility of interest, depending upon the nature of the assets purchased. Although the default classification of interest for an individual is non-deductible personal interest,[[458]](#footnote-458) interest payments under a SCIN, unless issued in regard to the purchase of a personal use asset other than a primary or secondary residence, should generally be deductible as investment interest under §163(h)(2)(B) (subject to the limitations of §163(d)), as qualified residence interest with respect to a primary or secondary residence under §§163(h)(2)(D) and (h)(3), as passive activity interest under §§163(h)(2)(C) and 469, or as business interest under §163(h)(2)(A).

3. Cancellation of SCIN. Finally, although the death of the seller during the term of the SCIN arguably may represent cancellation of indebtedness, resulting in a reduction of the buyer’s basis under §108(e) (and possibly taxable income to the buyer to the extent that the cancellation of indebtedness exceeds basis), this result does not seem to comport with the intent of §108(e).[[459]](#footnote-459)

F. Income Tax Consequences to Purchaser for Sale to Grantor Trust. As in the case of a typical installment sale to a grantor trust, the trust’s purchase of the seller’s property in exchange for a SCIN should not be a taxable event, at least as long as the trust remains a grantor trust.

1. Cessation of Grantor Trust Status During Grantor’s Lifetime. If the trust ceases to be a grantor trust during the grantor’s lifetime, if the SCIN is still outstanding at the time of such cessation, and if a taxable event is deemed to have occurred at the time the trust ceases to be a grantor trust, then the trust will take either a cost basis for the purchased property, which presumably will equal the outstanding balance under the SCIN at the time the trust ceases to be a grantor trust, or possibly will take a basis for such property equal to the payments under the SCIN, as provided in the regulations for a contingent payment instrument.[[460]](#footnote-460)

2. Grantor’s Death During Installment Note Term. The grantor’s death before the end of the term of the SCIN results in the cancellation of the remaining payments otherwise due under the SCIN. As in the case of a typical installment sale to a grantor trust, the outcome is certainly not free from doubt, but because of the cancellation feature, and because the grantor trust would not be obligated to make any payments under the SCIN after the seller’s death, the trust should take a basis under §1015(b), which would typically be a carryover basis as opposed to a cost basis.[[461]](#footnote-461)

G. Gift Tax Considerations. There are several gift tax considerations in regard to a SCIN transaction. These are substantially the same as those in regard to a typical installment sale to a grantor trust.

First, there is the normal valuation issue with respect to the assets sold in the transaction. Second, if the value of the SCIN received is found to be worth less than the value of the property sold (or not “substantially equal” to the value under the standard set forth in G.C.M. 39503), then the transaction will be treated as a part sale/part gift. The potential negative implications of such a bargain sale are very similar to those discussed above with respect to a typical installment sale to a grantor trust. Not only would a taxable gift result, but if the property is sold to a trust, the gift may even cause the assets in the trust to be ultimately includible in the grantor’s gross estate, for estate tax purposes, at their date of death or alternate valuation date values, including any appreciation after the initial transfer of the assets to the trust.

If a trust is the purchaser in a SCIN transaction in which a principal premium approach is used, substantially greater “seed” funding may be required to insure that the SCIN will be regarded as bona fide debt. In all probability, the total trust assets, or access to assets (taking into account bona fide guarantees), should be at least 10% (or possibly 11.1%) more than the principal obligation under the SCIN, including the principal premium. Otherwise, the transfer to the trust may be treated as an equity contribution, which almost inevitably would result in a significant taxable gift.[[462]](#footnote-462)

H. Estate Tax Considerations. If the SCIN is properly structured, and if there are no other retained interests in the SCIN or in a purchasing trust which would result in inclusion, the seller’s death prior to the expiration of the SCIN term should result in the inclusion in the seller’s gross estate, for federal estate tax purposes, of only the payments made or due under the SCIN during the seller’s life (and any income or appreciation attributable to such payments). The balance due under the SCIN, exclusive of any payments due but not made during the seller’s life, will be cancelled and will escape inclusion in the seller’s gross estate.[[463]](#footnote-463) In this regard, G.C.M. 39503 states that “in the case of an installment sale, when a death-extinguishing provision is expressly included in the sales agreement and any attendant installment notes, the notes will not be included in the transferor’s gross estate for Federal estate tax purposes.” This removal of assets from the seller’s gross estate is the primary motivation for using a SCIN.

The obvious tradeoff from an estate tax standpoint of a SCIN, of course, is that if the seller lives longer than he or she is “supposed to” and thus survives the end of the SCIN term, the assets included in the seller’s gross estate will be greater, and possibly much greater, than if the seller had sold the property in a typical installment sale. Because of the risk premium, the SCIN payments will be materially higher than typical installment payments, and unless the payments are consumed or otherwise insulated from estate tax inclusion, they will be includible in the decedent’s taxable estate. Depending upon the total return on the assets sold and interest rates, the estate tax inclusion could be even worse than if the seller had done nothing.

I. Advantages and Disadvantages of SCINs.

1. Advantages.

a. Estate Tax Savings Upon Early Death. A SCIN should be used only when the seller is expected to die prior to his or her actuarial life expectancy. If the seller obliges by passing away prior to, and “preferably” materially prior to, his or her actuarial life expectancy, the estate tax savings can be quite substantial. In so many words, the seller in a SCIN transaction is gambling on his or her premature death.

b. Interest Deductibility by Purchaser. Unless the purchased property consists of personal use property (other than a primary or secondary residence), the interest paid by the purchaser under the SCIN should generally be deductible. This assumes that the purchaser in the SCIN transaction is not a grantor trust.

c. Purchaser’s Basis. Although the issue is not free from doubt, the basis of a purchaser (other than a grantor trust) in a SCIN transaction should be the initial principal obligation under the SCIN, including any principal premium. In contrast, the purchaser’s basis for property purchased in a private annuity transaction may be limited to the aggregate annuity payments, which could result in a lower basis, especially if the seller dies prematurely (as anticipated).

d. Backloading Payments. A payment deferred under either a SCIN or a private annuity is a payment that may never have to be made. Backloading of payments is much more easily structured under a SCIN, as opposed to a private annuity. Conceptually, either interest or principal should be deferrable to a date within the seller’s actuarial life expectancy, but an appropriate principal premium or interest premium would have to be calculated and ultimately paid (unless the seller dies before the due date). However, in *Estate of Musgrove v. United States,[[464]](#footnote-464)* a demand SCIN transaction was held to be a gift because of the absence of a real expectation of repayment (since the seller was in poor health and the purchaser did not have other funds). This permissible backloading is a distinct SCIN advantage.

e. Collateralization of Payment Obligation. The property sold in exchange for the SCIN can be used as security, thus better assuring the stream of payments if the seller is otherwise concerned that payments will not be made. In contrast, a private annuity should not be secured or guaranteed.[[465]](#footnote-465)

f. Interest Rate. Although the issue is by no means free from doubt, there is a distinct possibility that the interest rate under the SCIN can be based on the generally lower AFR for the particular note pursuant to §7872, as opposed to 120% of the mid-term AFR under §7520. However, the planner must judge whether use of the §7872 AFR is worth the gift tax risk and possibly the estate tax risk.[[466]](#footnote-466)

2. Disadvantages.

a. Risk of Long Life. Why there are so few SCIN transactions in practice.

b. Tax Uncertainties. As outlined above, the SCIN transaction is replete with tax uncertainties.

c. Income Tax Consequences for Seller or Her Estate. If the seller dies before the SCIN matures, the deferred gain will be recognized for income tax purposes, upon cancellation of the note as of the seller’s death, either in the deceased seller’s final return or her estate’s first return. This disadvantage is much more significant as the estate and income tax rates become closer to each other. However, even if the rates are close together, there may still be a significant advantage with a SCIN because the estate tax savings is based on the entire amount that is cancelled whereas the income tax cost is based on the amount cancelled less basis that is attributable to that amount. It is less clear whether the same, or similar, income tax results will follow if the purchaser is a grantor trust; arguably, the remaining deferred gain should not be recognized by the seller or seller’s estate.[[467]](#footnote-467)

XXI. LOANS INVOLVING ESTATES

A. Significance. Estates often have liquidity needs for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is to be able to pay federal and state estate taxes nine months after the date of death. Other family entities may have liquid assets that would permit loans to the estate. This is a very commonly occurring situation. A very important tax issue that arises is whether the estate will be entitled to an estate tax administrative expense deduction for the interest that it pays on the loan.

On other side of the coin, (and of less importance) there may be situations in which beneficiaries need advances, before the executor is in a position to be able to make distributions. One possible scenario where this can occur is if only one beneficiary needs assets from the estate quickly, but the executor wants to make pro rata distributions when distributions are made. An advance could be made to the one beneficiary with needs until distributions can be made.

B. Estate Tax Administrative Expense Deduction for Interest Payments.

1. Generally. Section 2053 does not refer to the deduction of interest as such. To be deductible, interest must qualify as an administration expense.[[468]](#footnote-468) Deducting interest as an estate tax deduction is not as attractive as at one time, because the interest would be recognized as income when received and the decrease in the estate tax rates reduces the amount of arbitrage on the rate differential between the estate tax savings and the income tax cost. Even so, substantial savings may be achieved because the estate tax reduction occurs nine months after date of death whereas the interest income may not be recognized until later years.

2. Post-Death Interest on Federal Estate Tax--Generally. Interest payable to the IRS on a federal estate tax deficiency is deductible as an administration expense to the extent the expense is allowable under local law.[[469]](#footnote-469)

Unlike interest payable to the IRS on deferred estate tax payments, interest on private loans used to pay estate taxes is *not* automatically deductible. The IRS recognizes that interest is deductible on amounts borrowed to pay the federal estate tax where the borrowing is necessary in order to avoid a forced sale of assets.[[470]](#footnote-470) Various cases have permitted deduction of interest on amounts borrowed to pay federal estate tax, in situations where the loan was necessary to avoid a forced sale of assets.[[471]](#footnote-471) The interest is deductible only for the time period for which the loan is reasonably necessary for that purpose.[[472]](#footnote-472)

3. Interest on Amounts Borrowed by Executor From Family-Owned Entity to Pay Federal Estate Tax. Various cases have permitted an interest deduction where the funds were borrowed from a family-owned entity rather than being borrowed from a bank.[[473]](#footnote-473) Several of the cases are described below as examples.

In *Estate of Murphy*,[[474]](#footnote-474) the estate borrowed $11,040,000 from the FLP on a 9-year “Graegin” note (i.e., which had a fixed term and interest rate and which prohibited prepayment). The estate also borrowed an additional $41.8 million from a prior trust on a “regular” note (i.e., that had a floating interest rate and that permitted prepayment). The IRS argued that the interest should not be deductible for two reasons. (1) The interest was not necessarily incurred because the estate illiquidity was the result of the decedent’s transfer of assets to an FLP. The court disagreed because the FLP was created “in good faith and for legitimate and significant non-tax purposes,” and because decedent retained sufficient assets ($130 million) at the time the FLP was created to pay his living expenses and anticipated estate taxes. (2) The FLP could have sold some of its assets and made a distribution of cash to the estate to pay taxes. The court also rejected this argument, reasoning that “[i]f the executor acted in the best interest of the estate, the courts will not second guess the executor’s business judgment. [citing *McKee*, 72 T.C.M. at 333].”

In *Beat v. United States*,[[475]](#footnote-475) the estate owned largely illiquid farmland. The estate distributed the assets to the beneficiary subject to a refunding agreement, and the estate borrowed money from the beneficiary to pay estate taxes. The estate had not paid interest to the plaintiff; it was bankrupt and could not pay the interest. The court reasoned that even if the asset had not been distributed there would have had to be borrowing to pay the estate tax and that the borrowing was “necessary and beneficial to the Estate.”

An interest deduction was allowed on a Graegin loan in *Estate of Duncan v. Commissioner*.[[476]](#footnote-476) A revocable trust (responsible for paying estate taxes) borrowed funds from an almost identical irrevocable trust. The loan was evidenced by a 6.7%[[477]](#footnote-477) 15-year balloon note that prohibited prepayment. A 15-year term was used because the volatility of oil and gas prices made income from the oil and gas businesses difficult to predict.[[478]](#footnote-478) The estate claimed a deduction under § 2053 of about $10.7 million for interest that would be payable at the end of the 15-year term of the loan, which the court allowed because (i) the loan was bona fide debt,[[479]](#footnote-479) (ii) the loan was actually and reasonably necessary,[[480]](#footnote-480) and (iii) the amount of the interest was ascertainable with reasonable certainty.[[481]](#footnote-481)

A deduction was similarly allowed in *Estate of Kahanic.[[482]](#footnote-482)* The estate was trying to sell the decedent’s medical practice when the estate taxes were due, and did not have the liquid funds to pay the estate taxes without a forced sale of the medical practice. Immediately before paying the estate taxes, the estate had about $400,000 of cash and owed about $1.125 million of liabilities, including the federal and state estate taxes. The estate borrowed $700,000 from the decedent’s ex-wife for a secured note bearing interest at the short-term AFR (4.85%). The court allowed the amount of interest that had accrued up to the time of trial because (i) the loan was bona fide debt,[[483]](#footnote-483) (ii) the loan was actually and reasonably necessary,[[484]](#footnote-484) and (iii) the interest will be paid by the estate.[[485]](#footnote-485)

Cases have not always allowed the full estate tax deduction for interest when an estate borrows funds from a family entity.

The court rejected an interest deduction for amounts loaned from an FLP to the estate in *Estate of Black v. Commissioner*,[[486]](#footnote-486) An FLP sold about one-third of its very large block of stock in a public company in a secondary offering, generating about $98 million to the FLP, and the FLP loaned $71 million to the estate to pay various taxes, expenses, and a charitable bequest. The court found that the loan was not necessary, basing its analysis primarily on the “no economic effect” rationale that the IRS gave in its “no bona fide loan” argument.[[487]](#footnote-487) The partnership had to sell the stock, and it loaned the sale proceeds to the estate. Under the court’s analysis, the key factor in denying any deduction for loans obtained to pay debts and expenses seems to be that the loan was not necessary to avoid selling assets—the company stock that was owned by the FLP was in fact sold by the FLP.[[488]](#footnote-488) The partnership could have redeemed the estate’s interest in the FLP and the estate could have sold the assets received from the partnership to pay the estate tax.[[489]](#footnote-489)

In *Estate of Stick v. Commissioner*,[[490]](#footnote-490) the estate reported liquid assets of nearly $2 million and additional illiquid assets of over $1,000,000. The residuary beneficiary of the estate (a trust) borrowed $1.5 million from the Stick Foundation to satisfy the estate’s federal and state estate tax liabilities. The court concluded that the estate had sufficient liquid assets to pay the estate taxes and administration expenses without borrowing, and denied a deduction of over $650,000 on interest on the loan. (This was despite the fact that the liquid assets of the estate appeared to have exceeded its obligations at the time of the borrowing by only about $220,000. That seems like a rather narrow “cushion” for an estate that owed over $1.7 million of liabilities, and other courts have been reluctant the second guess the executor’s business judgment in somewhat similar situations.)

Technical Advice Memorandum 200513028 refused to allow any interest deduction for amounts borrowed from a family limited partnership to pay estate taxes.[[491]](#footnote-491) The ruling gave various reasons for denying a deduction for the interest expenses. (The IRS did not refer to the creation of the FLP as a self-imposed illiquidity as one of the reasons.) First, the IRS reasoned that the loan was not necessary to the administration of the estate because one of the decedent’s sons who was a co-executor of the estate was the remaining general partner of the FLP, the FLP was not engaged in any active business that would necessitate retention of liquid assets, and there was no fiduciary restraint on the co-executor’s ability to access the funds.[[492]](#footnote-492) Second, the IRS reasoned that the interest may not be repaid, and even if it is, the repayment has no economic impact on the parties. The most likely scenario for paying the loan was that he FLP would distribute assets to the estate, which would then repay those assets back to the FLP in payment of the loan.[[493]](#footnote-493)

Some IRS agents have indicated informally that claiming an interest deduction on a Graegin loan for borrowing from a family limited partnership will draw close scrutiny as to whether §2036 applies to include the partnership assets in the estate (without any discount).

4. Timing of Interest Deduction For Interest on Extension to Pay Federal Estate Tax. When the estates receives an extension to pay estate tax under §6161, the interest is deductible *only* *when it is actually paid.* In Rev. Rul. 80-250,[[494]](#footnote-494) the IRS gave two reasons for refusing to allow an “up-front deduction” for the interest.[[495]](#footnote-495) First, an estate can accelerate payment of the deferred tax. Second, the interest rate of the deferred amount fluctuates, which makes it impossible to accurately estimate the projected interest expense.[[496]](#footnote-496)

5. *Estate of Graegin* Approved Up-Front Deduction. In *Estate of Graegin v. Commissioner*,[[497]](#footnote-497) the Tax Court in a memorandum decision allowed an estate to deduct projected interest on a loan that was obtained to avoid the sale of stock in a closely-held corporation.   
The court reasoned that the amount of the interest was sufficiently ascertainable to be currently deductible because of the fixed term of the note and because of the substantial prepayment penalty provisions in the note. The court observed that it was “disturbed by the fact that the note requires only a single payment of principal and interest”, but determined that such a repayment term was not unreasonable given the decedent’s post-mortem asset arrangement. The court observed that it was “mindful of the potential for abuse presented by the facts in this case”, but found the executor’s testimony regarding his intention with respect to repayment of the note credible. The court specifically pointed to the fact that there was an outside shareholder who would complain if the loan was not timely paid.

The IRS has approved the upfront deduction of interest in several Graegin loan situations.[[498]](#footnote-498) The IRS’s position in the letter rulings that all interest that would have been owed for the entire loan term must be paid upon default of the note may present usury problems in some states. An alternative planning possibility may be to have the lender waive the right to accelerate the note in the event of default.[[499]](#footnote-499) Other IRS rulings involving Graegin loans have refused to allow the interest deduction.[[500]](#footnote-500)

Most of the cases involving Graegin loans have allowed the up-front interest deduction, in situations where the estate could establish a reason for the borrowing other than to generate the estate tax deduction, and courts are reluctant to second guess the business judgment of the executor.[[501]](#footnote-501) A few cases have also disallowed interest deductions in Graegin loan situations, where the estate could not demonstrate the necessity for the borrowing over the life of the loan.[[502]](#footnote-502)

IRS officials have stated informally that the IRS is continuing to look for vehicles to contest Graegin loans, particularly in situations involving family limited partnerships. The IRS’s concern is that a deduction will be allowed but the interest in fact will not have to be paid over the entire term of the note.

6. Example of Extremely Favorable Results of Up-Front Deduction. The economics of this up-front deduction can be staggering. For example, assume a $10 million taxable estate. Assume the marginal estate tax bracket is 45%. If sufficient lifetime gifts have been made so that the estate is in a 45% bracket, the estate would owe $4.5 million in estate taxes. However, assume the estate borrows $1.493 million [this amount is calculated in an interrelated calculation] from a closely-held company under a 15 year note, at 12.0% interest, with a balloon payment at the end of the 15 year period. The accumulated interest payment due at the end of the 15 years would be $6.681 million. Under the *Graegin* analysis, the interest expense would be currently deductible, yielding a taxable estate of $10 - $6.681 or $3.319 million, which would result in a federal estate tax (at a 45% rate) of $1.493 million. The $6.681 million of interest would be paid to the company (which in turn, is owned primarily by family members.) The overall result is a very considerable estate tax savings. **The estate tax that is due 9 months after the date of death is reduced from $4.5 million to a little under $1.5 million.**

The interest income would be subject to income tax over the 15-year period, and the IRS will take the position that the interest on loans to pay taxes is nondeductible personal interest. However, many families are willing to pay income taxes over the payment period if they can reduce the estate taxes that are due nine months after the date of death. Be aware that if a QTIP trust or funded revocable trust is the borrower rather than a probate estate, the IRS may argue that under §2503(b) only interest actually paid within the estate tax statute of limitations period may be deducted.

7. New Regulation Project Considering Applying Present Value of Administration Expenses and Claims; Graegin Loans. The §2053 final regulations do not seem to impact *Graegin* loans at all. However, the Treasury Priority Guidance Plans for 2009-2013 include a project to address when present value concepts should be applied to claims and administration expenses (including, for example, attorneys’ fees, Tax Court litigation expenses, etc.).[[503]](#footnote-503) Graegin notes are also in the scope of that project.

8. Comparison of Alternative Borrowing Approaches to Pay Estate Taxes. Alternatives for generating cash to pay estate taxes include (1) selling estate assets, (2) obtaining a §6166 deferral (in effect, borrowing from the government), (3) borrowing from a related family entity with a Graegin loan, and (4) (4) borrowing from a third-party vendor with a Graegin loan.

Advantages and disadvantages of the various approaches are summarized.

Selling assets*.* Advantages are that there are no financing costs and there should be minimal capital gains (because of the basis step up at death). Disadvantages are that the estate gives up potential future appreciation from the sold assets, and valuation discounts associated with those assets may be jeopardized by a quick sale after death.

Section 6166 deferral. Advantages are that there would be no impact on valuation discount for estate assets, and the loan could be prepaid at any time without penalty. Disadvantages are that the term and interest rates are not negotiable (though the interest rate is very low-being 45% of the normal IRS underpayment interest rate), and the interest rate is a variable rate rather than being able to lock in the current very low rates over a long-term period.

Intra-family Graegin loan*.* Advantages are that the interest rate can be tied to the AFR (but it could be higher if desired to generate a higher estate tax deduction as long as it is still commercially reasonable), and there is more flexibility in negotiating terms of the note with a related entity (collateral requirements, financial covenants, etc.). A disadvantage is that the family related entity gives up the potential future appreciation on the assets used to fund the loan. Another disadvantage is that an intrafamily Graegin loan comes under much greater scrutiny from the IRS than a loan from a third party lender.

Third-party lender Graegin loan*.* A significant advantage is that there is less scrutiny from the IRS regarding the deductibility of interest as an estate tax administration expense. A disadvantage is that there will obviously be significant negotiations regarding terms of the note with a third party lender. Typical restrictions include that the estate not incur any additional indebtedness, the estate cannot create any additional liens against estate assets, that you liquid assets of the estate (to which the bank will be looking for repayment of the loan) maintain certain liquidity levels, and typically no distributions are allowed to beneficiaries until the loan is repaid.

1. \* Copyright 2013 by Bessemer Trust Company, N.A. All rights reserved. Portions of this article, in particular Sections IV-VII and IX-X (the intricacies of §7872), Section XVIII (income tax effects of installment sales under the §§ 483, 1274, and 7872 rules), and Section XX (SCINs) are based on (and in large part taken verbatim from) outstanding articles by Philip J. Hayes. Philip J. Hayes, *Adventures in Forgiveness and Forgetfulness: Intra-Family Loans for Beginners,* 13 Calif. Tr. & Est. Quarterly 5 (Summer 2007)(permission granted for the use of portions of this article); Philip J. Hayes, *Adventures in Forgiveness and Forgetfulness, Part 2: Intra-family Sales for Beginners,* 13 Calif. Tr. & Est. Quarterly 15 (Fall 2007)(permission granted for the use of portions of this article); Philip J. Hayes, *Intra-Family Loans: Adventures in Forgiveness and Forgetfulness,* ABA Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. L. Section Spring Meeting (2007). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. References to a “§” in the text will be to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. *See* Whitty, *Effects of Low Interest Rates on Investment-Driven Estate Planning Techniques,* 30 Est. Pl. 587 (Dec. 2003). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The split dollar regulations provide that a premium financing arrangement will be governed by §7872, unless it provides for the payment or accrual of interest at the AFR. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-15(a)(1). Even if the loan provides for adequate interest, if the split dollar loan is “non-recourse” (e.g., a loan to a trust with no other assets than the life insurance policy), the loan will be treated as a below-market loan under § 7872 unless the parties attach statements to their annual income tax returns representing that a reasonable person would expect all payments under the loan to be made. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-15(d)(2)(“Each party should … attach a copy of this representation to its Federal income tax return for any taxable year in which the lender makes a loan to which the representation applies”). Split dollar life insurance plans are outside the scope of this outline and will not be addressed further. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Estate of Duncan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-255. The court’s reasoning is compelling:

   “ Interest rates are generally determined according to the debtor’s rather than the creditor’s characteristics... The long-term applicable Federal rate is thus inappropriate because it is based on the yield on Government obligations… It therefore reflects the Government’s cost of borrowing, which is low because Government obligations are low-risk investments…Using the long-term applicable Federal rate consequently would have been unfair to the Walter Trust. [citations omitted; emphasis in original].”

   *Estate of Duncan* is discussed in Section XXI.B.3 of this outline, *infra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. See Section II.D.4 of this outline, *infra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. The materials in this section are derived primarily from an excellent outline by Benjamin Pruett (Bessemer Trust, Washington, D.C): Pruett, *Loans Within the Family—Cautions and Considerations.* [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. I.R.C. § 1272(a). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Rev. Rul. 77-299, 1977-2 C.B. 343. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. See Section II.E.2-3 of this outline *infra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Prop. Reg. §1.7872-11(a). See Section XVI.C of this outline *infra.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Reg. §§25.2512-8; 25.2511-1(g)(1)(“]t]he gift tax is not applicable to a transfer for a full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth, or to ordinary business transactions ...”). *See* Harwood v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 239, 258 (1984), *aff’d,* 786 F,2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1986), *cert. den.*, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Estate of Van Anda v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 1158, 1162 (1949). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. *E.g.*, Santa Monica Pictures, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-104 (no basis was established for assumption of debt that was not a bona fide indebtedness). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Todd v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-123, *aff’d*, 110 AFTR 2d ¶ 2012-5205 (5th Cir. 2012)(unpublished decision) (appeallate decision emphasized post hoc note execution and that the loan was never repaid as supporting that the note was merely a formalized attempt to achieve a desired tax result despite a lack of substance). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. T.C. Memo. 1996-3. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. *Id.* [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. *E.g.,* Estate of Lockett v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-123. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. T.C. Docket No. 2127-03, filed Feb. 10, 2003) [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. T.C. Memo. 2006-212. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. 3 F.3d 591 (2nd Cir. 1993). [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. 33 Fed. Cl. 657 (1995). [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. T.C. Memo. 2006-115. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. *Id.* For an excellent discussion of the impact of the *Rosen* case on potential estate inclusion, see Blattmachr & Zeydel, *Comparing GRATs and Installment Sales*, 41 Univ. of Miami Heckerling Inst. On Est. Pl. ¶202.3[C][2](2007). [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. T.C. Memo. 1997-302. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. I.R.C. §2053 allows a deduction for any indebtedness, but only “to the extent that [it was] contracted bona fide and for an adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth.” [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. *E.g.,* Estate of Labombarde v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 745. 753 (1972), *aff’d*, 502 F.2d 1158 (1st Cir. 1973)(children’s support payments to their mother were not a loan because there was no note evidencing the supposed debt and no interest was ever paid); Estate of Hicks, T.C. Memo. 2007-182 (loan from father to trust for daughter funded by proceeds of tort settlement, where loan arrangement was planned in part to keep from disqualifying the daughter for Medicaid assistance, was bona fide; court observed in particular that a note was executed, interest was paid every month on the loan, and the loan resulted in the creation of real interest income on which the father really paid income tax); Estate of Ribblesdale v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1964-177 (wealthy son who was annoyed with constant requests from his mother for assistance made loans to mother for her support; “bona fides of a loan are primarily established by the intention of the parties that repayment will be made pursuant to the terms of the agreement;” factors mentioned by court were that the mother signed notes requiring repayment, her executor actually repaid the principal [but not the interest], and she had substantial assets for repaying the loans even though they were not secured). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. *E.g.,* Estate of Duncan, T.C. Memo. 2011-255; Estate of Kahanic, T.C. Memo. 2012-81; Estate of Graegin, T.C. Memo. 1988-477. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Treas. Reg. §20.2053-1(b)(2)(i). [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. The family members, related entities, and beneficiaries to whom such debts are given special scrutiny are detailed in Treas. Reg. §20.2053-1(b)(2)(iii). [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Treas. Reg. §20.2053-1(b)(2)(ii). [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Rev. Rul. 77-299, 1977-2 C.B. 343. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Rev. Rul. 81-264, 1081-2 C.B. 186. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. 29 T.C. 730 (1958). [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. *See e.g.,* Field Service Advice 1999-837 (donor makes gift of full amount of loan initially if donor intends to forgive the loan as part of a prearranged plan); Letter Rul. 200603002 (transfer of life insurance policies to trust in return for note in the amount of the difference between the combined value of the policies and the amount sheltered by gift tax annual exclusions; several months later the donors canceled the note and forgave the debt; taxpayer did not request a ruling on this issue, but IRS stated that it viewed the donors as having made a gift at the outset in the amount of the note where there was a prearranged plan that it would be canceled). [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. 42 T.C. 936 (1964). [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. 63 T.C. 321 (1974). [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. 3 F.3d 591 (2nd Cir. 1993). [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. *E.g.,* Miller v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-3, *aff’d without opinion*, 113 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 1997); Estate of Musgrove v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 657, 664 (1995); Estate of Lockett v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-123. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Henkel, Estate Planning and Wealth Preservation ¶28.05[2][a](Warren Gorham & Lamont 1997). [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. *E.g*., Zaritsky & Aucutt, Structuring Estate Freezes: Analysis With Forms, §12.03 (2d ed. 1997). [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. HOWARD ZARITSKY’S EXCELLENT ANSWER:

    If the entire trust fund is $10,000 when the grantor lends it $1 million, there is a serious question whether the loan creates a bona fide debtor/creditor relationship, rather than constituting a gift (with a retained right to control beneficial enjoyment by "calling" the loan).  There is a good discussion of the factors that show a true loan in *Todd v. Commissioner*, T.C. Memo. 2011-123, which was not an estate planning case, but still has a good discussion of this subject.

    Forgiving the loan in the same year as it was made also suggests that the entire transaction is a disguised gift.  That would be a gift of $1 million on the date the loan was made.

    If, despite the low net worth of the borrowing trust, the loan is still a bona fide debt instrument, forgiving the loan in a later year should be a gift of the lesser of the outstanding debt or the net worth of the trust at the time of the forgiveness.  The loan cannot be worth more than the debtor's total assets.

    Were the initial funding $100,000, the transaction looks much more like a bona fide loan, though if it is forgiven in the same year as it was made, it could still be a disguised gift of $1 million on the date the loan was made. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. 465 U.S. 330 (1984). [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. *See* Jonathan Blattmachr, Elisabeth Madden, & Bridget Crawford, *How Low Can You Go? Some Consequences of Substituting a Lower AFR Note for a Higher AFR Note*, 109 J. Tax’n 21 (July 2008). [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. *See* Frazee v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 554, 588 (1992)(“Nowhere does the text of section 7872 specify that section 7872 is limited to loans of money. If it was implicit that it was so limited, it would be unnecessary to specify that section 7872 does not apply to any loan to which sections 483 or 1274 apply. The presence of section 7872(f)(8) signaled Congress' belief that section 7872 could properly be applicable to some seller financing. We are not here to judge the wisdom of section 7872, but rather, to apply the provision as drafted.”); True v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-167 (“We concluded in Frazee v. Commissioner, supra at 588-589, that section 7872 does not apply solely to loans of money; it also applies to seller-provided financing for the sale of property. In our view, the fact that the deferred payment arrangement in the case at hand was contained in the buy-sell agreements, rather than in a separate note as in Frazee, does not require a different result.”), *aff’d on other grounds,* 390 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2004). [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. *See* Letter Ruling 9418013 (series of loans from QTIP trust would not be treated as a disposition of the spouse’s qualifying income interest for life under §2519 when the loans bore interest at the AFR). Section 7872 governs the effects of loans with below-market interest rates in a variety of contexts beyond just individuals, specifically including loans between employers and employees, corporation-shareholder loans, and loans to qualified continuing care facilities among others. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(B-C, F). There are special exceptions that apply only to loans between individuals. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(2-3); *see* Section VIII.A-B of this outline, *infra.* Having exceptions that apply only to individual loans confirms that the section applies beyond just loans between individuals. The application of the principles of §7872 to trusts is important, for example to know that a loan or sale of assets from a GST non-exempt trust in return for an AFR note from a GST exempt trust will not cause a change in the inclusion ratio of the exempt trust. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-3(c)(1)(“Section 7872 does not apply to any loan which has sufficient stated interest”). [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. I.R.C. § 7872(e)(1)(A). [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. I.R.C. § 7872(e)(1)(B). [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. *See* Prop. Reg. §1.7872-3(c)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-8(b)(2). A loan to a custodian under the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act is deemed to be to a natural person, but a loan to a trust does NOT qualify, even though the beneficiaries are natural persons. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-8(b)(3). The $10,000 de minimis exception is discussed in more detail in Section III.B.3.a. of this outline, *supra*. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. In determining the aggregate outstanding amount of loans between individuals, loans by a husband and wife to an individual borrower are treated as made by one person. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. I.R.C. § 7872(d). This exception is discussed in more detail in Section III.B.3.b of this outline, *supra.*. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Hayes, *Intra-Family Loans: Adventures in Forgiveness and Forgetfulness*, 2007 ABA Real Prop., Tr., & Est. Law Section Annual Spring Symposium Exh. A (2007). [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. *Id.* at Exh. B. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-3(b)(3)(i)(A). [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.7872-3(b)(3)(i)(B)Ex.5(iii). [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. For the 2012 blended rate, see Rev. Rul. 2012-20, 2012-27 I.R.B. 1 (Table 6). [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. I.R.C. § 1274(d)(2)(3-month provision); Treas. Reg. § 1.1274-4(c)(weighted average maturity description, referring to Reg. § 1.1273-1(e)(3)). See Section XVIII.A. of this outline, *infra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. See Section II.C of this outline, *supra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. T.C. Memo. 1996-3. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. See Section XVII.C-D of this outline, *infra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. *Id.* [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-6(a). [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-11(g). [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. See Section XI.B of this outline, *infra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. I.R.C. § 1272(a). [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. I.R.C. §§ 1272-1273; *see generally* Henkel, Estate Planning and Wealth Preservation ¶28.04(Warren Gorham & Lamont 1997). [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Treas. Reg. §1.1272-1(b)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. I.R.C. §1272(a)(2)(E)(ii). [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. I.R.C. 1274(c)(3). For a detailed discussion of these exceptions, see Harrison McCawley, BNA Inc. Tax. Port. 535, Time Value of Money: OID and Imputed Interest ¶III.C.2 (2012). [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. I.R.C. §1274A(c)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. I.R.C. §1273(a)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Reg. §1.1273-1(b). [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. I.R.C. § 1273(b)(2); Reg. 1.1273-2(a)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. The test rate is generally the lowest of the AFRs for the 3-month period ending with the month in which there is a binding contract of sale. For sale-leaseback transactions, the test rate is 110% of the AFR. I.R.C. §1274(e). [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. I.R.C. § 1274(a)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. See Section XVI.A of this outline, *infra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-11. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. These limitations are discussed in more detail in Section­­ XVI.C of this outline, *infra*. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. See Section XI.B of this outline, i*nfra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Reg. §§ 20.2031-4, 25.2512-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. See Section XV.C of this outline, *infra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Reg. § 20.2031-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Prop. Reg. § 20.7872-1. See Section XV.C of this outline, *infra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. See Section XV.E of this outline, *infra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-11(e). [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. *See* Jonathan Blattmachr, Elisabeth Madden, & Bridget Crawford, *How Low Can You Go? Some Consequences of Substituting a Lower AFR Note for a Higher AFR Note*, 109 J. Tax’n 21, 26 (July 2008)(hereinafter Blattmachr et. al., *How Low Can You Go?*). [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. *E.g.,* Benjamin Feder, *The Promissory Note Problem,* 142 Tr. & Ests. 10 (Jan. 2003). [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Philip J. Hayes, *Adventures in Forgiveness and Forgetfulness: Intra-Family Loans for Beginners,* 13 Calif. Tr. & Ests. Q 5, 7 (Summer 2007). [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Philip Hayes, *Intra-Family Loans: Common Hazards and 10 Steps to Avoid Them,* Bessemer Trust Perspectives on Wealth Management Issue IV (2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. Although Congress did address installment sale abuse in 1963 with the enactment of I.R.C. § 483. More on that later. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. (1961) 35 T.C. 1083. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Generally, in this era, the government was not concerned with benefits arising from the interest free use of money; *see*, e.g., the split dollar regime blessed by Rev. Rul. 64-328. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. *Hardee v. United States* (Ct. Cl. 1982) 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P84,656, *rev’d* (Fed. Cir. 1983) 708 F.2d 661. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. T.C. Memo. 1980-575, *rev’d* 690 F.2d 812, (11th Cir. 1982), *aff’d*, 465 U.S. 330 (1984). [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. At the time, the personal interest deduction made the statute essentially revenue neutral. The loss of the personal interest deduction through the enactment of I.R.C. § 163(h) under the 1986 Tax Act, however, caused income tax pain for the borrower when interest-free loans are compensatory. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(2)(B). [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. As exemplified in *Blackburn v. Commissioner* 20 T.C. 204 (1953). [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. All references to “Proposed Regulations” hereafter shall be to these proposed regulations issued in 1985 for I.R.C. § 7872, unless otherwise noted. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. Prop. Reg. §§ 1.7872-1-14. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. There is no I.R.C. provision, however, that specifically applies to intra-family loans. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. I.R.C. § 7872(c). [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. Although intra-family loans certainly occur in other contexts (employer-employee and corporation-stockholder), the majority of intra-family loans will be gift loans. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-3(c)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. As opposed to the other categories of below-market loans, which have adverse tax consequences for the *borrower* and the lender. For instance, with compensation related loans, the amount of interest imputed constitutes wages to the employee. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. *E.g*., under the statute, in the case of term gift loans, the amount treated as transferred from the lender to the borrower, which is subject to gift tax, and the amount of imputed interest payable by the borrower to the lender, which is subject to income tax, are computed differently. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. Reg. § 1.1273-1(c). [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(B). [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(C). [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(D). [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(3). [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-4(b)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. *See* Harwood v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 239, 258 (1984), *aff’d,* 786 F,2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1986), *cert. den.*, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986). [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. Bittker & Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts, ¶55.2.4 (Warren, Gorham and Lamont) (Nov. 2006); Prop. Reg. §§ 1.7872-4(b)(1) and (b)(2). [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. I.R.C. § 2511(a). [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. Present company included. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. Technically, a below market loan is a demand loan with an interest rate lower than the AFR, I.R.C. § 7872(e)(1)(A), or a term loan for which the amount loaned exceeds the present value of all payments due under the loan, I.R.C. § 7872(e)(1)(B). Because the present value of a term loan is determined using the AFR, a demand or term loan with an interest rate at least equal to the AFR is not a below market loan. *See* Prop. Reg. Section 1.7872-3(c)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. One way of locating the AFR for a particular month is to search for “AFR” on the IRS website ([www.IRS.gov](http://www.IRS.gov)). In addition, planners can register on the IRS website to receive a monthly notification of the AFR from the IRS. [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-3(b)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. Alternatively, a rate precisely appropriate for the note’s payment or compounding interval can be computed. *See* Bittker & Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts, ¶53.2 (Warren, Gorham and Lamont) (Nov. 2006). [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(5); Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-10(a)(1). What if a loan is payable at the earlier of a specified term or on demand? The statute and regulations do not address whether that is treated as a demand or term loan under §7872. The statute literally suggests that is a demand loan. Section 7872(f)(5) says that a demand loan “means any loan which is payable in full at any time on the demand of the lender,” and Section 7872(f)(6) says a term loan is any loan that is not a demand loan. The loan described is “payable in full on the demand of the lender”; therefore, the statute literally says it is a demand loan not a term loan. Indeed, the term may have no relationship to the economic reality; for example, what if it is a 15-year loan to lock in the benefit of the current low interest rates but the parties contemplate treating as a demand loan for which the rates will never have to fluctuate upward? A counterargument is that a loan with a fixed maturity but that can be called earlier sets a known outside limited on the term of the loan and arguably should be more akin to a term loan. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-13(a). [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. The blended rates for the last four years have been as follows: 2009-0.82%; 2010-0.59%; 2011-0.40%; 2012-0.22%. For the 2012 blended rate, see Rev. Rul. 2012-20, 2012-27 I.R.B. 1 (Table 6). [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. Nomenclature alert: At the time the Proposed Regulations were drafted, the AFR was determined twice a year and was effective for the six-month period following the announcement. The Proposed Regulations refer to this as the “federal statutory rate.” Soon after the Proposed Regulations were issued, the IRS decided to determine the AFR monthly. What the Proposed Regulations refer to as the “alternate rate” is this monthly AFR; the “alternative rate” became the statutory rate under § 1274(d) through an amendment to the statute in 1985 (P.L. 99-121). Thus, what the Proposed Regulations refer to as the “alternate” rate is actually the federal statutory rate. However, the (former) federal statutory rate set forth in the Proposed Regulations is still used to determine *forgone interest* under the Proposed Regulations. Effectively, since the semiannual rate is no longer determined, the IRS has adopted the January and July AFRs as substitutes for the former semiannual AFRs. And you wondered why it was so hard to understand the proposed regulations? [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. See Bittker & Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts, ¶55.2.3 (Warren, Gorham and Lamont) (Nov. 2006). [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-3(c)(2). [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-3(e)(2)(i). [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(6). [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-10(a)(2). A period is considered ascertainable if it can be “determined actuarially.” For example, a loan payable only on the borrower's death is a term loan because the borrower's life expectancy is actuarially determinable. [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(10); Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-8(b)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-3(c)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-3(e)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. I.R.C. § 1274(d)(2)(3-month provision); Treas. Reg. § 1.1274-4(c)(weighted average maturity description, referring to Reg. § 1.1273-1(e)(3)). See Section XVIII.A., *infra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(2). [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(2)(A). [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(2)(B). [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(10). [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(7). [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-8(b)(4). [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
141. I.R.C. § 7872(d). The amount of net investment income is determined under I.R.C. § 163(d)(3). If a borrower has more than one gift loan outstanding, the borrower’s net investment income is allocated among the loans in proportion to the respective amounts that would be treated as retransferred by the borrower without regard to this exception. I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)(C). [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
142. I.R.C. § 7872(d). [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
143. I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)(B). [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
144. Prop. Reg. §1.7872-11(g)(3). [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
145. I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)(E). [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
146. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-11(g)(3). [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
147. I.R.C. § 7872(e)(2)(A)-(B); Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-6; Reg. § 25.7872-1. [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
148. Rev. Rul. 86-17, 1986-1 C.B. 377. [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
149. *Id*.; Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-13(a). Note that in the case of *term* gift loans, the taxpayer is to use the AFR based on annual compounding in effect the day the loan is made, appropriate to the term to maturity, in lieu of the blended annual rate. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-13(e)(1)(i). [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
150. The blended rates for the last four years have been as follows: 2009-0.82%; 2010-0.59%; 2011-0.40%; 2012-0.22%. For the 2012 blended rate, see Rev. Rul. 2012-20, 2012-27 I.R.B. 1 (Table 6). [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
151. Note, however, that for gift term loans, the amount of interest that would have been payable in that year if interest had accrued at the AFR is computed using the AFR based on *semi-annual* compounding in effect the day the loan is made, appropriate to the term to maturity, in lieu of the Federal short-term rate. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-13(e)(1)(ii). [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
152. Bittker & Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts, ¶55.3.2 (Warren, Gorham and Lamont) (Nov. 2006); Prop. Reg. §§ 1.7872-13(b), (c) and (d). [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
153. *Id.* [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
154. *Id.* [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
155. *See* Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-13(b)(3). [↑](#footnote-ref-155)
156. Prop. Reg. §§ 1.7872-13(c) and (d). [↑](#footnote-ref-156)
157. See Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-13(d). [↑](#footnote-ref-157)
158. The lender is treated as having transferred to the borrower the excess of the amount of the loan over the present value of the payments required to be made under the terms of the loan. [↑](#footnote-ref-158)
159. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-6(a). [↑](#footnote-ref-159)
160. Except for minor calculation adjustments as provided in Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-13(e)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-160)
161. Bittker & Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts, ¶55.3.2 (Warren, Gorham and Lamont) (Nov. 2006), citing Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax’n, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, at 533 (Comm. Print 1984). [↑](#footnote-ref-161)
162. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-11(g). [↑](#footnote-ref-162)
163. I.R.C. § 7872(a); Prop. Reg. §§ 25.7872-1 and 1.7872-6(b)(5). [↑](#footnote-ref-163)
164. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-7(a)(2). [↑](#footnote-ref-164)
165. This also means that below market term loans are treated differently under the income tax and gift tax regimes. [↑](#footnote-ref-165)
166. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-7(a)(2). [↑](#footnote-ref-166)
167. Although the calculation is for a below-market loan to an employee, the concepts are the same for calculating the amount of a gift for a below-market intra-family gift loan. [↑](#footnote-ref-167)
168. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-14(b)Ex.(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-168)
169. I.R.C. § 7872(b)(1); Prop. Reg. §§ 25.7872-1 and 1.7872-7(a). [↑](#footnote-ref-169)
170. Reg. § 1.1274-1(b)(3). [↑](#footnote-ref-170)
171. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-6(a). [↑](#footnote-ref-171)
172. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-11(g). [↑](#footnote-ref-172)
173. Bittker & Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts, ¶55.3.2 (Warren, Gorham and Lamont) (Nov. 2006), citing Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax’n, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, at 533 (Comm. Print 1984). [↑](#footnote-ref-173)
174. I.R.C. §§ 1272-1275. [↑](#footnote-ref-174)
175. NSAR 08777, Vaughn # 8777 (June 24, 1991) (response of IRS Regional Technical Coordinator responding to submission from practitioner requesting amendment or clarification of §7872). [↑](#footnote-ref-175)
176. Kathryn Henkel, Estate Planning and Wealth Preservation ¶28.04 (Warren Gorham & Lamont 1997). [↑](#footnote-ref-176)
177. I.R.C. § 671; *see* Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C,B, 184. [↑](#footnote-ref-177)
178. I.R.C. § 1272(a)(2)(A-D). [↑](#footnote-ref-178)
179. I.R.C. § 1272(a)(2)(E)(ii). [↑](#footnote-ref-179)
180. I.R.C. § 1272(a)(2)(E)(iii). [↑](#footnote-ref-180)
181. I.R.C. § 1275(b)(2). [↑](#footnote-ref-181)
182. I.R.C. § 1275(b)(3). [↑](#footnote-ref-182)
183. See the discussion in Section XI.B.4.b of this outline *infra*. [↑](#footnote-ref-183)
184. I.R.C. § 1273(a)(3). [↑](#footnote-ref-184)
185. I.R.C. § 1273(b)(4)(issue price is equal to the state redemption price at maturity, so there would be no OID). [↑](#footnote-ref-185)
186. I.R.C. § 1274(c)(3). [↑](#footnote-ref-186)
187. The 2013 test amount is $3,905,900, Rev. Rul. 2012-33, 2012-51 IRB 710, and the 2012 test amount is $3,813,800, Rev. Rul. 2011-27, 2011-48 IRB 805. [↑](#footnote-ref-187)
188. I.R.C. § 1274A(c)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-188)
189. I.R.C. § 1272(a)(“sum of the daily portions of the original issue discount for each day during the taxable year on which such holder held such debt instrument”). [↑](#footnote-ref-189)
190. Reg. § 1.1272-1(a)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-190)
191. I.R.C. § 1272(a). [↑](#footnote-ref-191)
192. I.R.C. § 1273(a)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-192)
193. Reg. § 1.1273-1(b). [↑](#footnote-ref-193)
194. Reg. § 1.1273-1(c)(4). [↑](#footnote-ref-194)
195. I.R.C. § 1273(a)(2). [↑](#footnote-ref-195)
196. Reg. § 1.1273-1(c)(1)(iii). [↑](#footnote-ref-196)
197. S Rpt No. 98-169, Vol. I (PL 98-369) pp. 253–254. [↑](#footnote-ref-197)
198. I.R.C. § 1273(b)(2); Reg. § 1.1273-2(a)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-198)
199. I.R.C. § 1274(a)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-199)
200. I.R.C. § 1273(b)(4); Reg. §1.1273-2(d). [↑](#footnote-ref-200)
201. I.R.C. § 1274(c)(3). For a detailed discussion of these exceptions, see Harrison McCawley, BNA Inc. Tax. Port. 535, Time Value of Money: OID and Imputed Interest ¶III.C.2 (2012). [↑](#footnote-ref-201)
202. *See* Reg. §§ 1.1274-2(c)(1) 1274-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-202)
203. I.R.C. § 1274(d)(2). [↑](#footnote-ref-203)
204. I.R.C. § 1274(e). [↑](#footnote-ref-204)
205. I.R.C. § 1274(b). [↑](#footnote-ref-205)
206. Reg. § 1.1274-2(c)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-206)
207. I.R.C. § 671; *see* Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C,B, 184. [↑](#footnote-ref-207)
208. *E.g.,* Reg. § 1.1273(g)(2)(ii)(referring to interest deduction under §163); Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-11(g)(3)(under the exception for loans not exceeding $100,000 limiting deemed interest paid by the borrower to the borrower’s net investment income, the limitation also applies for determining the borrower’s interest deduction under §163); Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-11(g)(2)(statement required by borrower who is deducting deemed transfer under §7872 as an interest deduction). [↑](#footnote-ref-208)
209. I.R.C. § 163(h). [↑](#footnote-ref-209)
210. I.R.C. § 163(d)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-210)
211. I.R.C. § 163(d)(2). [↑](#footnote-ref-211)
212. I.R.C. §§ 163(d)(5(A)(i), 469(e)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-212)
213. Rev. Rul. 93-68, 1993-2 C.B. 72. [↑](#footnote-ref-213)
214. I.R.C. § 163(d)(5)(A)(ii). [↑](#footnote-ref-214)
215. I.R.C. § 163(d)(3)(A-B). [↑](#footnote-ref-215)
216. Reg. § 1.163-8T(a)(3). [↑](#footnote-ref-216)
217. *See e.g.,* Armacost v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-150. [↑](#footnote-ref-217)
218. I.R.C. § 163(d)(4)(A). [↑](#footnote-ref-218)
219. I.R.C. § 163(d)(4)(B). [↑](#footnote-ref-219)
220. I.R.C. § 163(d)(4)(C). [↑](#footnote-ref-220)
221. I.R.C. § 163(d)(4)(B). [↑](#footnote-ref-221)
222. I.R.C. § 1(h). [↑](#footnote-ref-222)
223. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3). [↑](#footnote-ref-223)
224. I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(A)(i); Reg. § 1.163-1(b)(taxpayer must be legal or equitable owner of the property). [↑](#footnote-ref-224)
225. Temp. Reg. §1.163-10T(o)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-225)
226. I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(C); Temp. Reg. § 1.163-10T(o)(2). [↑](#footnote-ref-226)
227. *See* Ellington v. Commissioner. T.C. Memo. 2011-193; Letter Ruling 908023. [↑](#footnote-ref-227)
228. Temp. Reg. § 1.163-10T(p)(3)(ii). [↑](#footnote-ref-228)
229. Temp. Reg. § 1.163-10T(p)(5). [↑](#footnote-ref-229)
230. I.R.C. §§ 163(h)(4)(A)(i)(II), 280A(d)(1); Tempo. Reg. § 1.163-10T(p)(3)(iii). [↑](#footnote-ref-230)
231. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(i)). [↑](#footnote-ref-231)
232. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(A-C). [↑](#footnote-ref-232)
233. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii). [↑](#footnote-ref-233)
234. CCA 200911007. [↑](#footnote-ref-234)
235. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C). [↑](#footnote-ref-235)
236. Rev. Rul. 2010-25, 2010-44 I.R.B. 571. [↑](#footnote-ref-236)
237. Temp. Reg. §1.163-10T(d)-(e); Notice 88-74, 1988-2 C.B. 385; Publication 936. [↑](#footnote-ref-237)
238. CCA 201201017. [↑](#footnote-ref-238)
239. I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(D). [↑](#footnote-ref-239)
240. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-11(e). [↑](#footnote-ref-240)
241. *See* Jonathan Blattmachr, Elisabeth Madden, & Bridget Crawford, *How Low Can You Go? Some Consequences of Substituting a Lower AFR Note for a Higher AFR Note*, 109 J. Tax’n 21, 26 (July 2008)(hereinafter Blattmachr et. al., *How Low Can You Go?*). [↑](#footnote-ref-241)
242. Robert Schweihs, *The AFR and the Value of Debt,* Willamette Mngt. Associates Insights 12, 17 (Summer 2012)(discussing how to value notes). [↑](#footnote-ref-242)
243. *See id*. at 27. [↑](#footnote-ref-243)
244. Blattmachr, *How Low Can You Go?* at 26-27. [↑](#footnote-ref-244)
245. *Id.* at 27-29. [↑](#footnote-ref-245)
246. Prop. Reg. § 25.7872-1(“…shall be treated as a gift from the lender to the borrower on the date the loan is made”) [↑](#footnote-ref-246)
247. Reg. § 25.2512-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-247)
248. Prop. Reg. § 20.7872-1. [↑](#footnote-ref-248)
249. Blattmachr et. al., *How Low Can You Go?*, at 28-29. [↑](#footnote-ref-249)
250. See the discussion in Section II.C of this outline *supra*. [↑](#footnote-ref-250)
251. *E.g.,* Benjamin Feder, *The Promissory Note Problem,* 142 Tr. & Ests. 10 (Jan. 2003). [↑](#footnote-ref-251)
252. Philip J. Hayes, *Adventures in Forgiveness and Forgetfulness: Intra-Family Loans for Beginners,* 13 Calif. Tr. & Ests. Q 5, 7 (Summer 2007). [↑](#footnote-ref-252)
253. Benjamin Pruett, *Loans Within the Family—Cautions and Considerations*. [↑](#footnote-ref-253)
254. The impact of these factors, as summarized in the text, are addressed in Carsten Hoffmann, *The Evolution of Note Valuations,* Tax Notes 1143, 1144-45 (September 1, 2003). [↑](#footnote-ref-254)
255. For general discussions of the valuation of promissory notes, see Carsten Hoffmann, *The Evolution of Note Valuations,* Tax Notes 1143, 1144-45 (September 1, 2003); M. Read Moore & D. Alan Hungate, *Valuation Discounts for Private Debt in Estate Administration*, 25 Est. Pl.(June 1998). [↑](#footnote-ref-255)
256. Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 923 F. Supp. 896 (S.D. Miss. 1996)(note from Fortune 500 company; 6% interest, annual principal payments of about 10% of face amount of note at date of death, court accepted estate appraiser’s methodology which determined value of payments on discounted cash flow basis, starting with discount rate of 10.09% but adjusted to 16% rate to account for specific risk factors, and also applied 20% lack of marketability discount factor); Scher v. United States, 39 AFTR 2d 77-1580, 76-2 USTC ¶ 13163 (D.N.J. 1976) (corporate notes were valued at face value at date of death although corp. may have been insolvent at that time; notes were not worthless merely because corporation was insolvent because corporation at that time had good credit reputation, was paying notes when presented, and potential lenders would not have checked the corporation’s actual financial status); Estate of Hoffman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-109 (unsecured 7.61% promissory notes with balloon payment of all principal and interest 18 years after the date of death; IRS and estate appraiser both used discounted cash flow approach to value the notes, difference was appropriate fair market value discount rate; court adopted IRS appraiser’s approach of using a 12.5% discount rate after considering interest rates associated with various debt instruments [the prime rate was 6% and Treasury yields ranged from 3 to 6%] and that borrower had enough assets to pay off notes at maturity, and that the 12.5% discount rate incorporated the nonmarketable nature of the notes); Estate of Luton v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-539 (court valued decedent’s 41.9% interest in a liquidating trust, the primary asset of which was an unsecured 10% promissory note payable over about 11 years from a company in good financial condition [having Roy Disney as one of its principal shareholders], court rejected estate’s argument for discounts due to comparison of bond yields of similar grade and for lack of control [because decedent could sue to compel trustee to sell the note it is retention was impudent under state law], court allowed 10% discount in valuing 41.9% interest in liquidating trust for lack of marketability); Estate of Friedberg v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-310 (corporation redeemed shares of Rule 144 restricted stock from estate for a down payment and 5-year note bearing interest at the short-term rate under §6621(b); IRS willing to allow only 1% discount on note; court allowed 32% discount from face considering the rate of interest, payment schedule, financial covenants, reporting requirements, restriction that payments could not exceed 15% of the corporation’s cash flow in any year, noteholder’s possible remedies, corporation financial condition, yields on comparable securities, and nature of the secondary market for private notes); Estate of Berkman v. Commisisoner, T.C. Memo. 1979-46 (gift and estate tax valuation; unsecured 6% notes from family members had 20-year term, with balloon principal payment at end of 20-year term, borrowers made timely interest payments and were good credit risks; IRS disallowed any discount from face; court allowed discount-to-face for estate tax purposes of 50-60%% of various notes focusing on low rate of interest because prime rate was 9.75% at death and long term of notes; discount for gift tax purposes was lower [15%-25%] because prime rate was only 7% at the date of the gift); Sam Broadhead Trust v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1972-196 (no discount from face plus accrued interest because estate offered no evidence of lower value). [↑](#footnote-ref-256)
257. Estate of Reynolds v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 172 (1970)(units in voting trust sold to two of decedent’s children for three separate $50,000 secured notes with terms of 10-15 years, interest-free except that 4% interest rate applied to late payments, $30,000 of payments were made on each of two of the notes and $27,000 of payments were made on the third note; court agreed with IRS that the value of each of the notes was only $30,000 and the excess values of the voting trust units over $30,000 constituted gifts; factors included interest-free nature of the note (until a payment default), large note amounts, ability of children to repay, fact of default on payments and that no interest was ever paid, prevailing interest rates in the years of the transfers, and no showing that any additional payments were ever made on the notes); Estate of Berkman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1979-46 (gift and estate tax valuation; unsecured 6% notes from family members had 20-year term, with balloon principal payment at end of 20-year term, borrowers made timely interest payments and were good credit risks; IRS disallowed any discount from face; court concluded that discount-to-face for gift tax purposes in three separate years was 15%-25%, lower than discounts of 50%-60% allowed for estate tax purposes, because prime rate was only 7% at the date of the gift and increased to 9.75% at the date of death). [↑](#footnote-ref-257)
258. Olster v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 456 (1982)(IRS attempted to value notes at face, court determined that the notes were worthless); Kronenberg v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 428 (1967)(income tax case valuing issued by a company in liquidation; note was interest-free, nonnegotiable, with no set date for repayment, and debtor had limited financial resources; court allowed 37.5% discount from face); Clayton v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1981-433 (80% discount on notes issued as low-interest second mortgages with terms of up to 30 years to facilitate purchase of homes by high-risk individuals who could not pay down payments and who had a history of being delinquent on payments, small balances on the notes meant that foreclosure proceedings were not economically feasible); Scott v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1979-29 (taxpayer valued note at 70% discount based on sale of similar note in arm’s length transaction; court concluded taxpayer did not show sufficient similarity to the prior transaction and allowed 30% discount based on nonrecourse nature of note, subordinated status of lien, limited nature of security, subsequent default of maker, and timely receipt of interest payments). [↑](#footnote-ref-258)
259. Internal Revenue Manual ch. 800, §842. [↑](#footnote-ref-259)
260. Reg. § 25.2512-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-260)
261. I.R.C. § 7872(e)(2). [↑](#footnote-ref-261)
262. 98 T.C. 554 (1992). *See also* True v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-167 (§7872 applied to determine gift tax consequences of purchase under a buy-sell agreement providing for a deferred payment), *aff’d on other grounds,* 390 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2004). [↑](#footnote-ref-262)
263. *E.g.* Ltr. Ruls. 9535026, 9408018. *See also* True v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-167, *aff’d on other grounds,* 390 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2004). See SectionXVIII.A.3 *infra* of this outline for a more detailed discussion of *Frazee* and those letter rulings. [↑](#footnote-ref-263)
264. Prop. Reg. § 25.2512-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-264)
265. *See* I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(A). [↑](#footnote-ref-265)
266. Reg. § 20.2031-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-266)
267. *See* Mulligan, *Sale to an Intentionally Defective Irrevocable Trust for a Balloon Note—An End Run Around Chapter 14?* 32 Univ. Miami Heckerling Inst. on Est. Pl. ¶1507.1 (1998). [↑](#footnote-ref-267)
268. T.C. Memo. 2011-255. [↑](#footnote-ref-268)
269. *Duncan* involved whether interest paid on a “Graegin loan” could be deducted as an administrative expenses for estate tax purposes. An irrevocable trust created by the decedent’s father loaned $6.5 million to the decedent's revocable trust in order to pay estate taxes. The $10.7 million of interest that was due on the loan at the end of 15 years was deducted. Among other things, the IRS argued that the 6.7% interest rate under the note exceeded the long-term AFR of 5.02% and was unreasonable. The court disagreed, stating that a note from the revocable trust is obviously a riskier investment than a government obligation and therefore a higher interest rate than the AFR is justified. Indeed, the court said that using the AFR “would have been unfair to the Walter Trust.” [↑](#footnote-ref-269)
270. Prop. Reg. § 20.7872-1. [↑](#footnote-ref-270)
271. Ronald Aucutt, *Installment Sales to Grantor Trusts,* ALI-CLE Planning Techniques for Large Estates 1203, at 1260 (April 2012)(hereinafter Aucutt, *Installment Sales to Grantor Trusts*). [↑](#footnote-ref-271)
272. Prop. Reg. § 20.7872-1(emphasis added). [↑](#footnote-ref-272)
273. *See* Shop Talk, *What is the Legal Effect of Proposed Regs*.? 69 J. Tax’n 279 (Oct. 1988). [↑](#footnote-ref-273)
274. KTA-Tator Inc. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 100 (1997). [↑](#footnote-ref-274)
275. Arens v. Commissioner¸ T.C. Memo. 1990-241. *See generally* Rozenshteyn, *Below-Market Loans Offer Tax Arbitrage Potential*, 64 Prac. Tax. Strat. 260 (May 2000). [↑](#footnote-ref-275)
276. I.R.C. §§ 1271(a)(1)(retirement of debt instrument treated as exchange),1276(a)(1)(gain on disposition treated as ordinary income up to the accrued market discount), 1276(a)(2)(partial principal payments treated as ordinary income to the extent the payment does not exceed accrued market discount). [↑](#footnote-ref-276)
277. *E.g.,* Treas. Reg. §1.1275-1(b)(3)(treatment of market discount for calculating OID accruals). [↑](#footnote-ref-277)
278. Kathryn Henkel, Estate Planning and Wealth Preservation ¶28.06[2](Warren Gorham & Lamont 1997). [↑](#footnote-ref-278)
279. I.R.C. §§ 453B(a), 453(e)(1); *see generally* Kathryn Henkel, Estate Planning and Wealth Preservation ch.30(Warren Gorham & Lamont 1997). See Section XVIII.C.2 *infra* of this outline. [↑](#footnote-ref-279)
280. I.R.C. § 102(a). *See* Helvering v. American Dental, 318 U.S. 322 (1943) (interpreting predecessors to §§102 and 61); Bosse v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1970-355 (§102 applied because forgiveness was gratuitous). [↑](#footnote-ref-280)
281. *See generally* Rohrbach, *The Disposition of Property Secured by Recourse and Nonrecourse Debt,* 41 Baylor L. Rev. 231, 253 (1989). [↑](#footnote-ref-281)
282. Section 108 provides various exceptions in which discharge of indebtedness does not result in taxable income, including if the discharge occurs in a Title 11 bankruptcy case or when the taxpayer is insolvent. I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(B). For a general discussion of the tax effects of canceled debts for individuals, see I.R.S. Publication 4681. [↑](#footnote-ref-282)
283. *See generally* Kathryn Henkel, Estate Planning and Wealth Preservation ¶28.05[2][b](Warren Gorham & Lamont 1997). Courts have interpreted the wholly worthless requirement strictly in the intra-family context. *See e.g.,* Buchanan v. U.S., 87 F,3d 197 (7th Cir. 1996). [↑](#footnote-ref-283)
284. I.R.C. § 166(d)(2). [↑](#footnote-ref-284)
285. I.R.C. § 166(d)(1). The deduction can be taken only in the year the debt becomes totally worthless. (Because of the difficulty in pinpointing when that occurs, there is a special 7-year statute of limitations for refunds due to nonbusiness bad debt losses. I.R.C. § 6511(d)(1).) The lender will need to establish the worthlessness of the debt, perhaps by proving that the borrower is insolvent or that the lender attempted to collect on the debt with demand for repayment which was not forthcoming. [↑](#footnote-ref-285)
286. See Section II.B-C of this outline *supra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-286)
287. This exception was added in the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, and was extended for one year (2013) by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012. I.R.C. §§ 108(a)(1)(E), 108(h)(2). The debt must have been used to buy, build or substantially improve the principal residence and be secured by that residence. There is no suggestion that the exception cannot apply to home mortgage loans between related parties. [↑](#footnote-ref-287)
288. I.R.C. § 453B(a). [↑](#footnote-ref-288)
289. Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, allowing relief for cancellation of “qualified principal residence indebtedness” that is discharged before January 1, 2013. I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(E). [↑](#footnote-ref-289)
290. Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184. [↑](#footnote-ref-290)
291. Prop. Reg. § 1.108-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-291)
292. I.R.C. § 453B(a). The special rules for installment notes are discussed in Section XVIII.C.2 of this outline *infra*. [↑](#footnote-ref-292)
293. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-11. [↑](#footnote-ref-293)
294. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-11(a)(emphasis added). [↑](#footnote-ref-294)
295. Bittker & Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts ¶ 58.4 (2d ed. 1993). Interestingly, the third edition of this treatise does not include that helpful discussion. [↑](#footnote-ref-295)
296. See Section XI.B of this outline *supra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-296)
297. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii)(types of authority considered in determining whether substantial authority exists for avoiding taxpayer penalty); Reg. §§ 1.6694-2(b)(1) & 1.6694-2(d)(2)(incorporating standards under §6662 regulations for determining whether substantial authority or reasonable basis standard is met to avoid preparer penalties). [↑](#footnote-ref-297)
298. T.C. Memo. 1996-3, *aff’d without opinion*, 113 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 1997). See Section II.C. of this outline *supra for a discussion of* Miller and the other cases addressing whether the note is treated as debt or equity. [↑](#footnote-ref-298)
299. NSAR 08777, Vaughn # 8777 (June 24, 1991) (response of IRS Regional Technical Coordinator responding to submission from practitioner requesting amendment or clarification of §7872). [↑](#footnote-ref-299)
300. 465 U.S. 330 (1984). [↑](#footnote-ref-300)
301. T.C. Memo. 1991-26, *aff’d,* 955 F.2d 41 (4th Cir. 1992). [↑](#footnote-ref-301)
302. *Id.; see also* McGinnis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-45; Wysong v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-344; Batson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-545. [↑](#footnote-ref-302)
303. Treas. Reg. §§25.2702-3 (GRATs, no limitation on needing minimum equity amount in trust above present value of annuity payments); 20.2055-2(f)(2)(iv)(testamentary CLAT, where actuarial value of annuity payments to charity exceeded amount transferred to trust, the charitable deduction was the full value contributed to the trust and there was no taxable value of the remainder). [↑](#footnote-ref-303)
304. Zaritsky, Tax Planning for Family Wealth Transfers: Analysis With Forms ¶12.05[3][a][i] (Warren Gorham & Lamont). [↑](#footnote-ref-304)
305. However, some cases have held that §2036 did not apply even though the trust that paid for assets with a private annuity was minimally funded. *E.g.,* Stern v. Commissioner, 747 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1984)(even though trust was minimally funded, there was no direct tie-in between trust income and annuity payment and annuitant had limited powers over trust). For cases referring to the requirement of a direct connection to paying the annuity from trust income, see Hesch & Manning, *Beyond the Basic Freeze: Further Uses of Deferred Payment Sales,* 34 Univ. of Miami Heckerling Inst. on Est. Pl.¶1601.1 n.55 (2000). [↑](#footnote-ref-305)
306. *Id.* at ¶1601.1G (2000) (“…only those who are willing to take substantial risks should use a trust with no other significant assets [for sales transactions with a trust]”). [↑](#footnote-ref-306)
307. Prop. Reg. § 25.7872-1. [↑](#footnote-ref-307)
308. *E.g.* Miller v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-3, *aff’d without opinion*, 113 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 1997). See Section II.C of this outline *supra*. [↑](#footnote-ref-308)
309. *E.g.,* Estate of Reynolds v. Commissioner, 55 TC 172 (1970)(units in voting trust sold to two of decedent’s children for three separate $50,000 secured notes with terms of 10-15 years, interest-free except that 4% interest rate applied to late payments, $30,000 of payments were made on each of two of the notes and $27,000 of payments were made on the third note; court agreed with IRS that the value of each of the notes was only $30,000 and the excess values of the voting trust units over $30,000 constituted gifts; factors included interest-free nature of the note (until a payment default), large note amounts, ability of children to repay, fact of default on payments and that no interest was ever paid, prevailing interest rates in the years of the transfers, and no showing that any additional payments were ever made on the notes). [↑](#footnote-ref-309)
310. *E.g.,* Estate of Mitchell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1982-185 (§2036 applied where children had no financial ability to make annuity payments and never intended to make annuity payments). [↑](#footnote-ref-310)
311. T.C. Memo. 2008-278. [↑](#footnote-ref-311)
312. The court pointed to other factors as well, including that the mother continued to exercise managerial control over the partnership and its assets after the transfer to the children. In addition, while the assets were transferred to two of her children, there was an understanding they would share benefits of the assets with a third child. The court applied I.R.C. §§ 2036(a)(2) and 2038 as well. [↑](#footnote-ref-312)
313. I.R.C. § 1274(b)(3). [↑](#footnote-ref-313)
314. *See e.g.* Miller v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-3, *aff’d without opinion*, 113 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 1997). See Section II.C of this outline *supra*. [↑](#footnote-ref-314)
315. *E.g.,* Scott v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1979-29 (taxpayer valued note at 70% discount based on sale of similar note in arm’s length transaction; court concluded taxpayer did not show sufficient similarity to the prior transaction and for income tax purposes allowed 30% discount based on nonrecourse nature of note, subordinated status of lien, limited nature of security, subsequent default of maker, and timely receipt of interest payments). [↑](#footnote-ref-315)
316. *See* Hatcher & Manigault, *Using Beneficiary Guarantees in Defective Grantor Trusts*, 92 J. Tax’n 152 (2000). [↑](#footnote-ref-316)
317. The IRS’s full analysis of this issue in Letter Ruling 9113009 is as follows:

     “The gift tax was designed to encompass all transfers of property and property rights having significant value. The transfer of a valuable economic right or benefit is a property interest that is subject to the gift tax. The valuable economic right is generally readily measurable by reference to current interest rates. See Dickman v. Commissioner,465 U.S. 330 (1984). The term “gifts” was meant to be used in its broadest and most comprehensive sense in order to “. . . hit all the protean arrangements which the wit of man can devise that are not business transactions within the meaning of ordinary speech.” Commissioner v. Wemyss,324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945).

     The agreements by T to guarantee payment of debts are valuable economic benefits conferred upon the shareholders of the acquiring companies and entities. You state that, without those guarantees, those shareholders (T's children) may not have obtained the loans or, in the very least, would have had to pay a higher interest rate to obtain the loans. Consequently, when T guaranteed payment of the loans, T transferred a valuable property interest to the shareholders. The promisor of a legally enforceable promise for less than adequate and full consideration makes a completed gift on the date the promise is binding and determinable in value rather than when the promised payment is actually made. *See* Rev. Rul. 84-25, 1984-1 C.B. 191.

     Accordingly, the enforceable agreements by T to guarantee the loans on behalf of the shareholders are transfers (subject to gift tax) of the economic benefit conferred upon the shareholders on the dates they are entered into by T.

     Likewise, in the event that the primary obligors subsequently default on the loans and T pays any outstanding obligation under the terms of the agreements, any amounts paid by T, less any reimbursement from the primary obligors, will be gifts subject to the gift tax.” [↑](#footnote-ref-317)
318. *See generally* Shenkman, *Role of Guarantees and Seed Gifts in Family Installment Sales*, 37 Est. Pl. 3, (Nov. 2010)(excellent discussion of various issues involving the use of guaranties in loan transactions). [↑](#footnote-ref-318)
319. This Section XVIII of this outline is based on (and taken largely verbatim from) outstanding articles by Philip J. Hayes (San Francisco). Hayes, *Adventures in Forgiveness and Forgetfulness: Intra-Family Loans for Beginners,* 13 Calif. Tr. & Est. Quarterly 5 (Summer 2007); Hayes, *Intra-Family Loans: Adventures in Forgiveness and Forgetfulness,* ABA Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. L. Section Spring Meeting (2007). The articles have an excellent detailed discussion of which interest rate safe harbor (*i.e*., under either §§483, 1274 or 7872) applies to installment sales, which discussion is not included in this article. [↑](#footnote-ref-319)
320. In fact, if a disposition qualifies as an installment sale, the installment method is mandatory and automatically applies unless he taxpayer elects out under §453(d)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-320)
321. I.R.C. § 453(k)(2). [↑](#footnote-ref-321)
322. I.R.C. §§ 453(i) and 453(g). [↑](#footnote-ref-322)
323. I.R.C. § 453(b)(2). [↑](#footnote-ref-323)
324. I.R.C. § 453A. [↑](#footnote-ref-324)
325. I.R.C. § 453A(d). [↑](#footnote-ref-325)
326. I.R.C. §§ 453B and 453(e). [↑](#footnote-ref-326)
327. Reg. § 1.1274-4(c) , referring to Reg. § 1.1273-1(e)(3). [↑](#footnote-ref-327)
328. *See* Reg. § 1.1273-1(f) for examples. *See* Section XI.B.4 of this outline *supra* for definitions of these terms. [↑](#footnote-ref-328)
329. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(8). [↑](#footnote-ref-329)
330. 98 T.C. 554 (1992).

     “Nowhere does the text of section 7872 specify that section 7872 is limited to loans of money. If it was implicit that it was so limited, it would be unnecessary to specify that section 7872 does not apply to any loan to which sections 483 or 1274 apply. The presence of section 7872(f)(8) signaled Congress' belief that section 7872 could properly be applicable to some seller financing. We are not here to judge the wisdom of section 7872, but rather, to apply the provision as drafted.” 98 T.C. at 588. [↑](#footnote-ref-330)
331. 98 T.C. at 590. [↑](#footnote-ref-331)
332. T.C. Memo. 2001-167 (“We concluded in Frazee v. Commissioner, supra at 588-589, that section 7872 does not apply solely to loans of money; it also applies to seller-provided financing for the sale of property. In our view, the fact that the deferred payment arrangement in the case at hand was contained in the buy-sell agreements, rather than in a separate note as in Frazee, does not require a different result.”), *aff’d on other grounds,* 390 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2004). [↑](#footnote-ref-332)
333. *See* Stephen J. Wolma, *Ambushed in a Safe Harbor*, 33 Val. U.L. Rev. 309 (1998), advocating Congressional action to resolve the conflict, short of Supreme Court intervention. [↑](#footnote-ref-333)
334. The 8th and 10th circuits hold that the 6% safe harbor does not apply for gift tax purposes. *Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner*, 939 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1991); *Schusterman v. United States*, 63 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 1995). The 7th circuit has held that the 6% safe harbor does apply for gift tax purposes as well. Ballard v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1988). [↑](#footnote-ref-334)
335. I.R.C. § 453(b)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-335)
336. Temp. Reg. § 15A.453-1(b)(2)(1) through (iii). [↑](#footnote-ref-336)
337. Temp. Reg. § 15A.453-1(b)(2)(i). [↑](#footnote-ref-337)
338. *See* Bittker & Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts, ¶106.1.1 (Warren, Gorham and Lamont) (Nov. 2006). [↑](#footnote-ref-338)
339. I.R.C. § 453B(a). [↑](#footnote-ref-339)
340. I.R.C. § 453B(f). [↑](#footnote-ref-340)
341. *See* Zaritsky & Aucutt, Structuring Estate Freezes: Analysis With Forms*,* §12.02[4][a] (2d ed. 1997). [↑](#footnote-ref-341)
342. I.R.C. § 453B(c). *See generally* LeDuc, *Avoiding Unintended Dispositions of Installment Obligations*, 31 Est. Pl. 211 (2004). [↑](#footnote-ref-342)
343. I.R.C. §§ 691(a)(4), 691(a)(5). [↑](#footnote-ref-343)
344. While I.R.C. § 453B(c) contains a general exception for distributing a decedent's installment note to beneficiaries of the estate, that section applies "except as provided in section 691." Section 691(a)(5)(A)(i) provides that a transfer by the estate of a decedent's installment note to the obligor of the note will trigger recognition of gain on the note I.R.C. § 691(a)(5). [↑](#footnote-ref-344)
345. If the obligor is related to the decedent, within the meaning of I.R.C. § 453(f)(1), the amount of gain triggered by the disposition will be based on the full face amount of the note instead of just the fair market value of the note, if the fair market value is lower. I.R.C. §§ 691(a)(5)(A)(iii), 691(a)(5)(B). [↑](#footnote-ref-345)
346. *See* Ltr. Rul. 8806048.  *See generally* Hesch, *Dispositions of Installment Obligations by Gift or Bequest*, 16 Tax Management-Estates, Gifts and Trusts Journal 137 (1991). [↑](#footnote-ref-346)
347. Ltr. Rul. 8552007. [↑](#footnote-ref-347)
348. Ltr. Rul. 8806048. [↑](#footnote-ref-348)
349. I.R.C. § 453B(a). (The exception under I.R.C. § 435B(c) for the disposition of an installment obligation at death does not help because it applies only to installment obligations passing *from a decedent*, rather than installment notes arising after the decedent's death.) Rev. Rul. 55-159, 1955-1 C.B. 391. [↑](#footnote-ref-349)
350. For this purpose, a related buyer includes the seller’s spouse, child, grandchild, or parent, or a related trust, estate, partnership, or corporation. The seller's brother, sister, stepbrother, stepsister, aunt, uncle, or relative by marriage (other than the seller's spouse) is not a related party. I.R.C. § 453(f)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-350)
351. *See* Zaritsky & Aucutt, Structuring Estate Freezes: Analysis With Forms, §12.02[2] (2d ed. 1997). [↑](#footnote-ref-351)
352. I.R.C. § 453(e)(4). [↑](#footnote-ref-352)
353. I.R.C. § 453(e)(6). [↑](#footnote-ref-353)
354. For an excellent discussion of the issues involved with sales to grantor trusts, see Mulligan, *Sale to Defective Grantor Trust: An Alternative to a GRAT*, Est. Pl. 3-10 (Jan. 1996); Mezzullo, *Freezing Techniques: Installment Sales to Grantor Trusts*, Prob. & Prop. 17-23 (Jan./Feb. 2000); Aucutt, *Installment Sales to Grantor Trusts*, ALI-CLE Planning Techniques for Large Estates 1203 (April 2012). [↑](#footnote-ref-354)
355. For a detailed discussion of ways to structure the trust so that it is a grantor trust as to both income and principal, see Akers, Blattmachr & Boyle, *Creating Intentional Grantor Trusts*, 44 Real Prop., Prob. & Est. Law J. 207 (2009); Zaritsky, *Open Issues and Close Calls—Using Grantor Trusts in Modern Estate Planning,* 43 Heckerling Inst. on Est. Pl. ch. 3 (2009); Heller, *Grantor Trusts: Take Nothing For Granted,* 46 Heckerling Inst. on Est. Pl. (Special Session Materials) (2012). [↑](#footnote-ref-355)
356. For an outstanding discussion of the various issues regarding the need for seeding of the trust prior to a sale, see Shenkman, *Role of Guarantees and Seed Gifts in Family Installment Sales*, 37 Est. Pl. 3 (Nov. 2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-356)
357. 13 T.C. 468 (1949), *acq*. 1950-1 C.B. 3 [↑](#footnote-ref-357)
358. T.C. Memo. 2009-280. [↑](#footnote-ref-358)
359. Hesch & Manning, *Beyond the Basic Freeze: Further Uses of Deferred Payment Sales*, 34 Univ. Miami Heckerling Inst. on Est. Pl.,¶ 1601.1 (2000). [↑](#footnote-ref-359)
360. *Id.* [↑](#footnote-ref-360)
361. *See* Gibbs v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-196. [↑](#footnote-ref-361)
362. For an outstanding discussion of the various issues regarding the need for seeding of the trust prior to a sale and of the implications of using guarantees, see Shenkman, *Role of Guarantees and Seed Gifts in Family Installment Sales*, 37 Est. Pl. 3 (Nov. 2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-362)
363. *See* Hatcher & Manigault, *Using Beneficiary Guarantees in Defective Grantor Trusts*, 92 J. Tax’n 152 (2000). [↑](#footnote-ref-363)
364. 34 T.C. 1059 (1960) [↑](#footnote-ref-364)
365. Hatcher, *Planning for Existing FLPs,* 35 Univ. of Miami Heckerling Inst. on Est. Pl,, ¶302.3.B.2 (2001). *See* Hatcher and Manigault, *Using Beneficiary Guarantees in Defective Grantor Trusts*, 92 J. Tax’n 152 (March, 2000), which sets forth a detailed rebuttal of a taxable gift being imputed by reason of a bona fide, pro rata guarantee by a beneficiary of a defective grantor trust. Another favorable factor in avoiding a gift by a beneficiary-guaranty is where the upside potential from the beneficial interest of the guarantor-beneficiary is sufficient to warrant that guarantor-beneficiary take the downside risk posed by the guarantee. [↑](#footnote-ref-365)
366. Unfortunately, there is no safe harbor for the amount to be paid for the guarantee. The safe harbor AFR rate under §1274 applies for intra-family loans, but there is no similar safe harbor for a guarantee fee.

     *See generally e.g.* Shenkman, *Role of Guarantees and Seed Gifts in Family Installment Sales*, 37 Est. Pl. 3, 16 (Nov. 2010)(excellent discussion of various approaches in determining appropriate fee, saying that some appraisers suggest guarantee fees in the range of 5% to 6%+ because of the nature of the underlying assets supporting the guarantee); Richard Oshins, *Leveraged Gifting Transactions in the New Millennium*, State Bar of Texas Advanced Estate Planning Strategies, ch.4 at 10 (2006) (“We take the conservative position and pay for the guarantee”); Hatcher, *Planning for Existing FLPs,* 35 Univ. of Miami Heckerling Inst. on Est. Pl., ¶302.3.B.2 (2001)(if IRS succeeds in treating guaranty as gift, by analogy to bank charge for a line of credit, annual gift would probably in the range of 1-2%, but a larger, one-time gift may occur at the inception of the guarantee, especially if the loan precludes prepayment).

     [↑](#footnote-ref-366)
367. 120 T.C. 170 (2008), *aff’d on other grounds*, 603 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2010) (avoiding step transaction argument with respect to funding and gifts of interests in a family limited partnership); *see also* Heckerman v. U.S., 104 AFTR 2d 2099-5551 (W.D. Wash. 2009)(step transaction doctrine applied; funding and gift of LLC interest on same day). While the Ninth Circuit in *Linton v. U.S*., 630 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2011) held that the step transaction doctrine did not apply to treat a donor as giving assets in an LLC rather than (discounted) interests in the LLC where the funding and transfers of interests occurred on the same day, the court observed that a timing test does apply under *Holman* and remanded the case for consideration under that test.

     Some respected planners suggest leaving as long as possible between the “seed” gift and the subsequent sale (e.g., 30, 60, 90 days or even wait until the following taxable year). [↑](#footnote-ref-367)
368. T.C. Memo. 2010-106 (lack of control discount reduced from 10% to 8% because of aggregating gift and sale portions to treat the aggregate 50% LLC interests transferred to each of two separate trusts). [↑](#footnote-ref-368)
369. See Section XIX.H.5 of this outline, *infra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-369)
370. Frazee v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 553 (1972); True v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-67, *aff’d on other grounds,* 390 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2004); Letter Rulings 9535026 & 9408018. [↑](#footnote-ref-370)
371. Rev. Rul. 2004-64, 2004-2 C.B. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-371)
372. *See* Rev. Rul. 85-15, 1985-1 C.B. 132. [↑](#footnote-ref-372)
373. For excellent discussions of the use of notes with self-cancelling features, including how to value such notes, see Wojnaroski, BNA Est. Tax Port. 805-3rd, Private Annuities and Self-Canceling Notes; Hesch & Manning, *Beyond the Basic Freeze: Further Uses of Deferred Payment Sales*, 34 Univ. of Miami Heckerling Inst. on Est. Pl. ¶ 1601.3.B (2000); Hayes, *Intra-Family Loans: Adventures in Forgiveness and Forgetfulness,* ABA Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. L. Section Spring Meeting 41-50 (2007). A key advantage of SCINs is that the cancellation feature removes any remaining value on the note from the seller’s gross estate for estate tax purposes. However, any remaining gain must be reported on the estate’s fiduciary income tax return, at least under the position of the Eight Circuit. Estate of Frane v. Commissioner, 998 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1993). [↑](#footnote-ref-373)
374. See the discussion of the *Holman*, *Heckerman*, *Linton*, and *Pierre* cases in Section XIX.A.3 of this outline, *supra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-374)
375. See Section XIX.G.1-2 of this outline *infra*. [↑](#footnote-ref-375)
376. Interestingly, there seems to be a way around the question. The obvious way around this question, to stay "under the radar screen," would be to create the grantor trust, sell to the grantor trust, have the grantor trust pay off the note while it is still a grantor trust (so there is no income recognition) then terminate the trust before the decedent dies. The trust would not be described in Question 12a or b, so the answer to Question 12e would be no. That would seem to work if the client wants the trust to terminate during his or her lifetime. (But that is not practical in many situations.) Query whether having the trustee “decant” the assets to a new trust created by the trustee under a decanting power would avoid answering Question 12a in the affirmative?

     Be careful in looking for technical ways to avoid this question. If the planner is “too clever,” the IRS may say the planner is being misleading and allege a Circular 230 violation. Furthermore, even if the planner could avoid the current question, the IRS can change the form in the future in reaction to clever plans to avoid the question. [↑](#footnote-ref-376)
377. Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(b)(1)(ii)(B). [↑](#footnote-ref-377)
378. Treas. Reg. §1.1001-2(c) Ex. 5, Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184 (to the extent grantor is treated as owner of trust, the trust will not be recognized as separate taxpayer capable of entering into a sales transaction with the grantor). In that ruling, the I.R.S. indicated that it would not follow *Rothstein v. U.S.*, 735 F.2d 704 (2nd Cir. 1984) to the extent it would require a different result. *See* Rev. Rul. 2007-13, 2007-1 C.B. 684 (Situation 1, of ruling reasons that the sale of a policy from one "wholly-owned" grantor trust to another "wholly-owned" grantor trust is not a transfer at all for income tax purposes because the grantor is treated as the owner of the assets of both trusts); Rev. Rul. 92-84, 1992-2 C.B. 216 (gain or loss on sale of asset by QSST, which is grantor trust, is treated as gain or loss of the grantor or other person treated as owner under the grantor trust rules and not of the trust, even if the gain or loss is allocable to corpus rather than to income). [↑](#footnote-ref-378)
379. *See* Gibbs v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-196. [↑](#footnote-ref-379)
380. Ltr. Ruls. 200729005, 200729007, 200729008, 200729009, 200729010, 200729011, 200729013, 200729014, 200729015, 200729016, 200730011, 201235006.

     Even if the trust does continue as a grantor trust as to the original grantor, it is not clear what happens at the grantor’s death and whether the trust becomes a grantor trust as to the Crummey beneficiary. Ltr. Rul. 9321050, revoking Ltr. Rul. 9026036 as to this issue. The IRS initially ruled that the beneficiary would be treated as the owner. Several years later, the IRS revoked that position and said the beneficiary would not be treated as the owner-with no further discussion.) At the grantor’s death, the trust may become a grantor trust as to the beneficiary, creating an extremely advantageous planning vehicle if the beneficiary also wishes to maximize transfer planning opportunities while still remaining a potential discretionary beneficiary of the trust. [↑](#footnote-ref-380)
381. Revenue Ruling 2004-64 held that the grantor’s payment of income taxes attributable to a grantor trust is not treated as a gift to the trust beneficiaries. (Situation 1) Furthermore, the Ruling provides that a mandatory tax reimbursement clause would not have any gift consequences, but would cause “the full value of the Trust’s assets” at the grantor’s death to be included in the grantor’s gross estate under section 2036(a)(1) because the grantor would have retained the right to have the trust assets be used to discharge the grantor’s legal obligation. (Situation 2) (The statement that the “full value of the trust assets” would be includible may overstate the issue. Courts might limit the amount includible in the estate to the maximum amount that might possibly be used for the grantor’s benefit at his or her death.) Observe that if a reimbursement is mandatory and it is not paid, the grantor will be treated as making a gift.

     In addition, giving the trustee the discretion to reimburse the grantor for income taxes attributable to the grantor trust may risk estate inclusion if there were an understanding or pre-existing arrangement between the trustee and the grantor regarding reimbursement, or if the grantor could remove the trustee and appoint himself as successor trustee, or if such discretion permitted the grantor’s creditors to reach the trust under applicable state law. (Situation 3 of Rev. Rul. 2004-64) The Ruling provides that the IRS will not apply the estate tax holding in Situation 2 adversely to a grantor’s estate with respect to any trust created before October 4, 2004. Some planners suggest allowing a third person to authorize the trustee to reimburse or to allow an independent trustee to reimburse the grantor for payment of income taxes attributable to the trust. Other planners suggest drafting the reimbursement clause to provide that the discretionary reimbursement power does not exist to the extent that it exposes the trust assets to claims of the grantor’s creditors.

     Some states are amending their laws to provide that the mere existence of a discretionary power by the trustee to reimburse the grantor for income taxes attributable to the trust will not give creditors access to the trust. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 112.035(d) (Vernon 2004); N.H. Stat. Ann. § 564-B:5-505(a)(2)(2006). Where a discretionary reimbursement provision is used, the planner should select a state which has such a law to govern the trust. [↑](#footnote-ref-381)
382. *Compare* Cantrell, *Gain is Realized at Death*, Tr. & Ests. 20 (Feb. 2010) and Dunn & Handler, *Tax Consequences of Outstanding Trust Liabilities When Grantor Status Terminates*, 95 J. Tax’n (July 2001) *with* Gans & Blattmachr, *No Gain at Death,*  Tr. & Ests. 34 (Feb. 2010); Manning & Hesch, *Deferred Payment Sales to Grantor Trusts, GRATs, and Net Gifts: Income and Transfer Tax Elements*, 24 Tax Mgmt. Est., Gifts & Tr. J. 3 (1999); Hatcher & Manigault, *Using Beneficiary Guarantees in Defective Grantor Trusts*, 92 J. Tax’n 152, 161-64 (2000); Blattmachr, Gans & Jacobson, *Income Tax Effects of Termination of Grantor Trust Status by Reason of the Grantor’s Death*, 97 J. Tax’n 149 (Sept. 2002). [↑](#footnote-ref-382)
383. Madorin v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 667 (1985) (trustee’s renunciation of power to add charitable beneficiaries was a deemed disposition of trust assets and a realization event); Reg. §1.1001-2(c), Ex.5; Rev. Rul. 77-402, 1977-2 C.B. 222. [↑](#footnote-ref-383)
384. Manning & Hesch, *Deferred Payment Sales to Grantor Trusts, GRATs, and Net Gifts: Income and Transfer Tax Elements*, 24 Tax Mgmt. Est., Gifts & Tr. J. 3 (1999) [↑](#footnote-ref-384)
385. *See* Rev. Rul. 73-183, 1973-1 C.B. 364. [↑](#footnote-ref-385)
386. I.R.C. § 691(a)(3). [↑](#footnote-ref-386)
387. Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184. [↑](#footnote-ref-387)
388. Dunn & Park, *Basis Boosting*, 146 Tr. & Est. 22 (Feb. 2007). [↑](#footnote-ref-388)
389. CCA 200923024 (emphasis added). [↑](#footnote-ref-389)
390. Schneider, Determining the Income Tax Basis of Property Gratuitously Transferred to Grantor Trusts, Amer. Bar. Assn. Real Prop. Tr. & Est. Law Section Newsletter, available at <http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/rpte_ereport/TE_Schneider.authcheckdam.pdf>.  [↑](#footnote-ref-390)
391. *See* Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202. [↑](#footnote-ref-391)
392. Aucutt, *Installment Sales to Grantor Trusts*, ALI-CLE Planning Techniques for Large Estates 1203, 1244 (April 2012). [↑](#footnote-ref-392)
393. *See* Letter Rulings 9436006 (stock contributed to grantor trust and other stock sold to trust for 25-year note; ruling holds §2702 does not apply); 9535026 (property sold to grantor trust for note, interest-only AFR rate for 20 years with a balloon payment at end of 20 years; held that the note is treated as debt and “debt instrument is not a ‘term interest’ within the meaning of §2702(c)(3);” specifically refrained from ruling on § 2036 issue). [↑](#footnote-ref-393)
394. *E.g.,* Miller v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. 1674 (1996), *aff’d*, 113 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 1997); Estate of Rosen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-115. [↑](#footnote-ref-394)
395. Tech. Adv. Memo. 9251004 (transfer of $5.0 million of stock to trust in return for $1.5 million note in “sale/gift” transaction; ruling held that §2036 applies to retained right to payments under note, reasoning that note payments would constitute a major share, if not all, of the trust income, thus causing inclusion of trust property in estate). [↑](#footnote-ref-395)
396. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274, 277 (1958). [↑](#footnote-ref-396)
397. For a listing of cases that have addressed the application of §2036 in the context of private annuity transactions where are the grantor is retaining the right to receive substantial payments from a trust, see Hesch & Manning, *Beyond the Basic Freeze: Further Uses of Deferred Payment Sales*, 34 Univ of Miami Heckerling Inst. on Est. Pl. ¶ 1601.1 n. 55 (2000). [↑](#footnote-ref-397)
398. U.S. Trust, Practical Drafting 4365-4370, at 4367 (Covey, ed. Apr. 1996). [↑](#footnote-ref-398)
399. Porter, *Current Valuation Issues*, AICPA Adv. Est. Pl. Conf. ch. 42 at 51 (2004). [↑](#footnote-ref-399)
400. T.C. Docket No. 2127-03, filed Feb. 10, 2003. [↑](#footnote-ref-400)
401. Aucutt, *Installment Sales to Grantor Trusts*, ALI-ABA Planning Techniques for Large Estates 1579, 1631 (Oct. 2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-401)
402. *Id*. at 1633. [↑](#footnote-ref-402)
403. T.C. Docket No. 2127-03, filed Feb. 10, 2003. [↑](#footnote-ref-403)
404. Cases that have approved defined value formula allocation transfers for federal gift and estate tax purposes are McCord v. Commissioner, 461 F.3d 614 (5th Cir. 2006), *rev’g*, 120 T.C. 358 (2003); Christiansen v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 1, 16-18 (2008), *aff’d*, 586 F.3d 1061 (8th Cir. 2009)(formula disclaimer that operated like defined value clause); Petter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-280, *aff’d,* 653 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011); Hendrix v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-133. One case has approved a straightforward formula transfer clause, not involving an excess amount over a defined value passing to charity. Wandry v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-88. These cases are addressed in Section XIX.I of this outline, *infra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-404)
405. 130 T.C. 170 (2008), *aff’d on other grounds*, 601 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2010) (avoiding step transaction argument with respect to funding and gifts of interests in a family limited partnership). For a further discussion of *Holman* and other relevant cases, see Section XIX.A.3 of this outline, *supra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-405)
406. See Section XIX.D.3 of this outline *supra*. [↑](#footnote-ref-406)
407. See Section XIX.B.4 of this outline, *supra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-407)
408. *See* Hatcher, *Underwater GRATs and ISGTs*, ACTEC 2008 Summer Meeting. [↑](#footnote-ref-408)
409. Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(c)-1(f)(4) provides that

     “[c]ompleted transfers to members of the transferor’s family, as defined in section 2032A(e)(2), that are made in the ordinary course of operating a business are deemed to be adequately disclosed …, even if the transfer is not reported on a gift tax return, provided the transfer is property reported by all parties for income tax purposes.”

     The regulations give, as an example, the payment of compensation to a family member. The transfer of an interest in a business, however, would not be “made in the ordinary course of operating a business” and would not seem to be within the exception. [↑](#footnote-ref-409)
410. For a discussion of whether to report sales on gift tax returns as non-gift transactions, see Section XIX.B.4 of this outline, *supra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-410)
411. McCord v. Commissioner, 461 F.3d 614 (5th Cir. 2006)(public policy issue not before court), *rev’g*, 120 T.C. 358 (2003); Christiansen v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 1, 16-18 (2008), *aff’d*, 586 F.3d 1061 (8th Cir. 2009)(formula disclaimer that operated like defined value clause); Petter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-280, *aff’d,* 653 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011); Hendrix v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-133. [↑](#footnote-ref-411)
412. T.C. Memo. 2009-280, *aff’d,* 653 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-412)
413. T.C. Memo. 2011-133. [↑](#footnote-ref-413)
414. The trust obtained an appraisal of the shares and the charitable fund hired independent counsel and an independent appraiser to review the original appraisal. The trust and charitable fund agreed on the stock values and the number of units that passed to each. (This description is simplified; in reality, each of the parents entered into two separate transfer transactions involving a “GST trust” and an “issue trust” and the same Foundation using this formula approach.) [↑](#footnote-ref-414)
415. As to the public policy argument, the court determined that the formula clauses do not immediately and severely frustrate any national or State policy. The *Procter* case was distinguished because there is no condition subsequent that would defeat the transfer and the transfers further the public policy of encouraging gifts to charity. The court observed that there is no reason to distinguish the holding in *Christiansen v. Commissioner*, 130 T.C. 1 (2008), *aff’d*, 586 F.3d 1061 (8th Cir. 2009) that similar formula disclaimers did not violate public policy. [↑](#footnote-ref-415)
416. Wandry v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-88. *Wandry* arguably is inconsistent with *Procter v. Commissioner,* 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944). [↑](#footnote-ref-416)
417. Gibbs v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-196. [↑](#footnote-ref-417)
418. This Section XX of this outline is based on (and taken largely verbatim from) an outstanding article by Philip J. Hayes (San Francisco). Hayes, *Intra-Family Loans: Adventures in Forgiveness and Forgetfulness,* ABA Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. L. Section Spring Meeting (2007). [↑](#footnote-ref-418)
419. 74 T.C. 1239 (1980), *acq. in result*, 1981-1 C.B. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-419)
420. *Id.* at 1246-47. [↑](#footnote-ref-420)
421. See Section XX.I.1.d of this outline, *infra*. [↑](#footnote-ref-421)
422. For an outstanding comprehensive discussion of the use of SCINs, including their valuation and tax treatment, see Wojnaroski, BNA Est. Tax Port. 805-3rd, Private Annuities and Self-Canceling Notes. For a discussion of planning alternatives, including the relative low mortality premium that exists under current conditions, see Maher & Laffey, *Practical Planning With Self-Cancelling Installment Notes,* Trsts. & Ests. 22 (April 2012). [↑](#footnote-ref-422)
423. *See* Banoff & Hartz, *Self-Canceling Installment Notes: New IRS Rules Expand Opportunities*, 65 J. Tax’n 146 (1986). [↑](#footnote-ref-423)
424. *See* Covey, et al. *Q&A Session I of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Institute on Estate Planning*, 27 U. Miami Inst. on Est. Plan. ¶216 (1993). [↑](#footnote-ref-424)
425. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d)(7); IRS Publication 1457, *Actuarial Valuations Book Aleph* (July 1999)(Table 90CM); IRS Publication 1457, *Actuarial Valuations Version 3A* (May 2009)(Table 2000CM). [↑](#footnote-ref-425)
426. *Id*. *See* Covey, et al. *Q&A Session I of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Institute on Estate Planning*, 27 U. Miami Inst. on Est. Plan. ¶216 (1993). [↑](#footnote-ref-426)
427. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9, Table V. [↑](#footnote-ref-427)
428. *See* Hesch & Manning, *Beyond the Basic Freeze: Further Uses of Deferred Payment Sales*, 34 Univ. Miami Heckerling Inst. on Est. Pl.,¶ 1601.3.B(1)-(2) (2000). [↑](#footnote-ref-428)
429. *See* Banoff & Hartz, *Sales of Property: Will Self-Canceling Installment Notes Make Private Annuities Obsolete?*, 59 Taxes 499, 515 (1981). [↑](#footnote-ref-429)
430. *See* Covey, et al. *Q&A Session I of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Institute on Estate Planning*, 27 U. Miami Inst. on Est. Plan. ¶216 (1993), and Smith & Olsen, *Fractionalized Equity Valuation Planning: Preservation of Post-Mortem Valuation Discounts*, 34 U. Miami Heckerling Inst. on Est. Plan. ¶ 1103.3(F)(2) (2000) [↑](#footnote-ref-430)
431. G.C.M. 39503, *supra*, Conclusion B. (Conclusion C of G.C.M. 39503 concludes that if the stated monetary amount would be received before the expiration of the transferor’s life expectancy, the transaction will be treated as an installment sale rather than as an annuity.) [↑](#footnote-ref-431)
432. *See* Hesch & Manning, *Beyond the Basic Freeze: Further Uses of Deferred Payment Sales*, 34 Univ. Miami Heckerling Inst. on Est. Pl.,¶ 1601.3.A (2000).. [↑](#footnote-ref-432)
433. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d)(7); IRS Publication 1457, *Actuarial Valuations Book Aleph* (July 1999)(Table 90CM); IRS Publication 1457, *Actuarial Valuations Version 3A* (May 2009)(Table 2000CM). [↑](#footnote-ref-433)
434. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9, Table V. [↑](#footnote-ref-434)
435. *See* Treas. Reg. § 20.7520-3(b)(3), which may or may not apply (depending upon whether Section 7520 rates apply to SCINs). [↑](#footnote-ref-435)
436. Treas. Reg. § 1.7520-3(b)(3). [↑](#footnote-ref-436)
437. Treas. Reg. § 1.7520-3(b)(3). [↑](#footnote-ref-437)
438. *See* Hesch & Manning, *Beyond the Basic Freeze: Further Uses of Deferred Payment Sales*, 34 Univ. Miami Heckerling Inst. on Est. Pl.,¶ 1601.3.C (2000). [↑](#footnote-ref-438)
439. Hesch & Manning, *Family Deferred Payment Sales, Installment Sales, SCINs, Private Annuity Sales, OID and Other Enigmas*, 26 U. of Miami Inst. on Est. Plan. ¶310.3.B (1992). [↑](#footnote-ref-439)
440. Temp. Reg. § 15A.453-1(c)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-440)
441. Temp. Reg. § 15A.453-1(c)(2)(i)(A). [↑](#footnote-ref-441)
442. Temp. Reg. § 15A.453-1(b)(2)(v). [↑](#footnote-ref-442)
443. Hesch & Manning, *Family Deferred Payment Sales, Installment Sales, SCINs, Private Annuity Sales, OID and Other Enigmas*, 26 U. of Miami Inst. on Est. Plan. ¶310.3.B(4) (1992). [↑](#footnote-ref-443)
444. *See* Banoff & Hartz, *Self-Canceling Installment Notes: New IRS Rules Expand Opportunities*, 65 J. Tax’n 146, 150-51 (1986); Hesch & Manning, *Family Deferred Payment Sales, Installment Sales, SCINs, Private Annuity Sales, OID and Other Enigmas*, 26 U. of Miami Inst. on Est. Plan. ¶310.1.F (1992). [↑](#footnote-ref-444)
445. Estate of Frane v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 341, 354 (1992). [↑](#footnote-ref-445)
446. 160 F. Supp. 368 (W.D. La. 1958). [↑](#footnote-ref-446)
447. I.R.C. § 453B(f)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-447)
448. I.R.C. § 453B(f)(2). [↑](#footnote-ref-448)
449. Estate of Frane v. Commissioner, 998 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1993). [↑](#footnote-ref-449)
450. *Id*., at 572. [↑](#footnote-ref-450)
451. Rev. Rul. 86-72, 1986-1 C.B. 253; G.C.M. 39503. [↑](#footnote-ref-451)
452. *See* Wojnaroski, BNA Est. Tax Port. 805-3rd, Private Annuities and Self-Canceling Notes, VII.A.4.c (“Taxpayers outside the Eighth Circuit may argue, in the alternative, that if the seller must recognize gain, then an estate tax deduction is available to the extent of the decedent's share of income tax liability consistent with the Tax Court’s majority opinion in *Frane*”). [↑](#footnote-ref-452)
453. *See id.* (discussion of 5-judge dissent in *Frane* Tax Court decision taking the position that no gain results to either the decedent or the decedent’s estate). [↑](#footnote-ref-453)
454. *See* Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(c), Example (5), Madorin v. Commissioner, Rev. Rul. 77-402, 1977-2 C.B. 222, and Ltr. Rul.200010010. [↑](#footnote-ref-454)
455. *See* Hesch & Manning, *Beyond the Basic Freeze: Further Uses of Deferred Payment Sales*, 34 Univ. Miami Heckerling Inst. on Est. Pl.,¶ 1601.4 (2000); Wojnaroski, BNA Est. Tax Port. 805-3rd, Private Annuities and Self-Canceling Notes. VII.A.4.c. (“In addition, planners may structure a SCIN transaction with an irrevocable grantor trust as the buyer. The logical argument follows that if the seller realized no gain during life, then death during the term of the SCIN cannot constitute a taxable event. Section 691 contemplates a realization event for income tax purposes. In effect, the gain remains deferred until the disposition by the buyer with a carryover or substitute income tax basis.”). See Section XIX.D.5 of this outline *supra* regarding the income tax treatment upon the death of the seller before all payments are made on a normal installment sale to a grantor trust. [↑](#footnote-ref-455)
456. *See* Estate of Frane v. Commissioner, 998 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1993), n.5.; Hesch & Manning, *Beyond the Basic Freeze: Further Uses of Deferred Payment Sales*, 34 Univ. Miami Heckerling Inst. on Est. Pl.,¶ 1601.3.F (2000). Other commentators conclude that the purchaser takes a basis equal to the maximum purchase price without noting an caveats, other than noting that there is no authority of what the purchaser’s basis would be if it should be determined that no gain should be recognized either to the decedent or the decedent’s estate. Wojnaroski, BNA Est. Tax Port. 805-3rd, Private Annuities and Self-Canceling Notes, VII.B.2. [↑](#footnote-ref-456)
457. *See* Hesch & Manning, *Beyond the Basic Freeze: Further Uses of Deferred Payment Sales*, 34 Univ. Miami Heckerling Inst. on Est. Pl.,¶ 1601.3.F (2000) (SCIN should not be treated as a contingent payment obligation for these purposes). [↑](#footnote-ref-457)
458. I.R.C. §§ 163(h)(1) and (2). [↑](#footnote-ref-458)
459. *Compare* Raby & Raby, *Self-Canceling Installment Notes and Private Annuities*, 2001 Tax Notes Today 115-54 (2001), which takes the position that I.R.C. § 108(e) applies, *with* Hesch & Manning, *Beyond the Basic Freeze: Further Uses of Deferred Payment Sales*, 34 Univ. Miami Heckerling Inst. on Est. Pl.,¶ 1601.3.F (2000)

     and Hesch, *The SCINs Game Continues*, 2001 Tax Notes Today 136-96 (2001), which make a persuasive argument that I.R.C. § 108(e) does not apply. [↑](#footnote-ref-459)
460. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.483-4 & 1.1275-4(c)(5). [↑](#footnote-ref-460)
461. *See* Hesch & Manning, *Beyond the Basic Freeze: Further Uses of Deferred Payment Sales*, 34 Univ. Miami Heckerling Inst. on Est. Pl.,¶ 1601.4 (2000). [↑](#footnote-ref-461)
462. See Section XIX.A.1 of this outline *supra* regarding the structuring of installment sales to grantor trusts. *Cf.* Ltr. Rul. 9535026. [↑](#footnote-ref-462)
463. Estate of Moss v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1239 (1980), *acq. in result only* 1981-1 C.B. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-463)
464. 33 Fed. Cl. 657 (Fed. Cl. 1995). [↑](#footnote-ref-464)
465. *See* Banoff & Hartz, *Self-Canceling Installment Notes: New IRS Rules Expand Opportunities*, 65 J. Tax’n 146 (1986). [↑](#footnote-ref-465)
466. See Section XX.B.1 of this outline *supra* for a discussion of the interest rate selection issue. [↑](#footnote-ref-466)
467. See Section XX.D.2 *supra* regarding installment sales to grantor trusts for a SCIN and see Section XIX.D.5 *supra* regarding traditional installment sales to grantor trusts. Presumably, the income tax treatment would be similar for these two situations. [↑](#footnote-ref-467)
468. *See generally* Lindquist, *Making Lemonade from Lemons—Deducting Interest on the From 706*, 14 Prob. & Prop. 21-26 (May/June 2000)(outstanding general discussion); Harmon, & Kulsrud, *When is Interest Deductible as an Estate Administration Expense?*, 77 Prac. Tax Strategies 166 (Sept. 2006). [↑](#footnote-ref-468)
469. *See* Estate of O’Neal v. Commissioner, 258 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2001); Rev. Rul. 79-252, 1979-2 C.B. 333 (interest on estate tax deficiency). The interest expense is deductible even if the interest accrues as a result of the estate’s willful delay in filing the estate tax return and in paying the estate tax. Rev. Rul. 81-154, 1981-1 C.B. 470. [↑](#footnote-ref-469)
470. Rev. Rul. 84-75, 1984-1 C.B. 193 (interest on private loan obtained to pay federal estate taxes deductible because loan was obtained to avoid a forced sale of assets). [↑](#footnote-ref-470)
471. Estate of Todd v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 288 (1971), *acq.* 1973-2 C.B. 4; Estate of Sturgis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-415; Hipp v. United States, 1972-1 U.S.T.C. ¶12824 (D. S.C. 1971); Estate of Webster v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 968 (1976); Estate of Graegin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-477; Estate of Huntington v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 698, 726 (1937). [↑](#footnote-ref-471)
472. Estate of Lasarzig v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-307 (refused to allow the estate to deduct interest on borrowing to pay estate tax where the beneficiaries rather than the estate borrowed the funds after an extended period of time; court was troubled by the estate’s effort to keep the case open for up to 20 years after the parties had resolved all controversies, observing that the IRS allowed deferral of payment of the estate tax for 5 years, “which seems to be a sufficient time to raise the funds to pay an agreed tax obligation”). [↑](#footnote-ref-472)
473. *E.g.*, Beat v. United States, 107 AFTR 2d 2011-1804 (D. Kan 2011); Estate of Murphy v. U.S., 104 AFTR 2d 2009-7703 (W.D. Ark. 2009); Keller v. U.S., 104 AFTR 2d 2009-6015 (S.D. Tex. August 20, 2009)($114 million borrowed after death from FLP on a 9-year note); Estate of Duncan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-255; Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-325 (estate borrowed $2 million from irrevocable life insurance trust; court observed that regulations “do not require that an estate totally deplete its liquid assets before an interest expense can be considered necessary”); McKee v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-362 (court refused to disallow interest deduction even though estate could have qualified for § 6166 election to defer payment of estate tax, concluding that it would not “second guess the business judgments of the executors”); Estate of Graegin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-477. [↑](#footnote-ref-473)
474. 104 AFTR 2d 2009-7703 (W.D. Ark. 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-474)
475. 107 AFTR 2d 2011-1804 (D. Kan 2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-475)
476. T.C. Memo. 2011-255. In that case, the decedent had transferred a substantial part of his estate, including oil and gas businesses to a revocable trust. The decedent at his death exercised a power of appointment over an irrevocable trust that had been created by decedent’s father to appoint the assets into trusts almost identical to trusts created under the revocable trust. The irrevocable trust and the revocable trust had the same trustees and beneficiaries. The irrevocable trust had liquidity; the revocable trust (which was responsible to pay the estate tax) did not. [↑](#footnote-ref-476)
477. The 6.7% interest rate was the rate quoted by the banking department of one of the corporate co-trustee for a 15-year bullet loan. (At the time of the loan, the long term AFR was 5.02% and the prime rate was 8.25%.) [↑](#footnote-ref-477)
478. In fact, the revocable trust ended up being able to generate to over $16 million in cash within the first three years, but the note prohibited prepayment. The revocable trust did not expect to generate sufficient cash to repay the loan within three years. [↑](#footnote-ref-478)
479. Even though the lender and borrower trusts had the same trustees and beneficiaries, the loan still had economic substance because the parties were separate entities that had to be respected under state law. [↑](#footnote-ref-479)
480. The revocable trust could not meet its obligations without selling its illiquid assets at reduced prices. Because of the trustee’s fiduciary duty, the irrevocable trust could not merely purchase assets from the revocable trust without requiring a discount that third parties would apply. The terms of the loan were reasonable and the court refused to second guess the business judgments of the fiduciary acting in the best interests of the trust. The 15-year term was reasonable because of the volatile nature of the anticipated income. The interest rate was reasonable; using the AFR as the interest rate would have been unfair to the irrevocable trust because the AFR represents the appropriate interest rate for extremely low risk U.S. government obligations. The IRS complained that there were no negotiations over the rate, but the court said that the trustees had made a good-faith effort to select a reasonable interest rate and that “formal negotiations would have amounted to nothing more than playacting.” [↑](#footnote-ref-480)
481. The IRS argued that the loan might be prepaid and that there is no economic interest to enforce the clause prohibiting prepayment. The court found that prepayment would not occur because the two trusts had to look out for their own respective economic interests. If a prepayment benefited one trust it would be a financial detriment to the other. [↑](#footnote-ref-481)
482. T.C. Memo. 2012-81. Observe, this case did not involve a “Graegin” loan, discussed *infra* in Section XXI.B.5 of this outline, because the loan could be repaid at any time. Accordingly, the estate did not claim a deduction on the estate tax return for the interest that would accrue over the life of the loan. The issue was merely whether the interest that had accrued up to the time of trial could be deducted under §2053. [↑](#footnote-ref-482)
483. The IRS argued that the lender never intended to create a genuine debt because she never demanded repayment and because she benefitted from the estate being able to pay its estate taxes because otherwise she would have been liable for some of the estate taxes because of transferee liability. The court responded that she did not demand payment when the loan became due because that would have exhausted the estate’s funds and prevented the estate from being able to challenge the IRS’s estate tax determination. The court also agreed with the estate that the ex-wife’s benefiting from the estate’s payment of its taxes and did not mean that she did not mean to collect the loan.

     The IRS also argued that the estate never intended to repay the loan. The disagreed, believing the executor’s testimony that she intended to repay the loan when it was made but the estate financially deteriorated when the medical practice could not be sold as a going concern. [↑](#footnote-ref-483)
484. The IRS argued that the estate could have recovered from the ex-wife a portion of the estate tax liabilities, but the court stated that the estate did not have a right of contribution from her for estate taxes at the time they were due because the residuary estate value at that time was sufficient to pay the taxes. In addition, the IRS maintained that the estate could have sold its illiquid asses in time to pay the taxes. The court disagreed, finding that it would have had to sell the medical practice and its receivables at a deep discount. [↑](#footnote-ref-484)
485. The IRS believed the estate had not shown that it could pay the interest, but the court accepted the estate’s counter that based on other findings in the case, the estate taxes would be reduced to the point that it could pay the interest. [↑](#footnote-ref-485)
486. 133 T.C. 340 (2009). *See generally* Liss, *Estate of Black: When Is It ‘Necessary’ to Pay Estate Taxes With Borrowed Funds?*, 112 J. Tax’n (June 2010).

     The estate argued four reasons for allowing an interest deduction. (1) The executor exercised reasonable business judgment when he borrowed funds, (2) the FLP was not required to make a distribution or redeem a partnership interest from the estate, (3) the son was the managing partner and executor and owed fiduciary duties to both the estate and the partnership, and (4) the loan itself was a bona fide loan. The IRS argued that the loan was (1) unnecessary and (2) not bona fide (because the transaction had no economic effect other than to generate an estate tax deduction). [↑](#footnote-ref-486)
487. The court noted that the partnership agreement allowed modifications, and a modification permitting a distribution of stock to the partners or a partial redemption of the estate’s interest would not have violated the son's fiduciary duties, as managing partner, to any of the partners. The court reasoned further that the estate had no way to repay the loan other than actually receiving a distribution from or having its partnership interest redeemed by the partnership in return for the stock, which it would then use to discharge the debt. Instead, the partnerships sold the stock and loaned the sale proceeds to the estate. [↑](#footnote-ref-487)
488. The other cases cited by the taxpayer in which an interest deduction was allowed involved situations where the estate avoided a forced sale of illiquid assets or company stock. [↑](#footnote-ref-488)
489. John Porter (the attorney representing the estate) points out a business judgment problem with the redemption argument. The estate’s interest would be redeemed at market value, with a discount. A redemption in that fashion enhances the value of the other partners, and the executor often makes a business decision not to do that. John Porter's view is that the court in *Black* substituted its business judgment for that of the executor. [↑](#footnote-ref-489)
490. T.C. Memo. 2010-192. [↑](#footnote-ref-490)
491. In that situation, the decedent created a family limited partnership with 90% of his assets, and died 5 ½ years later. The estate borrowed funds from the FLP to pay federal and state estate taxes under a 10-year note with principal and all interest payable on maturity, with a prohibition against any prepayments. The stated interest rate was 1% over the prime rate and 3% more than the 15-year mortgage rate on the date of the note. The estate’s 99% interest in the FLP was pledged as security for the note. [↑](#footnote-ref-491)
492. The IRS rejected the notion that the estate could not require a distribution from the partnership since the estate possessed only a 99% assignee interest:

     “It seems clear that the same parties (closely related family members whose proportionate interests in the Estate are virtually identical to their proportionate interests in the partnership) stood on all sides of this transaction. Thus, the assets held in Partnership were readily available for the purposes of paying the federal estate tax. Rather, we believe that in view of the availability of the liquid assets to the Estate and its beneficiaries, and in view of the structure of the loan (10-year term with prepayment prohibited), the only reason the loan transaction was entered into was to obtain an ‘upfront’ estate tax deduction for the interest expense (an expense, which, as discussed below, is largely illusory.)” [↑](#footnote-ref-492)
493. The limitation of the deduction for amounts actually paid “ensures that the expense has a real economic impact on the amount ultimately passing to the estate beneficiaries.” In this case the interest payments have no economic effect on the beneficiaries. If the estate has any funds for making payments, the estate would make the payments to the FLP to pay the interest, which would proportionately increase the value of the beneficiaries’ interests in the FLP. More likely, the FLP will distribute assets to the estate, which will then repay those assets back to the FLP in payment of the loan. “Since the parties have virtually identical interests in the Estate and the partnership, there is no change in the relative net worth of these parties as a result of the loan transaction. Rather, other than the favorable tax treatment resulting from the transaction, it is difficult to see what benefit will be derived from this circular transfer of funds.”

     The IRS attempted to further support this argument by analogizing to income tax cases, where the courts declined to allow an income tax deduction for interest under similar circumstances involving circular transfers for making payments on purported loan transactions. [↑](#footnote-ref-493)
494. 1980-2 C.B. 278. [↑](#footnote-ref-494)
495. The Ruling actually involved interest payments on a §6166 payout rather than an extension under §6161. The law has since changed so that interest on a §6166 extensions is not deductible, but the interest rate is only 45% of the normal IRS rate on underpayments (effectively allowing the benefit of a deduction at what was then a 55% marginal rate) However, the Ruling still gives the IRS’s reasons for not allowing an “upfront” deduction for interest payments on payment extensions. [↑](#footnote-ref-495)
496. Various courts agreed with the IRS’s concerns, and refused to allow an upfront deduction of the estimated interest because of the fluctuating interest rate and the possibility of prepayment (or forced acceleration) of the deferred payments. Estate of Bailly v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 246, *modified*, 81 T.C. 949 (1983); Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, 1987 T.C. Memo. 8; Estate of Spillar v. Commissioner, 1985 T.C. Memo. 529. [↑](#footnote-ref-496)
497. T.C. Memo. 1988-477. *See generally* Harrison, *Borrowing to Pay Estate Tax*, Tr. & Ests. 46 (May 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-497)
498. *E.g.,* Ltr. Ruls. 200020011 (allows a current deduction for the projected interest payments after the loan is amended to provide that it cannot be prepaid and that upon default all interest that would have been owed throughout the loan term must be paid at the time of default); 199952039 (ten year note providing for annual interest payments with a balloon principal payment at the end of ten years); 199903038. [↑](#footnote-ref-498)
499. Therefore, if there is a default, the terms of the note would continue to apply, and interest would continue to run to the end of the term of the loan. [↑](#footnote-ref-499)
500. Technical Advice Memorandum 200513028 (refused to allow any interest deduction for amounts borrowed from a family limited partnership to pay estate taxes). TAM 200513028 is discussed in detail in Section XXI.B.3 of this outline *supra*. [↑](#footnote-ref-500)
501. *E.g.*, Estate of Murphy v. U.S., 104 AFTR 2d 2009-7703 (W.D. Ark. 2009); Keller v. U.S., 104 AFTR 2d 2009-6015 (S.D. Tex. August 20, 2009)($114 million borrowed after death from FLP on a 9-year note); Estate of Duncan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-255; Estate of Gilman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-286 (estate borrowed funds to pay (i) federal and state estate taxes, (ii) compensation to executors [who were also employees of the estate’s closely held business and the will specified that they were not to receive executor’s commissions but should continue to receive compensation from the business], and (iii) miscellaneous expenses; court concluded that loan was necessary because of estate’s illiquidity and allowed interest deduction through date the notes were due); *cf.* McKee v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-362 (court refused to disallow interest deduction even though estate could have qualified for § 6166 election to defer payment of estate tax, concluding that it would not “second guess the business judgments of the executors”). [↑](#footnote-ref-501)
502. *E.g.,* Estate of Black v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 340 (2009); Estate of Lasarzig v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-307 (court observed that no prior cases had allowed such deduction in a situation in which a taxpayer “seeks an extended delay (up to 20 years) so that a nonparty (family trusts of beneficiaries) can benefit from improved market conditions that may or may not occur”). [↑](#footnote-ref-502)
503. Joint Treasury, IRS 2012-2013 Priority Guidance Plan (released Nov. 19, 2012), available at <http://www.irs.gov/uac/Priority-Guidance-Plan> (“Guidance under §2053 regarding personal guarantees and the application of present value concepts in determining the deductible amount of expenses and claims against the estate”). [↑](#footnote-ref-503)